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  1. 24 Apr, 2020 4 commits
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid · 3147d8aa
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      Combine the pid_task and thes test has_group_leader_pid into a single
dereference by using pid_task(PIDTYPE_TGID).

This makes the code simpler and proof against needing to even think
about any shenanigans that de_thread might get up to.
Acked-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      3147d8aa
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances · 0fb5ce62
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes:
 Procfs modernization:
 ---------------------
 Historically procfs was always tied to pid namespaces, during pid
 namespace creation we internally create a procfs mount for it. However,
 this has the effect that all new procfs mounts are just a mirror of the
 internal one, any change, any mount option update, any new future
 introduction will propagate to all other procfs mounts that are in the
 same pid namespace.

 This may have solved several use cases in that time. However today we
 face new requirements, and making procfs able to support new private
 instances inside same pid namespace seems a major point. If we want to
 to introduce new features and security mechanisms we have to make sure
 first that we do not break existing usecases. Supporting private procfs
 instances will allow to support new features and behaviour without
 propagating it to all other procfs mounts.

 Today procfs is more of a burden especially to some Embedded, IoT,
 sandbox, container use cases. In user space we are over-mounting null
 or inaccessible files on top to hide files and information. If we want
 to hide pids we have to create PID namespaces otherwise mount options
 propagate to all other proc mounts, changing a mount option value in one
 mount will propagate to all other proc mounts. If we want to introduce
 new features, then they will propagate to all other mounts too, resulting
 either maybe new useful functionality or maybe breaking stuff. We have
 also to note that userspace should not workaround procfs, the kernel
 should just provide a sane simple interface.

 In this regard several developers and maintainers pointed out that
 there are problems with procfs and it has to be modernized:

 "Here's another one: split up and modernize /proc." by Andy Lutomirski [1]

 Discussion about kernel pointer leaks:

 "And yes, as Kees and Daniel mentioned, it's definitely not just dmesg.
 In fact, the primary things tend to be /proc and /sys, not dmesg
 itself." By Linus Torvalds [2]

 Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems have been updated to be
 able to support private instances, devpts is one major example [3].

 Which will be used for:

 1) Embedded systems and IoT: usually we have one supervisor for
 apps, we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create
 pid namespaces we have to manage all the processes inside too,
 where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside
 its own mount namespace, maybe use network namespaces for vlans
 setups, but right now we only want mount namespaces, without all the
 other complexity. We want procfs to behave more like a real file system,
 and block access to inodes that belong to other users. The 'hidepid=' will
 not work since it is a shared mount option.

 2) Containers, sandboxes and Private instances of file systems - devpts case
 Historically, lot of file systems inside Linux kernel view when instantiated
 were just a mirror of an already created and mounted filesystem. This was the
 case of devpts filesystem, it seems at that time the requirements were to
 optimize things and reuse the same memory, etc. This design used to work but not
 anymore with today's containers, IoT, hostile environments and all the privacy
 challenges that Linux faces.

 In that regards, devpts was updated so that each new mounts is a total
 independent file system by the following patches:

 "devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem" by
 Eric W. Biederman [3] [4]

 3) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some
 subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee
 that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook
 will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to
 force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run.
 The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to
 the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate
 to all other procfs mounts.

 This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user
 sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other
 syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a
 per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(),
 clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private
 procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on
 /proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will
 allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with
 pids that the user can ptrace or not.

 By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see
 inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other
 processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine
 and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be
 ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict
 /proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a
 generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes
 and which user can not.

 Side notes:

 * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse
 arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls
 that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using
 filesystem syscalls. With this change all LSMs should be able to analyze
 open/read/write/close... on /proc/<pid>/

 4) This will allow to implement new features either in kernel or
 userspace without having to worry about procfs.
 In containers, sandboxes, etc we have workarounds to hide some /proc
 inodes, this should be supported natively without doing extra complex
 work, the kernel should be able to support sane options that work with
 today and future Linux use cases.

 5) Creation of new superblock with all procfs options for each procfs
 mount will fix the ignoring of mount options. The problem is that the
 second mount of procfs in the same pid namespace ignores the mount
 options. The mount options are ignored without error until procfs is
 remounted.

 Before:

 proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0

 mount("proc", "/tmp/proc", "proc", 0, "hidepid=1") = 0
 +++ exited with 0 +++

 proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0

 proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0

 After:

 proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0

 proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0
 proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=invisible 0 0

 Introduced changes:
 -------------------
 Each mount of procfs creates a separate procfs instance with its own
 mount options.

