- 18 Dec, 2015 12 commits
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit f598282f ("PCI: Fix the NIU MSI-X problem in a better way") teaches us that dealing with MSI-X can be troublesome. Further checks in the MSI-X architecture shows that if the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit is turned of in the PCI_COMMAND we may not be able to access the BAR (since they are memory regions). Since the MSI-X tables are located in there.. that can lead to us causing PCIe errors. Inhibit us performing any operation on the MSI-X unless the MEMORY bit is set. Note that Xen hypervisor with: "x86/MSI-X: access MSI-X table only after having enabled MSI-X" will return: xen_pciback: 0000:0a:00.1: error -6 enabling MSI-X for guest 3! When the generic MSI code tries to setup the PIRQ without MEMORY bit set. Which means with later versions of Xen (4.6) this patch is not neccessary. This is part of XSA-157 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
Otherwise just continue on, returning the same values as previously (return of 0, and op->result has the PIRQ value). This does not change the behavior of XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi[|x]. The pci_disable_msi or pci_disable_msix have the checks for msi_enabled or msix_enabled so they will error out immediately. However the guest can still call these operations and cause us to disable the 'ack_intr'. That means the backend IRQ handler for the legacy interrupt will not respond to interrupts anymore. This will lead to (if the device is causing an interrupt storm) for the Linux generic code to disable the interrupt line. Naturally this will only happen if the device in question is plugged in on the motherboard on shared level interrupt GSI. This is part of XSA-157 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
Otherwise an guest can subvert the generic MSI code to trigger an BUG_ON condition during MSI interrupt freeing: for (i = 0; i < entry->nvec_used; i++) BUG_ON(irq_has_action(entry->irq + i)); Xen PCI backed installs an IRQ handler (request_irq) for the dev->irq whenever the guest writes PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY (or PCI_COMMAND_IO) to the PCI_COMMAND register. This is done in case the device has legacy interrupts the GSI line is shared by the backend devices. To subvert the backend the guest needs to make the backend to change the dev->irq from the GSI to the MSI interrupt line, make the backend allocate an interrupt handler, and then command the backend to free the MSI interrupt and hit the BUG_ON. Since the backend only calls 'request_irq' when the guest writes to the PCI_COMMAND register the guest needs to call XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi before any other operation. This will cause the generic MSI code to setup an MSI entry and populate dev->irq with the new PIRQ value. Then the guest can write to PCI_COMMAND PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY and cause the backend to setup an IRQ handler for dev->irq (which instead of the GSI value has the MSI pirq). See 'xen_pcibk_control_isr'. Then the guest disables the MSI: XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi which ends up triggering the BUG_ON condition in 'free_msi_irqs' as there is an IRQ handler for the entry->irq (dev->irq). Note that this cannot be done using MSI-X as the generic code does not over-write dev->irq with the MSI-X PIRQ values. The patch inhibits setting up the IRQ handler if MSI or MSI-X (for symmetry reasons) code had been called successfully. P.S. Xen PCIBack when it sets up the device for the guest consumption ends up writting 0 to the PCI_COMMAND (see xen_pcibk_reset_device). XSA-120 addendum patch removed that - however when upstreaming said addendum we found that it caused issues with qemu upstream. That has now been fixed in qemu upstream. This is part of XSA-157 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: -
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
The guest sequence of: a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix results in hitting an NULL pointer due to using freed pointers. The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI-X capability. The a) constructs and SysFS representation of MSI and MSI groups. The b) adds a second set of them but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry). 'populate_msi_sysfs' frees the newly allocated msi_irq_groups (note that in a) pdev->msi_irq_groups is still set) and also free's ALL of the MSI-X entries of the device (the ones allocated in step a) and b)). The unwind code: 'free_msi_irqs' deletes all the entries and tries to delete the pdev->msi_irq_groups (which hasn't been set to NULL). However the pointers in the SysFS are already freed and we hit an NULL pointer further on when 'strlen' is attempted on a freed pointer. The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix to guard against that. The check for msi_enabled is not stricly neccessary. This is part of XSA-157 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
