Commit 9b1bf12d authored by KOSAKI Motohiro's avatar KOSAKI Motohiro Committed by Linus Torvalds

signals: move cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct

Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it.  Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.

Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct.  It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent b8401150
......@@ -1083,14 +1083,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
*/
int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex))
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (likely(bprm->cred))
return 0;
mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
......@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
kfree(bprm);
......@@ -1119,13 +1119,13 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
*/
security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* PTRACE_ATTACH
*/
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
......
......@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
if (mutex_lock_killable(&task->cred_guard_mutex))
if (mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
return NULL;
mm = get_task_mm(task);
......@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
mmput(mm);
mm = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return mm;
}
......@@ -2354,14 +2354,14 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
goto out_free;
/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */
length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (length < 0)
goto out_free;
length = security_setprocattr(task,
(char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
(void*)page, count);
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
out:
......
......@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ extern struct fs_struct init_fs;
.running = 0, \
.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(sig.cputimer.lock), \
}, \
.cred_guard_mutex = \
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(sig.cred_guard_mutex), \
}
extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
......@@ -145,8 +147,6 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
.group_leader = &tsk, \
RCU_INIT_POINTER(.real_cred, &init_cred), \
RCU_INIT_POINTER(.cred, &init_cred), \
.cred_guard_mutex = \
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_guard_mutex), \
.comm = "swapper", \
.thread = INIT_THREAD, \
.fs = &init_fs, \
......
......@@ -626,6 +626,10 @@ struct signal_struct {
int oom_adj; /* OOM kill score adjustment (bit shift) */
int oom_score_adj; /* OOM kill score adjustment */
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace) */
};
/* Context switch must be unlocked if interrupts are to be enabled */
......@@ -1305,9 +1309,6 @@ struct task_struct {
* credentials (COW) */
const struct cred __rcu *cred; /* effective (overridable) subjective task
* credentials (COW) */
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace) */
struct cred *replacement_session_keyring; /* for KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT */
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
......
......@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline void tracehook_report_syscall_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, int step)
*
* Return %LSM_UNSAFE_* bits applied to an exec because of tracing.
*
* @task->cred_guard_mutex is held by the caller through the do_execve().
* @task->signal->cred_guard_mutex is held by the caller through the do_execve().
*/
static inline int tracehook_unsafe_exec(struct task_struct *task)
{
......
......@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
/*
* Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
* - The caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex
* - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
*/
struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
{
......@@ -384,8 +384,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
struct cred *new;
int ret;
mutex_init(&p->cred_guard_mutex);
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
......
......@@ -908,6 +908,8 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
sig->oom_adj = current->signal->oom_adj;
sig->oom_score_adj = current->signal->oom_score_adj;
mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
return 0;
}
......
......@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
* under ptrace.
*/
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_guard_mutex))
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
goto out;
task_lock(task);
......@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
unlock_tasklist:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
......
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