 This series adds few new mount options:

 * New 'hidepid=ptraceable' or 'hidepid=4' mount option to show only ptraceable
 processes in the procfs. This allows to support lightweight sandboxes in
 Embedded Linux, also solves the case for LSM where now with this mount option,
 we make sure that they have a ptrace path in procfs.

 * 'subset=pid' that allows to hide non-pid inodes from procfs. It can be used
 in containers and sandboxes, as these are already trying to hide and block
 access to procfs inodes anyway.

 ChangeLog:
 ----------
 * Rebase on top of v5.7-rc1.
 * Fix a resource leak if proc is not mounted or if proc is simply reconfigured.
 * Add few selftests.

 * After a discussion with Eric W. Biederman, the numerical values for hidepid
   parameter have been removed from uapi.
 * Remove proc_self and proc_thread_self from the pid_namespace struct.
 * I took into account the comment of Kees Cook.
 * Update Reviewed-by tags.

 * 'subset=pidfs' renamed to 'subset=pid' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan.
 * Include Reviewed-by tags.

 * Rebase on top of Eric W. Biederman's procfs changes.
 * Add human readable values of 'hidepid' as suggested by Andy Lutomirski.

 * Started using RCU lock to clean dcache entries as suggested by Linus Torvalds.

 * 'pidonly=1' renamed to 'subset=pidfs' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan.
 * HIDEPID_* moved to uapi/ as they are user interface to mount().
   Suggested-by Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>

 * 'hidepid=' and 'gid=' mount options are moved from pid namespace to superblock.
 * 'newinstance' mount option removed as suggested by Eric W. Biederman.
    Mount of procfs always creates a new instance.
 * 'limit_pids' renamed to 'hidepid=3'.
 * I took into account the comment of Linus Torvalds [7].
 * Documentation added.

 * Fixed a bug that caused a problem with the Fedora boot.
 * The 'pidonly' option is visible among the mount options.

 * Renamed mount options to 'newinstance' and 'pids='
Suggested-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
 * Fixed order of commit, Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
 * Many bug fixes.

 * Removed 'unshared' mount option and replaced it with 'limit_pids'
    which is attached to the current procfs mount.
    Suggested-by Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
 * Do not fill dcache with pid entries that we can not ptrace.
 * Many bug fixes.

 References:
 -----------
 [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/ksummit-discuss/2017-January/004215.html
 [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/05/5
 [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/689539/
 [4] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/Documentation/filesystems/devpts.txt?v=3.14
 [5] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/2/407
 [6] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/3/357
 [7] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/11/505

 Alexey Gladkov (7):
   proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
   proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
   proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount
     option
   proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
   docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options
     and new mount behavior
  proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
   proc: use named enums for better readability

  Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst            |  92 +++++++++---
  fs/proc/base.c                                |  48 +++++--
  fs/proc/generic.c                             |   9 ++
  fs/proc/inode.c                               |  30 +++-
  fs/proc/root.c                                | 131 +++++++++++++-----
  fs/proc/self.c                                |   6 +-
  fs/proc/thread_self.c                         |   6 +-
  fs/proc_namespace.c                           |  14 +-
  include/linux/pid_namespace.h                 |  12 --
  include/linux/proc_fs.h                       |  30 +++-
  tools/testing/selftests/proc/.gitignore       |   2 +
  tools/testing/selftests/proc/Makefile         |   2 +
  .../selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c    |  50 +++++++
  .../selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c     |  48 +++++++
  14 files changed, 384 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c
  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200419141057.621356-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      0fb5ce62
    • Alexey Gladkov's avatar
      Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock · c59f415a
      Alexey Gladkov authored 
      To get pid_namespace from the procfs superblock should be used a special
helper. This will avoid errors when s_fs_info will change the type.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200423200316.164518-3-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200423112858.95820-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/06B50A1C-406F-4057-BFA8-3A7729EA7469@lca.pw/Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      c59f415a
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      proc: Put thread_pid in release_task not proc_flush_pid · 6ade99ec
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      Oleg pointed out that in the unlikely event the kernel is compiled
with CONFIG_PROC_FS unset that release_task will now leak the pid.

Move the put_pid out of proc_flush_pid into release_task to fix this
and to guarantee I don't make that mistake again.

When possible it makes sense to keep get and put in the same function
so it can easily been seen how they pair up.

