- 21 Jul, 2016 33 commits
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Al Viro authored
commit d20cb71d upstream. In "NFSv4: Move dentry instantiation into the NFSv4-specific atomic open code" unconditional d_drop() after the ->open_context() had been removed. It had been correct for success cases (there ->open_context() itself had been doing dcache manipulations), but not for error ones. Only one of those (ENOENT) got a compensatory d_drop() added in that commit, but in fact it should've been done for all errors. As it is, the case of O_CREAT non-exclusive open on a hashed negative dentry racing with e.g. symlink creation from another client ended up with ->open_context() getting an error and proceeding to call nfs_lookup(). On a hashed dentry, which would've instantly triggered BUG_ON() in d_materialise_unique() (or, these days, its equivalent in d_splice_alias()). Tested-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 1ead852d upstream. Fix boot crash that triggers if this driver is built into a kernel and run on non-AMD systems. AMD northbridges users call amd_cache_northbridges() and it returns a negative value to signal that we weren't able to cache/detect any northbridges on the system. At least, it should do so as all its callers expect it to do so. But it does return a negative value only when kmalloc() fails. Fix it to return -ENODEV if there are no NBs cached as otherwise, amd_nb users like amd64_edac, for example, which relies on it to know whether it should load or not, gets loaded on systems like Intel Xeons where it shouldn't. Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466097230-5333-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5761BEB0.9000807@cybernetics.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Masami Hiramatsu authored
commit dcfc4724 upstream. Fix kprobe_fault_handler() to clear the TF (trap flag) bit of the flags register in the case of a fault fixup on single-stepping. If we put a kprobe on the instruction which caused a page fault (e.g. actual mov instructions in copy_user_*), that fault happens on the single-stepping buffer. In this case, kprobes resets running instance so that the CPU can retry execution on the original ip address. However, current code forgets to reset the TF bit. Since this fault happens with TF bit set for enabling single-stepping, when it retries, it causes a debug exception and kprobes can not handle it because it already reset itself. On the most of x86-64 platform, it can be easily reproduced by using kprobe tracer. E.g. # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo p copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+5 > kprobe_events # echo 1 > events/kprobes/enable And you'll see a kernel panic on do_debug(), since the debug trap is not handled by kprobes. To fix this problem, we just need to clear the TF bit when resetting running kprobe. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: systemtap@sourceware.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160611140648.25885.37482.stgit@devbox [ Updated the comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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H. Peter Anvin authored
commit 9c77679c upstream. For newer versions of Syslinux, we need ldlinux.c32 in addition to isolinux.bin to reside on the boot disk, so if the latter is found, copy it, too, to the isoimage tree. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Alan Stern authored
commit 7e8b3dfe upstream. The HOSTPC extension registers found in some EHCI implementations form a variable-length array, with one element for each port. Therefore the hostpc field in struct ehci_regs should be declared as a zero-length array, not a single-element array. This fixes a problem reported by UBSAN. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: Wilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de> Tested-by: Wilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Gavin Shan authored
commit 8a934efe upstream. In commit 8445a87f "powerpc/iommu: Remove the dependency on EEH struct in DDW mechanism", the PE address was replaced with the PCI config address in order to remove dependency on EEH. According to PAPR spec, firmware (pHyp or QEMU) should accept "xxBBSSxx" format PCI config address, not "xxxxBBSS" provided by the patch. Note that "BB" is PCI bus number and "SS" is the combination of slot and function number. This fixes the PCI address passed to DDW RTAS calls. Fixes: 8445a87f ("powerpc/iommu: Remove the dependency on EEH struct in DDW mechanism") Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Guilherme G. Piccoli authored
