- 11 Mar, 2020 3 commits
-
-
Suraj Jitindar Singh authored
commit 7c990728 upstream. During an online resize an array of s_flex_groups structures gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array and this memory has been reused then this can lead to an invalid memory access. The s_flex_group array has been converted into an array of pointers rather than an array of structures. This is to ensure that the information contained in the structures cannot get out of sync during a resize due to an accessor updating the value in the old structure after it has been copied but before the array pointer is updated. Since the structures them- selves are no longer copied but only the pointers to them this case is mitigated. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-4-tytso@mit.eduSigned-off-by:
Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.4.x Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.9.x Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-
Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 1d0c3924 upstream. During an online resize an array of pointers to buffer heads gets replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a racing block allocation or deallocation which uses the old array, and the old array has gotten reused this can lead to a GPF or some other random kernel memory getting modified. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-2-tytso@mit.eduReported-by:
-
Johannes Berg authored
commit 8188a18e upstream We don't handle failures in the rb_allocator workqueue allocation correctly. To fix that, move the code earlier so the cleanup is easier and we don't have to undo all the interrupt allocations in this case. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> [Ajay: Rewrote this patch for v4.9.y, as 4.9.y codebase is different from mainline] Signed-off-by:
Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
-
- 28 Feb, 2020 37 commits
-
-
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
-
Nathan Chancellor authored
commit 38032473 upstream. Clang warns: In file included from ../arch/s390/purgatory/purgatory.c:10: In file included from ../include/linux/kexec.h:18: In file included from ../include/linux/crash_core.h:6: In file included from ../include/linux/elfcore.h:5: In file included from ../include/linux/user.h:1: In file included from ../arch/s390/include/asm/user.h:11: ../arch/s390/include/asm/page.h:45:6: warning: converting the result of '<<' to a boolean always evaluates to false [-Wtautological-constant-compare] if (PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY) ^ ../arch/s390/include/asm/page.h:23:44: note: expanded from macro 'PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY' #define PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY (PAGE_DEFAULT_ACC << 4) ^ 1 warning generated. Explicitly compare this against zero to silence the warning as it is intended to be used in a boolean context. Fixes: de3fa841 ("s390/mm: fix compile for PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY != 0") Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/860 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214064207.10381-1-natechancellor@gmail.comAcked-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 8645e56a upstream. xen_maybe_preempt_hcall() is called from the exception entry point xen_do_hypervisor_callback with interrupts disabled. _cond_resched() evades the might_sleep() check in cond_resched() which would have caught that and schedule_debug() unfortunately lacks a check for irqs_disabled(). Enable interrupts around the call and use cond_resched() to catch future issues. Fixes: fdfd811d ("x86/xen: allow privcmd hypercalls to be preempted") Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/878skypjrh.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.deReviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Prabhakar Kushwaha authored
commit 10a663a1 upstream. device_shutdown() called from reboot or power_shutdown expect all devices to be shutdown. Same is true for even ahci pci driver. As no ahci shutdown function is implemented, the ata subsystem always remains alive with DMA & interrupt support. File system related calls should not be honored after device_shutdown(). So defining ahci pci driver shutdown to freeze hardware (mask interrupt, stop DMA engine and free DMA resources). Signed-off-by:
Prabhakar Kushwaha <pkushwaha@marvell.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
-
Cong Wang authored
commit 8d0015a7 upstream. The user-specified hashtable size is unbound, this could easily lead to an OOM or a hung task as we hold the global mutex while allocating and initializing the new hashtable. Add a max value to cap both cfg->size and cfg->max, as suggested by Florian. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+adf6c6c2be1c3a718121@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
commit dc749779 upstream. snd_seq_check_queue() passes the current tick and time of the given queue as a pointer to snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(), but those might be updated concurrently by the seq timer update. Fix it by retrieving the current tick and time via the proper helper functions at first, and pass those values to snd_seq_prioq_cell_out() later in the loops. snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time() takes a new argument and adjusts with the current system time only when it's requested so; this update isn't needed for snd_seq_check_queue(), as it's called either from the interrupt handler or right after queuing. Also, snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick() is changed to read the value in the spinlock for the concurrency, too. Reported-by: syzbot+fd5e0eaa1a32999173b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-3-tiwai@suse.deSigned-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