Fixes: 7bc3e6e5 ("proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc")
Reported-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      6ade99ec
  3. 22 Apr, 2020 7 commits
  5. 21 Apr, 2020 1 commit
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      signal: Avoid corrupting si_pid and si_uid in do_notify_parent · 61e713bd
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      Christof Meerwald <cmeerw@cmeerw.org> writes:
> Hi,
>
> this is probably related to commit
> 7a0cf094 (signal: Correct namespace
> fixups of si_pid and si_uid).
>
> With a 5.6.5 kernel I am seeing SIGCHLD signals that don't include a
> properly set si_pid field - this seems to happen for multi-threaded
> child processes.
>
> A simple test program (based on the sample from the signalfd man page):
>
> #include <sys/signalfd.h>
> #include <signal.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <spawn.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
>
> #define handle_error(msg) \
>     do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } while (0)
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
>   sigset_t mask;
>   int sfd;
>   struct signalfd_siginfo fdsi;
>   ssize_t s;
>
>   sigemptyset(&mask);
>   sigaddset(&mask, SIGCHLD);
>
>   if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
>     handle_error("sigprocmask");
>
>   pid_t chldpid;
>   char *chldargv[] = { "./sfdclient", NULL };
>   posix_spawn(&chldpid, "./sfdclient", NULL, NULL, chldargv, NULL);
>
>   sfd = signalfd(-1, &mask, 0);
>   if (sfd == -1)
>     handle_error("signalfd");
>
>   for (;;) {
>     s = read(sfd, &fdsi, sizeof(struct signalfd_siginfo));
>     if (s != sizeof(struct signalfd_siginfo))
>       handle_error("read");
>
>     if (fdsi.ssi_signo == SIGCHLD) {
>       printf("Got SIGCHLD %d %d %d %d\n",
>           fdsi.ssi_status, fdsi.ssi_code,
>           fdsi.ssi_uid, fdsi.ssi_pid);
>       return 0;
>     } else {
>       printf("Read unexpected signal\n");
>     }
>   }
> }
>
>
> and a multi-threaded client to test with:
>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <pthread.h>
>
> void *f(void *arg)
> {
>   sleep(100);
> }
>
> int main()
> {
>   pthread_t t[8];
>
>   for (int i = 0; i != 8; ++i)
>   {
>     pthread_create(&t[i], NULL, f, NULL);
>   }
> }
>
> I tried to do a bit of debugging and what seems to be happening is
> that
>
>   /* From an ancestor pid namespace? */
>   if (!task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(t))) {
>
> fails inside task_pid_nr_ns because the check for "pid_alive" fails.
>
> This code seems to be called from do_notify_parent and there we
> actually have "tsk != current" (I am assuming both are threads of the
> current process?)

I instrumented the code with a warning and received the following backtrace:
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 777 at kernel/pid.c:501 __task_pid_nr_ns.cold.6+0xc/0x15
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 777 Comm: sfdclient Not tainted 5.7.0-rc1userns+ #2924
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns.cold.6+0xc/0x15
> Code: ff 66 90 48 83 ec 08 89 7c 24 04 48 8d 7e 08 48 8d 74 24 04 e8 9a b6 44 00 48 83 c4 08 c3 48 c7 c7 59 9f ac 82 e8 c2 c4 04 00 <0f> 0b e9 3fd
> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000042fbf8 EFLAGS: 00010046
> RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc9000042faf4
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff81193d29
> RBP: ffffc9000042fc18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
> R10: 000000100f938416 R11: 0000000000000309 R12: ffff8880b941c140
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8880b941c140
> FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880bca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00007f2e8c0a32e0 CR3: 0000000002e10000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
> Call Trace:
>  send_signal+0x1c8/0x310
>  do_notify_parent+0x50f/0x550
>  release_task.part.21+0x4fd/0x620
>  do_exit+0x6f6/0xaf0
>  do_group_exit+0x42/0xb0
>  get_signal+0x13b/0xbb0
>  do_signal+0x2b/0x670
>  ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x24d/0x2b0
>  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x4d/0x60
>  ? kfree+0x24c/0x2b0
>  do_syscall_64+0x176/0x640
>  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

The immediate problem is as Christof noticed that "pid_alive(current) == false".
This happens because do_notify_parent is called from the last thread to exit
in a process after that thread has been reaped.

The bigger issue is that do_notify_parent can be called from any
process that manages to wait on a thread of a multi-threaded process
from wait_task_zombie.  So any logic based upon current for
do_notify_parent is just nonsense, as current can be pretty much
anything.