The guest sequence of: a) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi b) XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi c) XEN_PCI_OP_disable_msi results in hitting an BUG_ON condition in the msi.c code. The MSI code uses an dev->msi_list to which it adds MSI entries. Under the above conditions an BUG_ON() can be hit. The device passed in the guest MUST have MSI capability. The a) adds the entry to the dev->msi_list and sets msi_enabled. The b) adds a second entry but adding in to SysFS fails (duplicate entry) and deletes all of the entries from msi_list and returns (with msi_enabled is still set). c) pci_disable_msi passes the msi_enabled checks and hits: BUG_ON(list_empty(dev_to_msi_list(&dev->dev))); and blows up. The patch adds a simple check in the XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msi to guard against that. The check for msix_enabled is not stricly neccessary. This is part of XSA-157. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only performed the first time. The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op->cmd value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler optimization. This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the compiler does not perform any optimization. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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David Vrabel authored
The copy of the ring request was lacking a following barrier(), potentially allowing the compiler to optimize the copy away. Use RING_COPY_REQUEST() to ensure the request is copied to local memory. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Roger Pau Monné authored
Since indirect descriptors are in memory shared with the frontend, the frontend could alter the first_sect and last_sect values after they have been validated but before they are recorded in the request. This may result in I/O requests that overflow the foreign page, possibly overwriting local pages when the I/O request is executed. When parsing indirect descriptors, only read first_sect and last_sect once. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
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Roger Pau Monné authored
A compiler may load a switch statement value multiple times, which could be bad when the value is in memory shared with the frontend. When converting a non-native request to a native one, ensure that src->operation is only loaded once by using READ_ONCE(). This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
Instead of open-coding memcpy()s and directly accessing Tx and Rx requests, use the new RING_COPY_REQUEST() that ensures the local copy is correct. This is more than is strictly necessary for guest Rx requests since only the id and gref fields are used and it is harmless if the frontend modifies these. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
The last from guest transmitted request gives no indication about the minimum amount of credit that the guest might need to send a packet since the last packet might have been a small one. Instead allow for the worst case 128 KiB packet. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
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David Vrabel authored
Using RING_GET_REQUEST() on a shared ring is easy to use incorrectly (i.e., by not considering that the other end may alter the data in the shared ring while it is being inspected). Safe usage of a request generally requires taking a local copy. Provide a RING_COPY_REQUEST() macro to use instead of RING_GET_REQUEST() and an open-coded memcpy(). This takes care of ensuring that the copy is done correctly regardless of any possible compiler optimizations. Use a volatile source to prevent the compiler from reordering or omitting the copy. This is part of XSA155. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Dec, 2015 1 commit
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
Using MMUEXT_TLB_FLUSH_MULTI doesn't buy us much since the hypervisor will likely perform same IPIs as would have the guest. More importantly, using MMUEXT_INVLPG_MULTI may not to invalidate the guest's address on remote CPU (when, for example, VCPU from another guest is running there). Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Suggested-by:
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- 02 Dec, 2015 2 commits
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
Resuming PMU currently triggers a warning from ___might_sleep() (assuming CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is set) when xen_pmu_init() allocates GFP_KERNEL page because we are in state resembling atomic context. Move resuming PMU to xen_arch_resume() which is called in regular context. For symmetry move suspending PMU to xen_arch_suspend() as well. Signed-off-by:
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Ross Lagerwall authored
When a CPU is offlined, there may be unprocessed events on a port for that CPU. If the port is subsequently reused on a different CPU, it could be in an unexpected state with the link bit set, resulting in interrupts being missed. Fix this by consuming any unprocessed events for a particular CPU when that CPU dies. Signed-off-by:
Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.14+ Signed-off-by:
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- 26 Nov, 2015 3 commits
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David Vrabel authored
If more than 1024 event channels are bound to a evtchn device then it possible (even with well behaved applications) for the ring to overflow and events to be lost (reported as an -EFBIG error). Dynamically increase the size of the ring so there is always enough space for all bound events. Well behaved applicables that only unmask events after draining them from the ring can thus no longer lose events. However, an application could unmask an event before draining it, allowing multiple entries per port to accumulate in the ring, and a overflow could still occur. So the overflow detection and reporting is retained. The ring size is initially only 64 entries so the common use case of an application only binding a few events will use less memory than before. The ring size may grow to 512 KiB (enough for all 2^17 possible channels). This order 7 kmalloc() may fail due to memory fragmentation, so we fall back to trying vmalloc(). Signed-off-by:
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
After commit 8c058b0b ("x86/irq: Probe for PIC presence before allocating descs for legacy IRQs") early_irq_init() will no longer preallocate descriptors for legacy interrupts if PIC does not exist, which is the case for Xen PV guests. Therefore we may need to allocate those descriptors ourselves. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Boris Ostrovsky authored
Doing so will cause the grant to be unmapped and then, during fault handling, the fault to be mistakenly treated as NUMA hint fault. In addition, even if those maps could partcipate in NUMA balancing, it wouldn't provide any benefit since we are unable to determine physical page's node (even if/when VNUMA is implemented). Marking grant maps' VMAs as VM_IO will exclude them from being part of NUMA balancing. Signed-off-by:
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- 02 Nov, 2015 1 commit
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Zhenzhong Duan authored
On some NUMA system, after dom0 up, we see below warning even if there are enough pfn ranges that could be used for remapping: "Unable to find available pfn range, not remapping identity pages" Fix it to avoid getting a memory region of zero size in xen_find_pfn_range. Signed-off-by:
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
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- 28 Oct, 2015 1 commit
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David Vrabel authored
Mapping a large range of foreign GFNs can take a long time, add a reschedule point after each batch of 16 GFNs. Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Oct, 2015 20 commits
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Stefano Stabellini authored
Call disable_percpu_irq on CPU_DYING and enable_percpu_irq when the cpu is coming up. Signed-off-by:
Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
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Stefano Stabellini authored
When offlining a cpu, instead of cpu_down, call device_offline, which also takes care of updating the cpu.dev.offline field. This keeps the sysfs file /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuN/online, up to date. Also move the call to disable_hotplug_cpu, because it makes more sense to have it there. We don't call device_online at cpu-hotplug time, because that would immediately take the cpu online, while we want to retain the current behaviour: the user needs to explicitly enable the cpu after it has been hotplugged. Signed-off-by:
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Stefano Stabellini authored
Build cpu_hotplug for ARM and ARM64 guests. Rename arch_(un)register_cpu to xen_(un)register_cpu and provide an empty implementation on ARM and ARM64. On x86 just call arch_(un)register_cpu as we are already doing. Initialize cpu_hotplug on ARM. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The PV ring may use multiple grants and expect them to be mapped contiguously in the virtual memory. Although, the current code is relying on a Linux page will be mapped to a single grant. On build where Linux is using a different page size than the grant (i.e other than 4KB), the grant will always be mapped on the first 4KB of each Linux page which make the final ring not contiguous in the memory. This can be fixed by mapping multiple grant in a same Linux page. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
With the 64KB page granularity support on ARM64, a Linux page may be split accross multiple grant. Currently we have the helper gnttab_foreach_grant_in_grant to break a Linux page based on an offset and a len, but it doesn't fit when we only have a number of grants in hand. Introduce a new helper which take an array of Linux page and a number of grant and will figure out the address of each grant. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
Linux may use a different page size than the size of grant. So make clear that the order is actually in number of grant. Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
Correct a comment in arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c referencing a wrong source file. Signed-off-by:
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Mikko Rapeli authored
__u32, __u64 etc. are preferred for userspace API headers. Signed-off-by:
Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi> Signed-off-by:
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Mikko Rapeli authored
__u32, __u64 etc. are preferred for userspace API headers. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The type of the item in frame_list is xen_pfn_t which is not an unsigned long on ARM but an uint64_t. With the current computation, the size of frame_list will be 2 * PAGE_SIZE rather than PAGE_SIZE. I bet it's just mistake when the type has been switched from "unsigned long" to "xen_pfn_t" in commit 965c0aaa "xen: balloon: use correct type for frame_list". Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
Swiotlb is used on ARM64 to support DMA on platform where devices are not protected by an SMMU. Furthermore it's only enabled for DOM0. While Xen is always using 4KB page granularity in the stage-2 page table, Linux ARM64 may either use 4KB or 64KB. This means that a Linux page can be spanned accross multiple Xen page. The Swiotlb code has to validate that the buffer used for DMA is physically contiguous in the memory. As a Linux page can't be shared between local memory and foreign page by design (the balloon code always removing entirely a Linux page), the changes in the code are very minimal because we only need to check the first Xen PFN. Note that it may be possible to optimize the function check_page_physically_contiguous to avoid looping over every Xen PFN for local memory. Although I will let this optimization for a follow-up. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