commit 8445a87f upstream. Commit 39baadbf ("powerpc/eeh: Remove eeh information from pci_dn") changed the pci_dn struct by removing its EEH-related members. As part of this clean-up, DDW mechanism was modified to read the device configuration address from eeh_dev struct. As a consequence, now if we disable EEH mechanism on kernel command-line for example, the DDW mechanism will fail, generating a kernel oops by dereferencing a NULL pointer (which turns to be the eeh_dev pointer). This patch just changes the configuration address calculation on DDW functions to a manual calculation based on pci_dn members instead of using eeh_dev-based address. No functional changes were made. This was tested on pSeries, both in PHyp and qemu guest. Fixes: 39baadbf ("powerpc/eeh: Remove eeh information from pci_dn") Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Jason Gunthorpe authored
commit 8c5122e4 upstream. When this code was reworked for IBoE support the order of assignments for the sl_tclass_flowlabel got flipped around resulting in TClass & FlowLabel being permanently set to 0 in the packet headers. This breaks IB routers that rely on these headers, but only affects kernel users - libmlx4 does this properly for user space. Fixes: fa417f7b ("IB/mlx4: Add support for IBoE") Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Martin Willi authored
commit 62397da5 upstream. A wmediumd that does not send this attribute causes a NULL pointer dereference, as the attribute is accessed even if it does not exist. The attribute was required but never checked ever since userspace frame forwarding has been introduced. The issue gets more problematic once we allow wmediumd registration from user namespaces. Fixes: 7882513b ("mac80211_hwsim driver support userspace frame tx/rx") Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Bob Copeland authored
commit fe7a7c57 upstream. Currently, the mesh paths associated with a nexthop station are cleaned up in the following code path: __sta_info_destroy_part1 synchronize_net() __sta_info_destroy_part2 -> cleanup_single_sta -> mesh_sta_cleanup -> mesh_plink_deactivate -> mesh_path_flush_by_nexthop However, there are a couple of problems here: 1) the paths aren't flushed at all if the MPM is running in userspace (e.g. when using wpa_supplicant or authsae) 2) there is no synchronize_rcu between removing the path and readers accessing the nexthop, which means the following race is possible: CPU0 CPU1 ~~~~ ~~~~ sta_info_destroy_part1() synchronize_net() rcu_read_lock() mesh_nexthop_resolve() mpath = mesh_path_lookup() [...] -> mesh_path_flush_by_nexthop() sta = rcu_dereference( mpath->next_hop) kfree(sta) access sta <-- CRASH Fix both of these by unconditionally flushing paths before destroying the sta, and by adding a synchronize_net() after path flush to ensure no active readers can still dereference the sta. Fixes this crash: [ 348.529295] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00020040 [ 348.530014] IP: [<f929245d>] ieee80211_mps_set_frame_flags+0x40/0xaa [mac80211] [ 348.530014] *pde = 00000000 [ 348.530014] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT [ 348.530014] Modules linked in: drbg ansi_cprng ctr ccm ppp_generic slhc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 8021q ] [ 348.530014] CPU: 0 PID: 20597 Comm: wget Tainted: G O 4.6.0-rc5-wt=V1 #1 [ 348.530014] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS 080016 11/07/2014 [ 348.530014] task: f64fa280 ti: f4f9c000 task.ti: f4f9c000 [ 348.530014] EIP: 0060:[<f929245d>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 [ 348.530014] EIP is at ieee80211_mps_set_frame_flags+0x40/0xaa [mac80211] [ 348.530014] EAX: f4ce63e0 EBX: 00000088 ECX: f3788416 EDX: 00020008 [ 348.530014] ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000088 EBP: f6409a4c ESP: f6409a40 [ 348.530014] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 348.530014] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00020040 CR3: 33190000 CR4: 00000690 [ 348.530014] Stack: [ 348.530014] 00000000 f4ce63e0 f5f9bd80 f6409a64 f9291d80 0000ce67 f5d51e00 f4ce63e0 [ 348.530014] f3788416 f6409a80 f9291dc1 f4ce8320 f4ce63e0 f5d51e00 f4ce63e0 f4ce8320 [ 348.530014] f6409a98 f9277f6f 00000000 00000000 0000007c 00000000 f6409b2c f9278dd1 [ 348.530014] Call Trace: [ 348.530014] [<f9291d80>] mesh_nexthop_lookup+0xbb/0xc8 [mac80211] [ 348.530014] [<f9291dc1>] mesh_nexthop_resolve+0x34/0xd8 [mac80211] [ 348.530014] [<f9277f6f>] ieee80211_xmit+0x92/0xc1 [mac80211] [ 348.530014] [<f9278dd1>] __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x807/0x83c [mac80211] [ 348.530014] [<c04df012>] ? sch_direct_xmit+0xd7/0x1b3 [ 348.530014] [<c022a8c6>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x5d/0x7b [ 348.530014] [<f956870c>] ? nf_nat_ipv4_out+0x4c/0xd0 [nf_nat_ipv4] [ 348.530014] [<f957e036>] ? iptable_nat_ipv4_fn+0xf/0xf [iptable_nat] [ 348.530014] [<c04c6f45>] ? netif_skb_features+0x14d/0x30a [ 348.530014] [<f9278e10>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa/0xe [mac80211] [ 348.530014] [<c04c769c>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1f8/0x267 [ 348.530014] [<c04c7261>] ? validate_xmit_skb.isra.120.part.121+0x10/0x253 [ 348.530014] [<c04defc6>] sch_direct_xmit+0x8b/0x1b3 [ 348.530014] [<c04c7a9c>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2c8/0x513 [ 348.530014] [<c04c7cfb>] dev_queue_xmit+0xa/0xc [ 348.530014] [<f91bfc7a>] batadv_send_skb_packet+0xd6/0xec [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<f91bfdc4>] batadv_send_unicast_skb+0x15/0x4a [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<f91b5938>] batadv_dat_send_data+0x27e/0x310 [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<f91c30b5>] ? batadv_tt_global_hash_find.isra.11+0x8/0xa [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<f91b63f3>] batadv_dat_snoop_outgoing_arp_request+0x208/0x23d [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<f91c0cd9>] batadv_interface_tx+0x206/0x385 [batman_adv] [ 348.530014] [<c04c769c>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1f8/0x267 [ 348.530014] [<c04c7261>] ? validate_xmit_skb.isra.120.part.121+0x10/0x253 [ 348.530014] [<c04defc6>] sch_direct_xmit+0x8b/0x1b3 [ 348.530014] [<c04c7a9c>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2c8/0x513 [ 348.530014] [<f80cbd2a>] ? igb_xmit_frame+0x57/0x72 [igb] [ 348.530014] [<c04c7cfb>] dev_queue_xmit+0xa/0xc [ 348.530014] [<f843a326>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xeb/0xfb [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a35f>] br_forward_finish+0x29/0x74 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a23b>] ? deliver_clone+0x3b/0x3b [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a714>] __br_forward+0x89/0xe7 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a336>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xfb/0xfb [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a234>] deliver_clone+0x34/0x3b [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a68b>] ? br_flood+0x95/0x95 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a66d>] br_flood+0x77/0x95 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a809>] br_flood_forward+0x13/0x1a [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843a68b>] ? br_flood+0x95/0x95 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843b877>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x392/0x3db [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<c04e9b2b>] ? nf_iterate+0x2b/0x6b [ 348.530014] [<f843baa6>] br_handle_frame+0x1e6/0x240 [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<f843b4e5>] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x6a/0x6a [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<c04c4ba0>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x43a/0x66b [ 348.530014] [<f843b8c0>] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3db/0x3db [bridge] [ 348.530014] [<c023cea4>] ? resched_curr+0x19/0x37 [ 348.530014] [<c0240707>] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0xbf/0xfe [ 348.530014] [<c0255dec>] ? ktime_get_with_offset+0x5c/0xfc [ 348.530014] [<c04c4fc1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x47/0x55 [ 348.530014] [<c04c57ba>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x40/0x5a [ 348.530014] [<c04c61ef>] napi_gro_receive+0x3a/0x94 [ 348.530014] [<f80ce8d5>] igb_poll+0x6fd/0x9ad [igb] [ 348.530014] [<c0242bd8>] ? swake_up_locked+0x14/0x26 [ 348.530014] [<c04c5d29>] net_rx_action+0xde/0x250 [ 348.530014] [<c022a743>] __do_softirq+0x8a/0x163 [ 348.530014] [<c022a6b9>] ? __hrtimer_tasklet_trampoline+0x19/0x19 [ 348.530014] [<c021100f>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x26/0x2c [ 348.530014] <IRQ> [ 348.530014] [<c022a957>] irq_exit+0x31/0x6f [ 348.530014] [<c0210eb2>] do_IRQ+0x8d/0xa0 [ 348.530014] [<c058152c>] common_interrupt+0x2c/0x40 [ 348.530014] Code: e7 8c 00 66 81 ff 88 00 75 12 85 d2 75 0e b2 c3 b8 83 e9 29 f9 e8 a7 5f f9 c6 eb 74 66 81 e3 8c 005 [ 348.530014] EIP: [<f929245d>] ieee80211_mps_set_frame_flags+0x40/0xaa [mac80211] SS:ESP 0068:f6409a40 [ 348.530014] CR2: 0000000000020040 [ 348.530014] ---[ end trace 48556ac26779732e ]--- [ 348.530014] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 348.530014] Kernel Offset: disabled Reported-by: Fred Veldini <fred.veldini@gmail.com> Tested-by: Fred Veldini <fred.veldini@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Andrew Goodbody authored
commit f3eec0cf upstream. shared_fifo endpoints would only get a previous tx state cleared out, the rx state was only cleared for non shared_fifo endpoints Change this so that the rx state is cleared for all endpoints. This addresses an issue that resulted in rx packets being dropped silently. Signed-off-by: Andrew Goodbody <andrew.goodbody@cambrionix.com> Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Andrew Goodbody authored
commit 7b2c17f8 upstream. Ensure that the endpoint is stopped by clearing REQPKT before clearing DATAERR_NAKTIMEOUT before rotating the queue on the dedicated bulk endpoint. This addresses an issue where a race could result in the endpoint receiving data before it was reprogrammed resulting in a warning about such data from musb_rx_reinit before it was thrown away. The data thrown away was a valid packet that had been correctly ACKed which meant the host and device got out of sync. Signed-off-by: Andrew Goodbody <andrew.goodbody@cambrionix.com> Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Hans de Goede authored
