Commit 8b50b92f authored by Sean Christopherson's avatar Sean Christopherson Committed by Paolo Bonzini

KVM: VMX: Add a helper and macros to reduce boilerplate for sec exec ctls

Add a helper function and several wrapping macros to consolidate the
copy-paste code in vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control() for adjusting
controls that are dependent on guest CPUID bits.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: default avatarSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200925003011.21016-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
parent 7f3603b6
......@@ -4081,6 +4081,61 @@ u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
return exec_control;
}
/*
* Adjust a single secondary execution control bit to intercept/allow an
* instruction in the guest. This is usually done based on whether or not a
* feature has been exposed to the guest in order to correctly emulate faults.
*/
static inline void
vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 *exec_control,
u32 control, bool enabled, bool exiting)
{
/*
* If the control is for an opt-in feature, clear the control if the
* feature is not exposed to the guest, i.e. not enabled. If the
* control is opt-out, i.e. an exiting control, clear the control if
* the feature _is_ exposed to the guest, i.e. exiting/interception is
* disabled for the associated instruction. Note, the caller is
* responsible presetting exec_control to set all supported bits.
*/
if (enabled == exiting)
*exec_control &= ~control;
/*
* Update the nested MSR settings so that a nested VMM can/can't set
* controls for features that are/aren't exposed to the guest.
*/
if (nested) {
if (enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= control;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= ~control;
}
}
/*
* Wrapper macro for the common case of adjusting a secondary execution control
* based on a single guest CPUID bit, with a dedicated feature bit. This also
* verifies that the control is actually supported by KVM and hardware.
*/
#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, name, feat_name, ctrl_name, exiting) \
({ \
bool __enabled; \
\
if (cpu_has_vmx_##name()) { \
__enabled = guest_cpuid_has(&(vmx)->vcpu, \
X86_FEATURE_##feat_name); \
vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, \
SECONDARY_EXEC_##ctrl_name, __enabled, exiting); \
} \
})
/* More macro magic for ENABLE_/opt-in versus _EXITING/opt-out controls. */
#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, ENABLE_##uname, false)
#define vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname) \
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, exec_control, lname, uname, uname##_EXITING, true)
static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
......@@ -4130,33 +4185,12 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = xsaves_enabled;
if (!xsaves_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
if (nested) {
if (xsaves_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
}
vmx_adjust_secondary_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control,
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES,
xsaves_enabled, false);
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp()) {
bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
if (!rdtscp_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP;
if (nested) {
if (rdtscp_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP;
}
}
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, rdtscp, RDTSCP);
/*
* Expose INVPCID if and only if PCID is also exposed to the guest.
......@@ -4166,71 +4200,14 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
*/
if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PCID))
guest_cpuid_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_feature(vmx, &exec_control, invpcid, INVPCID);
if (cpu_has_vmx_invpcid()) {
/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
bool invpcid_enabled =
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
if (!invpcid_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
if (nested) {
if (invpcid_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
}
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_rdrand()) {
bool rdrand_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
if (rdrand_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
if (nested) {
if (rdrand_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
}
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_rdseed()) {
bool rdseed_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
if (rdseed_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
if (nested) {
if (rdseed_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
}
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_waitpkg()) {
bool waitpkg_enabled =
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
if (!waitpkg_enabled)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdrand, RDRAND);
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_exiting(vmx, &exec_control, rdseed, RDSEED);
if (nested) {
if (waitpkg_enabled)
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
else
vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
}
}
vmx_adjust_sec_exec_control(vmx, &exec_control, waitpkg, WAITPKG,
ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE, false);
vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
}
......
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