Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them to select
the hashing algorithm.  Without this, something like the following error
might get written to dmesg:

[   31.829322] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [32] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
[   31.829328] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [180] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
[   31.829330] Unsupported digest algo: 55

Where the 55 on the third line is OID__NR indicating an unknown OID.
Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-By: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

The module signing script (sign-file) used to be a wrapper around the
openssl program.  It has now been replaced by a C program that uses the
crypto library from the OpenSSL package meaning that the OpenSSL devel
packages are necessary to provide the devel library link and the header
files.

This would be openssl-devel on Fedora and libssl-dev on Debian.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

...so "git status" doesn't nag us about them.

Cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Merge tag 'modsign-pkcs7-20150814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into ra-next

Since commit 1329e8cc ("modsign: Extract signing cert from
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed"), the build system has carefully coped
with the signing key being specified as a relative path in either the
source or or the build trees.

However, the actual signing of modules has not worked if the filename
is relative to the source tree.

Fix that by moving the config_filename helper into scripts/Kbuild.include
so that it can be used from elsewhere, and then using it in the top-level
Makefile to find the signing key file.

Kill the intermediate $(MODPUBKEY) and $(MODSECKEY) variables too, while
we're at it. There's no need for them.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

We couldn't use if_changed for this before, because it didn't live in
the kernel/ directory so we couldn't add it to $(targets). It was easier
just to leave it as it was.

Now it's in the certs/ directory we can use if_changed, the same as we
do for the trusted certificate list.

Aside from making things consistent, this means we don't need to depend
explicitly on the include/config/module/sig/key.h file. And we also get
to automatically do the right thing and re-extract the cert if the user
does odd things like using a relative filename and then playing silly
buggers with adding/removing that file in both the source and object
trees. We always favour the one in the object tree if it exists, and
now we'll correctly re-extract the cert when it changes. Previously we'd
*only* re-extract the cert if the config option changed, even if the
actual file we're using did change.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Merge tag 'modsign-pkcs7-20150812-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next

Fix the following warning:

	scripts/sign-file.c: In function ‘main’:
	scripts/sign-file.c:188: warning: value computed is not used

whereby the result of BIO_ctrl() is cast inside of BIO_reset() to an
integer of a different size - which we're not checking but probably should.
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Add a MODULE_LICENSE() line to the PKCS#7 test key module to fix this
warning:

	WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in
	crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_test_key.o

Whilst we're at it, also add a module description.
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.
Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The revised sign-file program is no longer a script that wraps the openssl
program, but now rather a program that makes use of OpenSSL's crypto
library.  This means that to build the sign-file program, the kernel build
process now has a dependency on the OpenSSL development packages in
addition to OpenSSL itself.

Document this in Kconfig and in module-signing.txt.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature.  If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.

Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].

We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate.  To this end:

 (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
     signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
     that does not.

 (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
     Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
     rejected:

     (a) contentType.  This is checked to be an OID that matches the
     	 content type in the SignedData object.

     (b) messageDigest.  This must match the crypto digest of the data.

     (c) signingTime.  If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
     	 UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
     	 the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.

     (d) S/MIME capabilities.  We don't check the contents.

     (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info.  We don't check the contents.

     (f) Authenticode Statement Type.  We don't check the contents.

     The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing.  If the message is
     an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
     not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.

     The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
     to support kernels already signed by the pesign program.  This only
     affects kexec.  sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).

     The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
     if it contains more than one element in its set of values.

 (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
     restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:

     (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE

	 This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
	 forbids authattrs.  sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR.  We could be more
	 flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
	 content.

     (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE

	 This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
	 requires authattrs.  In future, this will require an attribute
	 holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.

     (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE

	 This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
	 allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.

     (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE

	 This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
	 and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
	 minimal set.  It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
	 an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
	 remove these).

     (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
     (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE

	 These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
	 when limiting the use of X.509 certs.

 (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
     the above options for testing purposes.  For example:

	echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
	keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7

     will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
     firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 into the pkey_id_type_name array.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Make the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder fill in a time64_t rather than a
struct tm to make comparison easier (unfortunately, this makes readable
display less easy) and export it so that it can be used by the PKCS#7 code
too.

Further, tighten up its parsing to reject invalid dates (eg. weird
characters, non-existent hour numbers) and unsupported dates (eg. timezones
other than 'Z' or dates earlier than 1970).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Fix up the dependencies somewhat too, while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

This is not required for the module signing key, although it doesn't do any
harm — it just means that any additional certs in the PEM file are also
trusted by the kernel.

But it does allow us to use the extract-cert tool for processing the extra
certs from CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS, instead of that horrid awk|base64
hack.

Also cope with being invoked with no input file, creating an empty output
file as a result.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Make sign-file use the OpenSSL CMS routines to generate a message to be
used as the signature blob instead of the PKCS#7 routines.  This allows us
to change how the matching X.509 certificate is selected.  With PKCS#7 the
only option is to match on the serial number and issuer fields of an X.509
certificate; with CMS, we also have the option of matching by subjectKeyId
extension.  The new behaviour is selected with the "-k" flag.

Without the -k flag specified, the output is pretty much identical to the
PKCS#7 output.

Whilst we're at it, don't include the S/MIME capability list in the message
as it's irrelevant to us.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com

Since CMS is an evolution of PKCS#7, with much of the ASN.1 being
compatible, add support for CMS signed-data messages also [RFC5652 sec 5].
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

The key identifiers fabricated from an X.509 certificate are currently:

 (A) Concatenation of serial number and issuer

 (B) Concatenation of subject and subjectKeyID (SKID)

When verifying one X.509 certificate with another, the AKID in the target
can be used to match the authoritative certificate.  The AKID can specify
the match in one or both of two ways:

 (1) Compare authorityCertSerialNumber and authorityCertIssuer from the AKID
     to identifier (A) above.