commit 32cb0b37 upstream. The Acer C120 LED Projector is a USB-3 connected pico projector which takes both its power and video data from USB-3. In combination with some hubs this device does not play well with lpm, so disable lpm for it. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Feng Tang authored
[ Upstream commit 881d0327 ] Note: This is a verified backported patch for stable 4.4 kernel, and it could also be applied to 4.3/4.2/4.1/3.18/3.16 There is a problem with alx devices, that the network link will be lost in 1-5 minutes after the device is up. >From debugging without datasheet, we found the error always happen when the DMA RX address is set to 0x....fc0, which is very likely to be a HW/silicon problem. This patch will apply rx skb with 64 bytes longer space, and if the allocated skb has a 0x...fc0 address, it will use skb_resever(skb, 64) to advance the address, so that the RX overflow can be avoided. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70761Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Tested-by: Ole Lukoie <olelukoie@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Tom Goff authored
[ Upstream commit 70a0dec4 ] This fixes wrong-interface signaling on 32-bit platforms for entries created when jiffies > 2^31 + MFC_ASSERT_THRESH. Signed-off-by: Tom Goff <thomas.goff@ll.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Simon Horman authored
[ Upstream commit d5d8760b ] Since 32b8a8e5 ("sit: add IPv4 over IPv4 support") ipip6_err() may be called for packets whose IP protocol is IPPROTO_IPIP as well as those whose IP protocol is IPPROTO_IPV6. In the case of IPPROTO_IPIP packets the correct protocol value is not passed to ipv4_update_pmtu() or ipv4_redirect(). This patch resolves this problem by using the IP protocol of the packet rather than a hard-coded value. This appears to be consistent with the usage of the protocol of a packet by icmp_socket_deliver() the caller of ipip6_err(). I was able to exercise the redirect case by using a setup where an ICMP redirect was received for the destination of the encapsulated packet. However, it appears that although incorrect the protocol field is not used in this case and thus no problem manifests. On inspection it does not appear that a problem will manifest in the fragmentation needed/update pmtu case either. In short I believe this is a cosmetic fix. None the less, the use of IPPROTO_IPV6 seems wrong and confusing. Reviewed-by: Dinan Gunawardena <dinan.gunawardena@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Linus Walleij authored
commit 19ced623 upstream. The hash buffer is really HASH_BLOCK_SIZE bytes, someone must have thought that memmove takes n*u32 words by mistake. Tests work as good/bad as before after this patch. Cc: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> Reported-by: David Binderman <linuxdev.baldrick@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit d7591f0c upstream The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Bernhard Thaler authored
commit d26e2c9f upstream. This partially reverts commit 1086bbe9 ("netfilter: ensure number of counters is >0 in do_replace()") in net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c. Setting rules with ebtables does not work any more with 1086bbe9 place. There is an error message and no rules set in the end. e.g. ~# ebtables -t nat -A POSTROUTING --src 12:34:56:78:9a:bc -j DROP Unable to update the kernel. Two possible causes: 1. Multiple ebtables programs were executing simultaneously. The ebtables userspace tool doesn't by default support multiple ebtables programs running Reverting the ebtables part of 1086bbe9 makes this work again. Signed-off-by: Bernhard Thaler <bernhard.thaler@wvnet.at> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 09d96860 upstream. This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix. Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path. For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies. While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case. Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync. At a high level 32 bit compat works like this: 1- initial pass over blob: validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.) 2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to contain the translated ruleset 3- second pass over original blob: for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc). 4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps) 5-first pass over translated blob: call the checkentry function of all matches and targets. The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement. In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name . This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks. This has two drawbacks: 1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets. 2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target. THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code. iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002 -A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003 shows no noticeable differences in restore times: old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s 64bit: 0m25.674s Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Dave Jones authored