commit bb51e669 upstream. The queue flags are represented in bit fields and the concurrent access may result in unexpected results. Although the current code should be mostly OK as it's only reading a field while writing other fields as KCSAN reported, it's safer to cover both with a proper spinlock protection. This patch fixes the possible concurrent read by protecting with q->owner_lock. Also the queue owner field is protected as well since it's the field to be protected by the lock itself. Reported-by: syzbot+65c6c92d04304d0a8efc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+e60ddfa48717579799dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-2-tiwai@suse.deSigned-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
commit dfa9a5ef upstream. The rawmidi state flags (opened, append, active_sensing) are stored in bit fields that can be potentially racy when concurrently accessed without any locks. Although the current code should be fine, there is also no any real benefit by keeping the bitfields for this kind of short number of members. This patch changes those bit fields flags to the simple bool fields. There should be no size increase of the snd_rawmidi_substream by this change. Reported-by: syzbot+576cc007eb9f2c968200@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-4-tiwai@suse.deSigned-off-by:
-
Aditya Pakki authored
commit 2c2a7552 upstream. In crypt_scatterlist, if the crypt_stat argument is not set up correctly, the kernel crashes. Instead, by returning an error code upstream, the error is handled safely. The issue is detected via a static analysis tool written by us. Fixes: 237fead6 (ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig) Signed-off-by:
Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Carpenter authored
commit b7db5810 upstream. When we call kobject_put() and it's the last reference to the kobject then it calls gb_audio_module_release() and frees module. We dereference "module" on the next line which is a use after free. Fixes: c77f85bb ("greybus: audio: Fix incorrect counting of 'ida'") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Reviewed-by:
Vaibhav Agarwal <vaibhav.sr@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200205123217.jreendkyxulqsool@kili.mountainSigned-off-by:
-
Jack Pham authored
commit c724417b upstream. SuperSpeedPlus peripherals must report their bMaxPower of the configuration descriptor in units of 8mA as per the USB 3.2 specification. The current switch statement in encode_bMaxPower() only checks for USB_SPEED_SUPER but not USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS so the latter falls back to USB 2.0 encoding which uses 2mA units. Replace the switch with a simple if/else. Fixes: eae5820b ("usb: gadget: composite: Write SuperSpeedPlus config descriptors") Signed-off-by:
Jack Pham <jackp@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Bart Van Assche authored
commit 807b9515 upstream. Since commit e9d3009c introduced a regression and since the fix for that regression was not perfect, revert this commit. Link: https://marc.info/?l=target-devel&m=158157054906195 Cc: Rahul Kundu <rahul.kundu@chelsio.com> Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reported-by:
Dakshaja Uppalapati <dakshaja@chelsio.com> Fixes: e9d3009c ("scsi: target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a session") Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Bart Van Assche authored
commit 76261ada upstream. Since commit 04060db4 introduces soft lockups when toggling network interfaces, revert it. Link: https://marc.info/?l=target-devel&m=158157054906196 Cc: Rahul Kundu <rahul.kundu@chelsio.com> Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com> Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Reported-by:
-
Filipe Manana authored
commit e75fd33b upstream. In btrfs_wait_ordered_range() once we find an ordered extent that has finished with an error we exit the loop and don't wait for any other ordered extents that might be still in progress. All the users of btrfs_wait_ordered_range() expect that there are no more ordered extents in progress after that function returns. So past fixes such like the ones from the two following commits: ff612ba7 ("btrfs: fix panic during relocation after ENOSPC before writeback happens") 28aeeac1 ("Btrfs: fix panic when starting bg cache writeout after IO error") don't work when there are multiple ordered extents in the range. Fix that by making btrfs_wait_ordered_range() wait for all ordered extents even after it finds one that had an error. Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/228#issuecomment-569777554 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Miaohe Lin authored
commit 23520b2d upstream. When pv_eoi_get_user() fails, 'val' may remain uninitialized and the return value of pv_eoi_get_pending() becomes random. Fix the issue by initializing the variable. Reviewed-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Oliver Upton authored
