Commit b792e7f0 authored by Ben Hutchings's avatar Ben Hutchings Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

Documentation/module-signing.txt: Note need for version info if reusing a key

commit b8612e51 upstream.

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  If a module signing key is used for
multiple ABI-incompatible kernels, the modules need to include enough
version information to distinguish them.
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent fc77c4ad
...@@ -238,3 +238,9 @@ Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use ...@@ -238,3 +238,9 @@ Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use
the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The
private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept
in the root node of the kernel source tree. in the root node of the kernel source tree.
If you use the same private key to sign modules for multiple kernel
configurations, you must ensure that the module version information is
sufficient to prevent loading a module into a different kernel. Either
set CONFIG_MODVERSIONS=y or ensure that each configuration has a different
kernel release string by changing EXTRAVERSION or CONFIG_LOCALVERSION.
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