commit 1086bbe9 upstream. After improving setsockopt() coverage in trinity, I started triggering vmalloc failures pretty reliably from this code path: warn_alloc_failed+0xe9/0x140 __vmalloc_node_range+0x1be/0x270 vzalloc+0x4b/0x50 __do_replace+0x52/0x260 [ip_tables] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x15d/0x1d0 [ip_tables] nf_setsockopt+0x65/0x90 ip_setsockopt+0x61/0xa0 raw_setsockopt+0x16/0x60 sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0 It turns out we don't validate that the num_counters field in the struct we pass in from userspace is initialized. The same problem also exists in ebtables, arptables, ipv6, and the compat variants. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 0188346f upstream. Always returned 0. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 329a0807 upstream. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 7d3f843e upstream. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 8dddd327 upstream. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 7b7eba0f upstream. Quoting John Stultz: In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that /proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty. Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the: if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the offset + standard_target struct size. next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members of ip(6)t_entry struct). This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding. Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Fixes: 7ed2abdd ("netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size too") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 13631bfc upstream. Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size. The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit ce683e5f upstream. We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 7ed2abdd upstream. We have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict. The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated. Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob. Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit fc1221b3 upstream. 32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit a08e4e19 upstream. The target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit aa412ba2 upstream. Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob or a normal one. Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry, compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit 7d35812c upstream. Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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- 18 Jul, 2016 4 commits
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Florian Westphal authored
commit f24e230d upstream. Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Base chains enforce absolute verdict. User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return, xtables userspace adds them automatically. But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Al Viro authored
commit 3d56c25e upstream. Ascend-to-parent logics in d_walk() depends on all encountered child dentries not getting freed without an RCU delay. Unfortunately, in quite a few cases it is not true, with hard-to-hit oopsable race as the result. Fortunately, the fix is simiple; right now the rule is "if it ever been hashed, freeing must be delayed" and changing it to "if it ever had a parent, freeing must be delayed" closes that hole and covers all cases the old rule used to cover. Moreover, pipes and sockets remain _not_ covered, so we do not introduce RCU delay in the cases which are the reason for having that delay conditional in the first place. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Prasun Maiti authored
commit 3d5fdff4 upstream. iwpriv app uses iw_point structure to send data to Kernel. The iw_point structure holds a pointer. For compatibility Kernel converts the pointer as required for WEXT IOCTLs (SIOCIWFIRST to SIOCIWLAST). Some drivers may use iw_handler_def.private_args to populate iwpriv commands instead of iw_handler_def.private. For those case, the IOCTLs from SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV to SIOCIWLASTPRIV will follow the path ndo_do_ioctl(). Accordingly when the filled up iw_point structure comes from 32 bit iwpriv to 64 bit Kernel, Kernel will not convert the pointer and sends it to driver. So, the driver may get the invalid data. The pointer conversion for the IOCTLs (SIOCIWFIRSTPRIV to SIOCIWLASTPRIV), which follow the path ndo_do_ioctl(), is mandatory. This patch adds pointer conversion from 32 bit to 64 bit and vice versa, if the ioctl comes from 32 bit iwpriv to 64 bit Kernel. Signed-off-by: Prasun Maiti <prasunmaiti87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ujjal Roy <royujjal@gmail.com> Tested-by: Dibyajyoti Ghosh <dibyajyotig@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Jeff Mahoney authored