commit 35a57134 upstream. Consult the 'unconditional IO exiting' and 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution controls when checking instruction interception. If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 1, check the instruction access against the IO bitmaps to determine if the instruction causes a VM-exit. Signed-off-by:
Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Oliver Upton authored
commit e71237d3 upstream. Checks against the IO bitmap are useful for both instruction emulation and VM-exit reflection. Refactor the IO bitmap checks into a helper function. Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Biggers authored
commit cb85f4d2 upstream. If EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is set on an inode while ext4_writepages() is running on it, the following warning in ext4_add_complete_io() can be hit: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at fs/ext4/page-io.c:234 ext4_put_io_end_defer+0xf0/0x120 Here's a minimal reproducer (not 100% reliable) (root isn't required): while true; do sync done & while true; do rm -f file touch file chattr -e file echo X >> file chattr +e file done The problem is that in ext4_writepages(), ext4_should_dioread_nolock() (which only returns true on extent-based files) is checked once to set the number of reserved journal credits, and also again later to select the flags for ext4_map_blocks() and copy the reserved journal handle to ext4_io_end::handle. But if EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is being concurrently set, the first check can see dioread_nolock disabled while the later one can see it enabled, causing the reserved handle to unexpectedly be NULL. Since changing EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is uncommon, and there may be other races related to doing so as well, fix this by synchronizing changing EXT4_EXTENTS_FL with ext4_writepages() via the existing s_writepages_rwsem (previously called s_journal_flag_rwsem). This was originally reported by syzbot without a reproducer at https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2202a584a00fffd19fbf, but now that dioread_nolock is the default I also started seeing this when running syzkaller locally. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-3-ebiggers@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+2202a584a00fffd19fbf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6b523df4 ("ext4: use transaction reservation for extent conversion in ext4_end_io") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Biggers authored
commit bbd55937 upstream. In preparation for making s_journal_flag_rwsem synchronize ext4_writepages() with changes to both the EXTENTS and JOURNAL_DATA flags (rather than just JOURNAL_DATA as it does currently), rename it to s_writepages_rwsem. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-2-ebiggers@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
commit 9db176bc upstream. When CONFIG_QFMT_V2 is configured as a module, the test in ext4_feature_set_ok() fails and so mount of filesystems with quota or project features fails. Fix the test to use IS_ENABLED macro which works properly even for modules. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221100835.9332-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: d65d87a0 ("ext4: improve explanation of a mount failure caused by a misconfigured kernel") Signed-off-by:
-
Shijie Luo authored
commit 9424ef56 upstream. We tested a soft lockup problem in linux 4.19 which could also be found in linux 5.x. When dir inode takes up a large number of blocks, and if the directory is growing when we are searching, it's possible the restart branch could be called many times, and the do while loop could hold cpu a long time. Here is the call trace in linux 4.19. [ 473.756186] Call trace: [ 473.756196] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198 [ 473.756199] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 473.756205] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc [ 473.756210] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8 [ 473.756215] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358 [ 473.756217] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8 [ 473.756222] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58 [ 473.756226] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248 [ 473.756231] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50 [ 473.756234] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0 [ 473.756236] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150 [ 473.756238] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 [ 473.756286] ext4_es_lookup_extent+0xdc/0x258 [ext4] [ 473.756310] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4] [ 473.756333] ext4_getblk+0x6c/0x1d0 [ext4] [ 473.756356] ext4_bread_batch+0x7c/0x1f8 [ext4] [ 473.756379] ext4_find_entry+0x124/0x3f8 [ext4] [ 473.756402] ext4_lookup+0x8c/0x258 [ext4] [ 473.756407] __lookup_hash+0x8c/0xe8 [ 473.756411] filename_create+0xa0/0x170 [ 473.756413] do_mkdirat+0x6c/0x140 [ 473.756415] __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x28/0x38 [ 473.756419] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130 [ 473.756421] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 473.756423] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 485.755156] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 22s! [tmp:5149] Add cond_resched() to avoid soft lockup and to provide a better system responding. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200215080206.13293-1-luoshijie1@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Qian Cai authored