So change do_notify_parent to call __send_signal directly.

Inspecting the code it appears this problem has existed since the pid
namespace support started handling this case in 2.6.30.  This fix only
backports to 7a0cf094 ("signal: Correct namespace fixups of si_pid and si_uid")
where the problem logic was moved out of __send_signal and into send_signal.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6588c1e3 ("signals: SI_USER: Masquerade si_pid when crossing pid ns boundary")
Ref: 921cf9f6 ("signals: protect cinit from unblocked SIG_DFL signals")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200419201336.GI22017@edge.cmeerw.net/Reported-by: default avatarChristof Meerwald <cmeerw@cmeerw.org>
Acked-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      61e713bd
  7. 16 Apr, 2020 1 commit
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      proc: Handle umounts cleanly · 4fa3b1c4
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      syzbot writes:
> KASAN: use-after-free Read in dput (2)
>
> proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846
> Read of size 4 at addr ffff88808a618cf0 by task syz-executor.0/8426
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 8426 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-next-20200412-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
>  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
>  dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
>  print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x315 mm/kasan/report.c:382
>  __kasan_report.cold+0x35/0x4d mm/kasan/report.c:511
>  kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625
>  fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline]
>  dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846
>  proc_kill_sb+0x73/0xf0 fs/proc/root.c:195
>  deactivate_locked_super+0x8c/0xf0 fs/super.c:335
>  vfs_get_super+0x258/0x2d0 fs/super.c:1212
>  vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
>  do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2813 [inline]
>  do_mount+0x1306/0x1b30 fs/namespace.c:3138
>  __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3347 [inline]
>  __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3324 [inline]
>  __x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230 fs/namespace.c:3324
>  do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
> RIP: 0033:0x45c889
> Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> RSP: 002b:00007ffc1930ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001324914 RCX: 000000000045c889
> RDX: 0000000020000140 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000
> RBP: 000000000076bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
> R13: 0000000000000749 R14: 00000000004ca15a R15: 0000000000000013

Looking at the code now that it the internal mount of proc is no
longer used it is possible to unmount proc.   If proc is unmounted
the fields of the pid namespace that were used for filesystem
specific state are not reinitialized.

Which means that proc_self and proc_thread_self can be pointers to
already freed dentries.

The reported user after free appears to be from mounting and
unmounting proc followed by mounting proc again and using error
injection to cause the new root dentry allocation to fail.  This in
turn results in proc_kill_sb running with proc_self and
proc_thread_self still retaining their values from the previous mount
of proc.  Then calling dput on either proc_self of proc_thread_self
will result in double put.  Which KASAN sees as a use after free.

Solve this by always reinitializing the filesystem state stored
in the struct pid_namespace, when proc is unmounted.

Reported-by: syzbot+72868dd424eb66c6b95f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Fixes: 69879c01 ("proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc")
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      4fa3b1c4
  9. 12 Apr, 2020 10 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux 5.7-rc1 · 8f3d9f35
      Linus Torvalds authored
      8f3d9f35
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      MAINTAINERS: sort field names for all entries · 3b50142d
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      This sorts the actual field names too, potentially causing even more
chaos and confusion at merge time if you have edited the MAINTAINERS
file.  But the end result is a more consistent layout, and hopefully
it's a one-time pain minimized by doing this just before the -rc1
release.

This was entirely scripted:

  ./scripts/parse-maintainers.pl --input=MAINTAINERS --output=MAINTAINERS --order
Requested-by: default avatarJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3b50142d
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      MAINTAINERS: sort entries by entry name · 4400b7d6
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      They are all supposed to be sorted, but people who add new entries don't
always know the alphabet.  Plus sometimes the entry names get edited,
and people don't then re-order the entry.

Let's see how painful this will be for merging purposes (the MAINTAINERS
file is often edited in various different trees), but Joe claims there's
relatively few patches in -next that touch this, and doing it just
before -rc1 is likely the best time.  Fingers crossed.

This was scripted with

  /scripts/parse-maintainers.pl --input=MAINTAINERS --output=MAINTAINERS

but then I also ended up manually upper-casing a few entry names that
stood out when looking at the end result.
Requested-by: default avatarJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4400b7d6
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 4f8a3cc1
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of three patches to fix the fallout of the newly added split
  lock detection feature.

  It addressed the case where a KVM guest triggers a split lock #AC and
  KVM reinjects it into the guest which is not prepared to handle it.

