Skip to content

L
linux
Switch branch/tag
  1. 30 Sep, 2014 30 commits
  3. 23 Sep, 2014 1 commit
  5. 22 Sep, 2014 9 commits
    • Ilya Dryomov's avatar
      libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len · ae72a158
      Ilya Dryomov authored 
      commit c27a3e4d upstream.

We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes.  This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper).  Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.

Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979Signed-off-by: default avatarIlya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ae72a158
    • Ilya Dryomov's avatar
      libceph: add process_one_ticket() helper · 9cc937e4
      Ilya Dryomov authored 
      commit 597cda35 upstream.

Add a helper for processing individual cephx auth tickets.  Needed for
the next commit, which deals with allocating ticket buffers.  (Most of
the diff here is whitespace - view with git diff -b).
Signed-off-by: default avatarIlya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
[ kamal: 3.13 stable prereq for
  c27a3e4d "libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len" ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      9cc937e4
    • Jiri Kosina's avatar
      HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback · 4294cbe1
      Jiri Kosina authored 
      commit 844817e4 upstream.

The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Reported-by: default avatarSteven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      4294cbe1
    • James Forshaw's avatar
      USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response · 820644e9
      James Forshaw authored 
      commit 6817ae22 upstream.

This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      820644e9
    • Jiri Kosina's avatar
      HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones · b3e736dc
      Jiri Kosina authored 
      commit 4ab25786 upstream.

There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Reported-by: default avatarBen Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBenjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      b3e736dc
    • Jiri Kosina's avatar
      HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback · e5cb67ba
      Jiri Kosina authored 
      commit c54def7b upstream.

The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Reported-by: default avatarSteven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      e5cb67ba
    • Jan Kara's avatar
      udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs · cf56fc67
      Jan Kara authored 
      commit c03aa9f6 upstream.

We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.

Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reference: CVE-2014-6410
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      cf56fc67
    • Jan Kara's avatar
      udf: Fold udf_fill_inode() into __udf_read_inode() · fd549856
      Jan Kara authored 
      commit bb7720a0 upstream.

There's no good reason to separate these since udf_fill_inode() is
called only from __udf_read_inode() and both do part of the same thing.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[ kamal: 3.13 stable prereq for
  c03aa9f6 "udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs" ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      fd549856
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Fix termination condition in assoc array garbage collection · dd248e95
      David Howells authored 
      commit 95389b08 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2014-3631.

It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).

When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.

Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.

This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).

This can be reproduced by:

	ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
	for ((i=1; i<=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
	keyctl timeout $last_key 2

Doing this:

	echo 3 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay

first will speed things up.

If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8136cea7>] [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40  EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
 ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
 ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
 ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff812e2a70>] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
 [<ffffffff812e3e75>] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
 [<ffffffff812e1424>] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
 [<ffffffff810a67b6>] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
 [<ffffffff810a744b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff810a7330>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
 [<ffffffff810ae1a8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
 [<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
 [<ffffffff816ffb7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
 [<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 <4e> 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP  [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
 RSP <ffff8800aac15d40>
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDon Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      dd248e95
GitLab Nexedi Edition | About GitLab | About Nexedi | 沪ICP备2021021310号-2 | 沪ICP备2021021310号-7