commit 35df4299 upstream. EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN, BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_write_end [ext4] / ext4_writepages [ext4] write to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 49268 on cpu 127: ext4_write_end+0x4e3/0x750 [ext4] ext4_update_i_disksize at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3032 (inlined by) ext4_update_inode_size at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3046 (inlined by) ext4_write_end at fs/ext4/inode.c:1287 generic_perform_write+0x208/0x2a0 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4] ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4] new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0 __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0 vfs_write+0x103/0x260 ksys_write+0x9d/0x130 __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe read to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 24872 on cpu 37: ext4_writepages+0x10ac/0x1d00 [ext4] mpage_map_and_submit_extent at fs/ext4/inode.c:2468 (inlined by) ext4_writepages at fs/ext4/inode.c:2772 do_writepages+0x5e/0x130 __writeback_single_inode+0xeb/0xb20 writeback_sb_inodes+0x429/0x900 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150 wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x870 wb_workfn+0x6b4/0x960 process_one_work+0x54c/0xbe0 worker_thread+0x80/0x650 kthread+0x1e0/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 37 PID: 24872 Comm: kworker/u261:2 Tainted: G W O L 5.5.0-next-20200204+ #5 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Since only the read is operating as lockless (outside of the "i_data_sem"), load tearing could introduce a logic bug. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE() for the read and WRITE_ONCE() for the write. Signed-off-by:
Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581085751-31793-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by:
-
Jann Horn authored
[ Upstream commit 6ab40511 ] Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads. As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap memory disclosure or oopses. This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf module can be autoloaded. Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627 CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1 [...] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x85 print_address_description+0x6a/0x260 kasan_report+0x254/0x370 ? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf] [...] Allocated by task 4627: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables] [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048 The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0) [...] ================================================================== Fixes: e6f30c73 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match") Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Paolo Bonzini authored
[ Upstream commit 07721fee ] vmx_check_intercept is not yet fully implemented. To avoid emulating instructions disallowed by the L1 hypervisor, refuse to emulate instructions by default. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [Made commit, added commit msg - Oliver] Signed-off-by:
-
Alexander Potapenko authored
[ Upstream commit 305e519c ] Walter Wu has reported a potential case in which init_stack_slab() is called after stack_slabs[STACK_ALLOC_MAX_SLABS - 1] has already been initialized. In that case init_stack_slab() will overwrite stack_slabs[STACK_ALLOC_MAX_SLABS], which may result in a memory corruption. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200218102950.260263-1-glider@google.com Fixes: cd11016e ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB") Signed-off-by:
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reported-by:
Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 6cd1ed50 ] We need to make sure vc_cons[i].d is not NULL after grabbing console_lock(), or risk a crash. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000068: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000340-0x0000000000000347] CPU: 1 PID: 19462 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883 Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <42> 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40 RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000 RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340 RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f FS: 00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tty_ioctl+0xa37/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline] ksys_ioctl+0x123/0x180 fs/ioctl.c:763 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x45b399 Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f7d13c11c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d13c126d4 RCX: 000000000045b399 RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 000000000000560a RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000666 R14: 00000000004c7f04 R15: 000000000075bf2c Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 80970faf7a67eb77 ]--- RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883 Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <42> 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40 RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000 RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340 RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f FS: 00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210190721.200418-1-edumazet@google.comSigned-off-by:
-
Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 1b3bce4d ] Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
Miaohe Lin authored
commit 7455a832 upstream. Commit 13db7734 ("KVM: x86: don't notify userspace IOAPIC on edge EOI") said, edge-triggered interrupts don't set a bit in TMR, which means that IOAPIC isn't notified on EOI. And var level indicates level-triggered interrupt. But commit 3159d36a ("KVM: x86: use generic function for MSI parsing") replace var level with irq.level by mistake. Fix it by changing irq.level to irq.trig_mode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3159d36a ("KVM: x86: use generic function for MSI parsing") Signed-off-by:
-
Mathias Nyman authored
commit a3ae87dc upstream. Intel Comet Lake based platform require the XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK quirk as well. Without this xHC can not enter D3 in runtime suspend. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210134553.9144-5-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
-
Ioanna Alifieraki authored
commit edf28f40 upstream. This reverts commit a9795584. Commit a9795584 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()") removes a lock that is needed. This leads to a process looping infinitely in exit_sem() and can also lead to a crash. There is a reproducer available in [1] and with the commit reverted the issue does not reproduce anymore. Using the reproducer found in [1] is fairly easy to reach a point where one of the child processes is looping infinitely in exit_sem between for(;;) and if (semid == -1) block, while it's trying to free its last sem_undo structure which has already been freed by freeary(). Each sem_undo struct is on two lists: one per semaphore set (list_id) and one per process (list_proc). The list_id list tracks undos by semaphore set, and the list_proc by process. Undo structures are removed either by freeary() or by exit_sem(). The freeary function is invoked when the user invokes a syscall to remove a semaphore set. During this operation freeary() traverses the list_id associated with the semaphore set and removes the undo structures from both the list_id and list_proc lists. For this case, exit_sem() is called at process exit. Each process contains a struct sem_undo_list (referred to as "ulp") which contains the head for the list_proc list. When the process exits, exit_sem() traverses this list to remove each sem_undo struct. As in freeary(), whenever a sem_undo struct is removed from list_proc, it is also removed from the list_id list. Removing elements from list_id is safe for both exit_sem() and freeary() due to sem_lock(). Removing elements from list_proc is not safe; freeary() locks &un->ulp->lock when it performs list_del_rcu(&un->list_proc) but exit_sem() does not (locking was removed by commit a9795584 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()"). This can result in the following situation while executing the reproducer [1] : Consider a child process in exit_sem() and the parent in freeary() (because of semctl(sid[i], NSEM, IPC_RMID)). - The list_proc for the child contains the last two undo structs A and B (the rest have been removed either by exit_sem() or freeary()). - The semid for A is 1 and semid for B is 2. - exit_sem() removes A and at the same time freeary() removes B. - Since A and B have different semid sem_lock() will acquire different locks for each process and both can proceed. The bug is that they remove A and B from the same list_proc at the same time because only freeary() acquires the ulp lock. When exit_sem() removes A it makes ulp->list_proc.next to point at B and at the same time freeary() removes B setting B->semid=-1. At the next iteration of for(;;) loop exit_sem() will try to remove B. The only way to break from for(;;) is for (&un->list_proc == &ulp->list_proc) to be true which is not. Then exit_sem() will check if B->semid=-1 which is and will continue looping in for(;;) until the memory for B is reallocated and the value at B->semid is changed. At that point, exit_sem() will crash attempting to unlink B from the lists (this can be easily triggered by running the reproducer [1] a second time). To prove this scenario instrumentation was added to keep information about each sem_undo (un) struct that is removed per process and per semaphore set (sma). CPU0 CPU1 [caller holds sem_lock(sma for A)] ... freeary() exit_sem() ... ... ... sem_lock(sma for B) spin_lock(A->ulp->lock) ... list_del_rcu(un_A->list_proc) list_del_rcu(un_B->list_proc) Undo structures A and B have different semid and sem_lock() operations proceed. However they belong to the same list_proc list and they are removed at the same time. This results into ulp->list_proc.next pointing to the address of B which is already removed. After reverting commit a9795584 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()") the issue was no longer reproducible. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1694779 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191211191318.11860-1-ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com Fixes: a9795584 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()") Signed-off-by:
Ioanna Alifieraki <ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Acked-by:
Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: <malat@debian.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Fugang Duan authored
commit f7670783 upstream. There has oops as below happen on i.MX8MP EVK platform that has 6G bytes DDR memory. when (xmit->tail < xmit->head) && (xmit->head == 0), it setups one sg entry with sg->length is zero: sg_set_buf(sgl + 1, xmit->buf, xmit->head); if xmit->buf is allocated from >4G address space, and SDMA only support <4G address space, then dma_map_sg() will call swiotlb_map() to do bounce buffer copying and mapping. But swiotlb_map() don't allow sg entry's length is zero, otherwise report BUG_ON(). So the patch is to correct the tx DMA scatter list. Oops: [ 287.675715] kernel BUG at kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:497! [ 287.680592] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 287.686075] Modules linked in: [ 287.689133] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.3-00016-g3fdc4e0-dirty #10 [ 287.696872] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MP EVK (DT) [ 287.701402] pstate: 80000085 (Nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO) [ 287.706199] pc : swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x1fc/0x310 [ 287.711076] lr : swiotlb_map+0x60/0x148 [ 287.714909] sp : ffff800010003c00 [ 287.718221] x29: ffff800010003c00 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 287.723533] x27: 0000000000000040 x26: ffff800011ae0000 [ 287.728844] x25: ffff800011ae09f8 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 287.734155] x23: 00000001b7af9000 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 287.739465] x21: ffff000176409c10 x20: 00000000001f7ffe [ 287.744776] x19: ffff000176409c10 x18: 000000000000002e [ 287.750087] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 287.755397] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 287.760707] x13: ffff00017f334000 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 287.766018] x11: 00000000001fffff x10: 0000000000000000 [ 287.771328] x9 : 0000000000000003 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 287.776638] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 287.781949] x5 : 0000000000200000 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 287.787259] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 00000001b7af9000 [ 287.792570] x1 : 00000000fbfff000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 287.797881] Call trace: [ 287.800328] swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x1fc/0x310 [ 287.804859] swiotlb_map+0x60/0x148 [ 287.808347] dma_direct_map_page+0xf0/0x130 [ 287.812530] dma_direct_map_sg+0x78/0xe0 [ 287.816453] imx_uart_dma_tx+0x134/0x2f8 [ 287.820374] imx_uart_dma_tx_callback+0xd8/0x168 [ 287.824992] vchan_complete+0x194/0x200 [ 287.828828] tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x154/0x1a0 [ 287.833879] tasklet_action+0x24/0x30 [ 287.837540] __do_softirq+0x120/0x23c [ 287.841202] irq_exit+0xb8/0xd8 [ 287.844343] __handle_domain_irq+0x64/0xb8 [ 287.848438] gic_handle_irq+0x5c/0x148 [ 287.852185] el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 [ 287.855327] cpuidle_enter_state+0x84/0x360 [ 287.859508] cpuidle_enter+0x34/0x48 [ 287.863083] call_cpuidle+0x18/0x38 [ 287.866571] do_idle+0x1e0/0x280 [ 287.869798] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x40 [ 287.873721] rest_init+0xd4/0xe0 [ 287.876949] arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14 [ 287.880958] start_kernel+0x420/0x44c [ 287.884622] Code: 9124c021 9417aff8 a94363f7 17ffffd5 (d4210000) [ 287.890718] ---[ end trace 5bc44c4ab6b009ce ]--- [ 287.895334] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 287.901686] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 288.905607] SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 0-1 [ 288.910395] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 288.913882] CPU features: 0x0002,2000200c [ 288.917888] Memory Limit: none [ 288.920944] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Reported-by:
Eagle Zhou <eagle.zhou@nxp.com> Tested-by:
Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 7942f857 ("serial: imx: TX DMA: clean up sg initialization") Reviewed-by:
Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581401761-6378-1-git-send-email-fugang.duan@nxp.comSigned-off-by:
-
Nicolas Ferre authored
commit 04b5bfe3 upstream. In atmel_shutdown() we call atmel_stop_rx() and atmel_stop_tx() functions. Prevent the rx restart that is implemented in RS485 or ISO7816 modes when calling atmel_stop_tx() by using the atomic information tasklet_shutdown that is already in place for this purpose. Fixes: 98f2082c ("tty/serial: atmel: enforce tasklet init and termination sequences") Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210152053.8289-1-nicolas.ferre@microchip.comSigned-off-by:
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 51dede9c upstream. Accessing the MCA thresholding controls in sysfs concurrently with CPU hotplug can lead to a couple of KASAN-reported issues: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_file_ops+0x155/0x180 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888367578940 by task grep/4019 and BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in show_error_count+0x15c/0x180 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888368a05514 by task grep/4454 for example. Both result from the fact that the threshold block creation/teardown code frees the descriptor memory itself instead of defining proper ->release function and leaving it to the driver core to take care of that, after all sysfs accesses have completed. Do that and get rid of the custom freeing code, fixing the above UAFs in the process. [ bp: write commit message. ] Fixes: 95268664 ("[PATCH] x86_64: mce_amd support for family 0x10 processors") Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214082801.13836-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by:
-
Borislav Petkov authored
commit 6e5cf31f upstream. threshold_create_bank() creates a bank descriptor per MCA error thresholding counter which can be controlled over sysfs. It publishes the pointer to that bank in a per-CPU variable and then goes on to create additional thresholding blocks if the bank has such. However, that creation of additional blocks in allocate_threshold_blocks() can fail, leading to a use-after-free through the per-CPU pointer. Therefore, publish that pointer only after all blocks have been setup successfully. Fixes: 019f34fc ("x86, MCE, AMD: Move shared bank to node descriptor") Reported-by:
Saar Amar <Saar.Amar@microsoft.com> Reported-by:
-
Larry Finger authored
commit 4ddf8ab8 upstream. In routine wpa_supplicant_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is checked to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but the code does not detect the case where p->length is greater than the size of the struct, thus a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory. Fixes commit a2c60d42 ("Add files for new driver - part 16"). Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com> Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com> Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes commit a2c60d42 ("Add files for new driver - part 16"). Signed-off-by:
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-4-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.netSigned-off-by:
-
Larry Finger authored
commit 499c405b upstream. In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory. Fixes commit a2c60d42 ("Add files for new driver - part 16"). Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com> Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com> Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: a2c60d42 ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16") Signed-off-by:
-
Alan Stern authored
commit 8099f58f upstream. Paul Zimmerman reports that his USB Bluetooth adapter sometimes crashes following system resume, when it receives a Get-Device-Descriptor request while it is busy doing something else. Such a request was added by commit a4f55d8b ("usb: hub: Check device descriptor before resusciation"). It gets sent when the hub driver's work thread checks whether a connect-change event on an enabled port really indicates a new device has been connected, as opposed to an old device momentarily disconnecting and then reconnecting (which can happen with xHCI host controllers, since they automatically enable connected ports). The same kind of thing occurs when a port's power session is lost during system suspend. When the system wakes up it sees a connect-change event on the port, and if the child device's persist_enabled flag was set then hub_activate() sets the device's reset_resume flag as well as the port's bit in hub->change_bits. The reset-resume code then takes responsibility for checking that the same device is still attached to the port, and it does this as part of the device's resume pathway. By the time the hub driver's work thread starts up again, the device has already been fully reinitialized and is busy doing its own thing. There's no need for the work thread to do the same check a second time, and in fact this unnecessary check is what caused the problem that Paul observed. Note that performing the unnecessary check is not actually a bug. Devices are supposed to be able to send descriptors back to the host even when they are busy doing something else. The underlying cause of Paul's problem lies in his Bluetooth adapter. Nevertheless, we shouldn't perform the same check twice in a row -- and as a nice side benefit, removing the extra check allows the Bluetooth adapter to work more reliably. The work thread performs its check when it sees that the port's bit is set in hub->change_bits. In this situation that bit is interpreted as though a connect-change event had occurred on the port _after_ the reset-resume, which is not what actually happened. One possible fix would be to make the reset-resume code clear the port's bit in hub->change_bits. But it seems simpler to just avoid setting the bit during hub_activate() in the first place. That's what this patch does. (Proving that the patch is correct when CONFIG_PM is disabled requires a little thought. In that setting hub_activate() will be called only for initialization and resets, since there won't be any resumes or reset-resumes. During initialization and hub resets the hub doesn't have any child devices, and so this code path never gets executed.) Reported-and-tested-by:
Paul Zimmerman <pauldzim@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://marc.info/?t=157949360700001&r=1&w=2 CC: David Heinzelmann <heinzelmann.david@gmail.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2001311037460.1577-100000@iolanthe.rowland.orgSigned-off-by:
-