  Add proper sanity checks which prevent the unconditional injection
  into the guest and handles the #AC on the host side in the same way as
  user space detections are handled. Depending on the detection mode it
  either warns and disables detection for the task or kills the task if
  the mode is set to fatal"

* tag 'x86-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  KVM: VMX: Extend VMXs #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest
  KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator
  x86/split_lock: Provide handle_guest_split_lock()
      4f8a3cc1
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'timers-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 0785249f
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull time(keeping) updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Fix the time_for_children symlink in /proc/$PID/ so it properly
   reflects that it part of the 'time' namespace

 - Add the missing userns limit for the allowed number of time
   namespaces, which was half defined but the actual array member was
   not added. This went unnoticed as the array has an exessive empty
   member at the end but introduced a user visible regression as the
   output was corrupted.

 - Prevent further silent ucount corruption by adding a BUILD_BUG_ON()
   to catch half updated data.

* tag 'timers-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  ucount: Make sure ucounts in /proc/sys/user don't regress again
  time/namespace: Add max_time_namespaces ucount
  time/namespace: Fix time_for_children symlink
      0785249f
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'sched-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 590680d1
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull scheduler fixes/updates from Thomas Gleixner:

 - Deduplicate the average computations in the scheduler core and the
   fair class code.

 - Fix a raise between runtime distribution and assignement which can
   cause exceeding the quota by up to 70%.

 - Prevent negative results in the imbalanace calculation

 - Remove a stale warning in the workqueue code which can be triggered
   since the call site was moved out of preempt disabled code. It's a
   false positive.

 - Deduplicate the print macros for procfs

 - Add the ucmap values to the SCHED_DEBUG procfs output for completness

* tag 'sched-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/debug: Add task uclamp values to SCHED_DEBUG procfs
  sched/debug: Factor out printing formats into common macros
  sched/debug: Remove redundant macro define
  sched/core: Remove unused rq::last_load_update_tick
  workqueue: Remove the warning in wq_worker_sleeping()
  sched/fair: Fix negative imbalance in imbalance calculation
  sched/fair: Fix race between runtime distribution and assignment
  sched/fair: Align rq->avg_idle and rq->avg_scan_cost
      590680d1
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'perf-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 20e2aa81
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Three fixes/updates for perf:

   - Fix the perf event cgroup tracking which tries to track the cgroup
     even for disabled events.

   - Add Ice Lake server support for uncore events

   - Disable pagefaults when retrieving the physical address in the
     sampling code"

* tag 'perf-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/core: Disable page faults when getting phys address
  perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Ice Lake server uncore support
  perf/cgroup: Correct indirection in perf_less_group_idx()
  perf/core: Fix event cgroup tracking
      20e2aa81
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'locking-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 652fa53c
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull locking fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Three small fixes/updates for the locking core code:

   - Plug a task struct reference leak in the percpu rswem
     implementation.

   - Document the refcount interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT

   - Improve the 'invalid wait context' data dump in lockdep so it
     contains all information which is required to decode the problem"

* tag 'locking-urgent-2020-04-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  locking/lockdep: Improve 'invalid wait context' splat
  locking/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT
  locking/percpu-rwsem: Fix a task_struct refcount
      652fa53c
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag '5.7-rc-smb3-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6 · 4119bf9f
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
 "Ten cifs/smb fixes:

   - five RDMA (smbdirect) related fixes

   - add experimental support for swap over SMB3 mounts

   - also a fix which improves performance of signed connections"

* tag '5.7-rc-smb3-fixes-part2' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  smb3: enable swap on SMB3 mounts
  smb3: change noisy error message to FYI
  smb3: smbdirect support can be configured by default
  cifs: smbd: Do not schedule work to send immediate packet on every receive
  cifs: smbd: Properly process errors on ib_post_send
  cifs: Allocate crypto structures on the fly for calculating signatures of incoming packets
  cifs: smbd: Update receive credits before sending and deal with credits roll back on failure before sending
  cifs: smbd: Check send queue size before posting a send
  cifs: smbd: Merge code to track pending packets
  cifs: ignore cached share root handle closing errors
      4119bf9f
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'nfs-for-5.7-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs · 50bda5fa
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull NFS client bugfix from Trond Myklebust:
 "Fix an RCU read lock leakage in pnfs_alloc_ds_commits_list()"

* tag 'nfs-for-5.7-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
  pNFS: Fix RCU lock leakage
      50bda5fa
  11. 11 Apr, 2020 14 commits
  13. 10 Apr, 2020 3 commits
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