With 64KB page granularity support, the frame number will be different. It will be easier to modify the behavior in a single place rather than in each caller. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The hypercall interface is always using 4KB page granularity. This is requiring to use xen page definition macro when we deal with hypercall. Note that pfn_to_gfn is working with a Xen pfn (i.e 4KB). We may want to rename pfn_gfn to make this explicit. We also allocate a 64KB page for the shared page even though only the first 4KB is used. I don't think this is really important for now as it helps to have the pointer 4KB aligned (XENMEM_add_to_physmap is taking a Xen PFN). Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The hypercall interface (as well as the toolstack) is always using 4KB page granularity. When the toolstack is asking for mapping a series of guest PFN in a batch, it expects to have the page map contiguously in its virtual memory. When Linux is using 64KB page granularity, the privcmd driver will have to map multiple Xen PFN in a single Linux page. Note that this solution works on page granularity which is a multiple of 4KB. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The PV network protocol is using 4KB page granularity. The goal of this patch is to allow a Linux using 64KB page granularity working as a network backend on a non-modified Xen. It's only necessary to adapt the ring size and break skb data in small chunk of 4KB. The rest of the code is relying on the grant table code. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The PV network protocol is using 4KB page granularity. The goal of this patch is to allow a Linux using 64KB page granularity using network device on a non-modified Xen. It's only necessary to adapt the ring size and break skb data in small chunk of 4KB. The rest of the code is relying on the grant table code. Note that we allocate a Linux page for each rx skb but only the first 4KB is used. We may improve the memory usage by extending the size of the rx skb. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The PV block protocol is using 4KB page granularity. The goal of this patch is to allow a Linux using 64KB page granularity behaving as a block backend on a non-modified Xen. It's only necessary to adapt the ring size and the number of request per indirect frames. The rest of the code is relying on the grant table code. Note that the grant table code is allocating a Linux page per grant which will result to waste 6OKB for every grant when Linux is using 64KB page granularity. This could be improved by sharing the page between multiple grants. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The PV block protocol is using 4KB page granularity. The goal of this patch is to allow a Linux using 64KB page granularity using block device on a non-modified Xen. The block API is using segment which should at least be the size of a Linux page. Therefore, the driver will have to break the page in chunk of 4K before giving the page to the backend. When breaking a 64KB segment in 4KB chunks, it is possible that some chunks are empty. As the PV protocol always require to have data in the chunk, we have to count the number of Xen page which will be in use and avoid sending empty chunks. Note that, a pre-defined number of grants are reserved before preparing the request. This pre-defined number is based on the number and the maximum size of the segments. If each segment contains a very small amount of data, the driver may reserve too many grants (16 grants is reserved per segment with 64KB page granularity). Furthermore, in the case of persistent grants we allocate one Linux page per grant although only the first 4KB of the page will be effectively in use. This could be improved by sharing the page with multiple grants. Signed-off-by:
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Julien Grall authored
The Xen interface is using 4KB page granularity. This means that each grant is 4KB. The current implementation allocates a Linux page per grant. On Linux using 64KB page granularity, only the first 4KB of the page will be used. We could decrease the memory wasted by sharing the page with multiple grant. It will require some care with the {Set,Clear}ForeignPage macro. Note that no changes has been made in the x86 code because both Linux and Xen will only use 4KB page granularity. Signed-off-by: -
Julien Grall authored
Only use the first 4KB of the page to store the events channel info. It means that we will waste 60KB every time we allocate page for: * control block: a page is allocating per CPU * event array: a page is allocating everytime we need to expand it I think we can reduce the memory waste for the 2 areas by: * control block: sharing between multiple vCPUs. Although it will require some bookkeeping in order to not free the page when the CPU goes offline and the other CPUs sharing the page still there * event array: always extend the array event by 64K (i.e 16 4K chunk). That would require more care when we fail to expand the event channel. Signed-off-by:Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
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