 (2) Compare keyIdentifier from the AKID plus the issuer from the target
     certificate to identifier (B) above.

When verifying a PKCS#7 message, the only available comparison is between
the IssuerAndSerialNumber field and identifier (A) above.

However, a subsequent patch adds CMS support.  Whilst CMS still supports a
match on IssuerAndSerialNumber as for PKCS#7, it also supports an
alternative - which is the SubjectKeyIdentifier field.  This is used to
match to an X.509 certificate on the SKID alone.  No subject information is
available to be used.

To this end change the fabrication of (B) above to be from the X.509 SKID
alone.  The AKID in keyIdentifier form then only matches on that and does
not include the issuer.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

We only support PKCS#7 signed-data [RFC2315 sec 9] content at the top level,
so reject anything else.  Further, check that the version numbers in
SignedData and SignerInfo are 1 in both cases.

Note that we don't restrict the inner content type.  In the PKCS#7 code we
don't parse the data attached there, but merely verify the signature over
it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

The keyrings mailing list has moved to keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Adds an ignore case for kernel tasks,
so that they can access all resources.

Since kernel worker threads are spawned with
floor label, they are severely restricted by
Smack policy. It is not an issue without onlycap,
as these processes also run with root,
so CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE kicks in. But with onlycap
turned on, there is no way to change the label
for these processes.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Let the user explicitly provide a file containing trusted keys, instead of
just automatically finding files matching *.x509 in the build tree and
trusting whatever we find. This really ought to be an *explicit*
configuration, and the build rules for dealing with the files were
fairly painful too.

Fix applied from James Morris that removes an '=' from a macro definition
in kernel/Makefile as this is a feature that only exists from GNU make 3.82
onwards.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The current rule for generating signing_key.priv and signing_key.x509 is
a classic example of a bad rule which has a tendency to break parallel
make. When invoked to create *either* target, it generates the other
target as a side-effect that make didn't predict.

So let's switch to using a single file signing_key.pem which contains
both key and certificate. That matches what we do in the case of an
external key specified by CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY anyway, so it's also
slightly cleaner.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Where an external PEM file or PKCS#11 URI is given, we can get the cert
from it for ourselves instead of making the user drop signing_key.x509
in place for us.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

This is only the key; the corresponding *cert* still needs to be in
$(topdir)/signing_key.x509. And there's no way to actually use this
from the build system yet.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

We don't want this in the Kconfig since it might then get exposed in
/proc/config.gz. So make it a parameter to Kbuild instead. This also
means we don't have to jump through hoops to strip quotes from it, as
we would if it was a config option.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a
data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with
the system keyring code as it's generic.  This makes it independent of module
config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>

system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h as it doesn't use
the one thing that exports.  Remove the inclusion.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Make the -d option (which currently isn't actually wired to anything) write
out the PKCS#7 message as per the -p option and then exit without either
modifying the source or writing out a compound file of the source, signature
and metadata.

This will be useful when firmware signature support is added
upstream as firmware will be left intact, and we'll only require
the signature file. The descriptor is implicit by file extension
and the file's own size.
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Move to using PKCS#7 messages as module signatures because:

 (1) We have to be able to support the use of X.509 certificates that don't
     have a subjKeyId set.  We're currently relying on this to look up the
     X.509 certificate in the trusted keyring list.

 (2) PKCS#7 message signed information blocks have a field that supplies the
     data required to match with the X.509 certificate that signed it.

 (3) The PKCS#7 certificate carries fields that specify the digest algorithm
     used to generate the signature in a standardised way and the X.509
     certificates specify the public key algorithm in a standardised way - so
     we don't need our own methods of specifying these.

 (4) We now have PKCS#7 message support in the kernel for signed kexec purposes
     and we can make use of this.

To make this work, the old sign-file script has been replaced with a program
that needs compiling in a previous patch.  The rules to build it are added
here.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Provide a utility that:

 (1) Digests a module using the specified hash algorithm (typically sha256).

     [The digest can be dumped into a file by passing the '-d' flag]

 (2) Generates a PKCS#7 message that:

     (a) Has detached data (ie. the module content).

     (b) Is signed with the specified private key.

     (c) Refers to the specified X.509 certificate.

     (d) Has an empty X.509 certificate list.

     [The PKCS#7 message can be dumped into a file by passing the '-p' flag]

 (3) Generates a signed module by concatenating the old module, the PKCS#7
     message, a descriptor and a magic string.  The descriptor contains the
     size of the PKCS#7 message and indicates the id_type as PKEY_ID_PKCS7.

 (4) Either writes the signed module to the specified destination or renames
     it over the source module.

This allows module signing to reuse the PKCS#7 handling code that was added
for PE file parsing for signed kexec.

Note that the utility is written in C and must be linked against the OpenSSL
crypto library.

Note further that I have temporarily dropped support for handling externally
created signatures until we can work out the best way to do those.  Hopefully,
whoever creates the signature can give me a PKCS#7 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

It is possible for a PKCS#7 message to have detached data.  However, to verify
the signatures on a PKCS#7 message, we have to be able to digest the data.
Provide a function to supply that data.  An error is given if the PKCS#7
message included embedded data.

This is used in a subsequent patch to supply the data to module signing where
the signature is in the form of a PKCS#7 message with detached data, whereby
the detached data is the module content that is signed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides
an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference
to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing
certificate.

If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the
certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well.  If
the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate,
EKEYREJECTED is returned.

This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and
serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier.  This is necessary as
we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates
that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>