commit f0fe970d upstream. There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems that don't offer support natively. CVE-2016-1583 Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> [tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Henry Jensen <hjensen@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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- 12 Jul, 2016 3 commits
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Helge Deller authored
commit 8b78f260 upstream. One of the debian buildd servers had this crash in the syslog without any other information: Unaligned handler failed, ret = -2 clock_adjtime (pid 22578): Unaligned data reference (code 28) CPU: 1 PID: 22578 Comm: clock_adjtime Tainted: G E 4.5.0-2-parisc64-smp #1 Debian 4.5.4-1 task: 000000007d9960f8 ti: 00000001bde7c000 task.ti: 00000001bde7c000 YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI PSW: 00001000000001001111100000001111 Tainted: G E r00-03 000000ff0804f80f 00000001bde7c2b0 00000000402d2be8 00000001bde7c2b0 r04-07 00000000409e1fd0 00000000fa6f7fff 00000001bde7c148 00000000fa6f7fff r08-11 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 00000000fac9bb7b 000000000002b4d4 r12-15 000000000015241c 000000000015242c 000000000000002d 00000000fac9bb7b r16-19 0000000000028800 0000000000000001 0000000000000070 00000001bde7c218 r20-23 0000000000000000 00000001bde7c210 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 r24-27 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001bde7c148 00000000409e1fd0 r28-31 0000000000000001 00000001bde7c320 00000001bde7c350 00000001bde7c218 sr00-03 0000000001200000 0000000001200000 0000000000000000 0000000001200000 sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000402d2e84 00000000402d2e88 IIR: 0ca0d089 ISR: 0000000001200000 IOR: 00000000fa6f7fff CPU: 1 CR30: 00000001bde7c000 CR31: ffffffffffffffff ORIG_R28: 00000002369fe628 IAOQ[0]: compat_get_timex+0x2dc/0x3c0 IAOQ[1]: compat_get_timex+0x2e0/0x3c0 RP(r2): compat_get_timex+0x40/0x3c0 Backtrace: [<00000000402d4608>] compat_SyS_clock_adjtime+0x40/0xc0 [<0000000040205024>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x14 This means the userspace program clock_adjtime called the clock_adjtime() syscall and then crashed inside the compat_get_timex() function. Syscalls should never crash programs, but instead return EFAULT. The IIR register contains the executed instruction, which disassebles into "ldw 0(sr3,r5),r9". This load-word instruction is part of __get_user() which tried to read the word at %r5/IOR (0xfa6f7fff). This means the unaligned handler jumped in. The unaligned handler is able to emulate all ldw instructions, but it fails if it fails to read the source e.g. because of page fault. The following program reproduces the problem: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/mman.h> int main(void) { /* allocate 8k */ char *ptr = mmap(NULL, 2*4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); /* free second half (upper 4k) and make it invalid. */ munmap(ptr+4096, 4096); /* syscall where first int is unaligned and clobbers into invalid memory region */ /* syscall should return EFAULT */ return syscall(__NR_clock_adjtime, 0, ptr+4095); } To fix this issue we simply need to check if the faulting instruction address is in the exception fixup table when the unaligned handler failed. If it is, call the fixup routine instead of crashing. While looking at the unaligned handler I found another issue as well: The target register should not be modified if the handler was unsuccessful. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Thomas Huth authored
commit 8dd75ccb upstream. We are already using the privileged versions of MMCR0, MMCR1 and MMCRA in the kernel, so for MMCR2, we should better use the privileged versions, too, to be consistent. Fixes: 240686c1 ("powerpc: Initialise PMU related regs on Power8") Suggested-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Thomas Huth authored
commit d23fac2b upstream. The SIAR and SDAR registers are available twice, one time as SPRs 780 / 781 (unprivileged, but read-only), and one time as the SPRs 796 / 797 (privileged, but read and write). The Linux kernel code currently uses the unprivileged SPRs - while this is OK for reading, writing to that register of course does not work. Since the KVM code tries to write to this register, too (see the mtspr in book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S), the contents of this register sometimes get lost for the guests, e.g. during migration of a VM. To fix this issue, simply switch to the privileged SPR numbers instead. Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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