- 06 Mar, 2015 11 commits
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 49d2ca84 upstream. Fix memory leak in the gpio sysfs interface due to failure to drop reference to device returned by class_find_device when setting the gpio-line polarity. Fixes: 07697461 ("gpiolib: add support for changing value polarity in sysfs") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 0f303db0 upstream. Fix memory leak in the gpio sysfs interface due to failure to drop reference to device returned by class_find_device when creating a link. Fixes: a4177ee7 ("gpiolib: allow exported GPIO nodes to be named using sysfs links") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Hemmo Nieminen authored
commit c7754e75 upstream. As printk() invocation can cause e.g. a TLB miss, printk() cannot be called before the exception handlers have been properly initialized. This can happen e.g. when netconsole has been loaded as a kernel module and the TLB table has been cleared when a CPU was offline. Call cpu_report() in start_secondary() only after the exception handlers have been initialized to fix this. Without the patch the kernel will randomly either lockup or crash after a CPU is onlined and the console driver is a module. Signed-off-by: Hemmo Nieminen <hemmo.nieminen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8953/Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
commit 8997c27e upstream. src_net points to the netns where the netlink message has been received. This netns may be different from the netns where the interface is created (because the user may add IFLA_NET_NS_[PID|FD]). In this case, src_net is the link netns. It seems wrong to override the netns in the newlink() handler because if it was not already src_net, it means that the user explicitly asks to create the netdevice in another netns. CC: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> CC: Dmitry Tarnyagin <dmitry.tarnyagin@lockless.no> Fixes: 8391c4aa ("caif: Bugfixes in CAIF netdevice for close and flow control") Fixes: c4125400 ("caif-hsi: Add rtnl support") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop the change to caif_hsi change] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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karl beldan authored
commit 9ce35779 upstream. Fixed commit added from64to32 under _#ifndef do_csum_ but used it under _#ifndef csum_tcpudp_nofold_, breaking some builds (Fengguang's robot reported TILEGX's). Move from64to32 under the latter. Fixes: 150ae0e9 ("lib/checksum.c: fix carry in csum_tcpudp_nofold") Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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karl beldan authored
commit 150ae0e9 upstream. The carry from the 64->32bits folding was dropped, e.g with: saddr=0xFFFFFFFF daddr=0xFF0000FF len=0xFFFF proto=0 sum=1, csum_tcpudp_nofold returned 0 instead of 1. Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 4161b450 upstream. When ak4114 work calls its callback and the callback invokes ak4114_reinit(), it stalls due to flush_delayed_work(). For avoiding this, control the reentrance by introducing a refcount. Also flush_delayed_work() is replaced with cancel_delayed_work_sync(). The exactly same bug is present in ak4113.c and fixed as well. Reported-by: Pavel Hofman <pavel.hofman@ivitera.com> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Tested-by: Pavel Hofman <pavel.hofman@ivitera.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: snd_ak411{3,4}_reinit were previously using flush_delayed_work_sync() rather than flush_delayed_work()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Bo Shen authored
commit a43bd7e1 upstream. According to the I2S specification information as following: - WS = 0, channel 1 (left) - WS = 1, channel 2 (right) So, the start event should be TF/RF falling edge. Reported-by: Songjun Wu <songjun.wu@atmel.com> Signed-off-by: Bo Shen <voice.shen@atmel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Felix Fietkau authored
commit a3e6c1ef upstream. If the irq_chip does not define .irq_disable, any call to disable_irq will defer disabling the IRQ until it fires while marked as disabled. This assumes that the handler function checks for this condition, which handle_percpu_irq does not. In this case, calling disable_irq leads to an IRQ storm, if the interrupt fires while disabled. This optimization is only useful when disabling the IRQ is slow, which is not true for the MIPS CPU IRQ. Disable this optimization by implementing .irq_disable and .irq_enable Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8949/Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Ben Hutchings authored
When backporting commit 33692f27 ('vm: add VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV handling support') I didn't notice that it depended on a recent change to the locking context of mm_fault_error() (commit 7fb08eca, 'x86: mm: move mmap_sem unlock from mm_fault_error() to caller'). That isn't easily applicable to 3.2, so instead make sure we drop mm->mmap_sem on the new branch of mm_fault_error(). Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Ben Hutchings authored
Commit 06cf35f9 ('PCI: Handle read-only BARs on AMD CS553x devices') added the function quirk_io() which calls pcibios_bus_to_resource(). Prior to Linux 3.14, pcibios_bus_to_resource() takes a pointer to struct pci_dev and looks up the device's bus itself, so we need to pass dev not dev->bus. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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- 20 Feb, 2015 29 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Myron Stowe authored
commit 06cf35f9 upstream. Some AMD CS553x devices have read-only BARs because of a firmware or hardware defect. There's a workaround in quirk_cs5536_vsa(), but it no longer works after 36e81648 ("PCI: Restore detection of read-only BARs"). Prior to 36e81648, we filled in res->start; afterwards we leave it zeroed out. The quirk only updated the size, so the driver tried to use a region starting at zero, which didn't work. Expand quirk_cs5536_vsa() to read the base addresses from the BARs and hard-code the sizes. On Nix's system BAR 2's read-only value is 0x6200. Prior to 36e81648, we interpret that as a 512-byte BAR based on the lowest-order bit set. Per datasheet sec 5.6.1, that BAR (MFGPT) requires only 64 bytes; use that to avoid clearing any address bits if a platform uses only 64-byte alignment. [bhelgaas: changelog, reduce BAR 2 size to 64] Fixes: 36e81648 ("PCI: Restore detection of read-only BARs") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85991#c4 Link: http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/31506_cs5535_databook.pdf Link: http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/33238G_cs5536_db.pdfReported-and-tested-by: Nix <nix@esperi.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit f3747379 upstream. SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways: 1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239). 2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can still be set without causing #GP). 3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in legacy-mode. 4. There is some unneeded code. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.linux.org Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Avi Kivity authored
commit 1a18a69b upstream. If the guest thinks it's an AMD, it will not have prepared the SYSENTER MSRs, and if the guest executes SYSENTER in compatibility mode, it will fails. Detect this condition and #UD instead, like the spec says. Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit db29a950 upstream. Given following iptables ruleset: -P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue. This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information). All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the 'generic' entry. Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others. [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Ben Hutchings authored
We need to check the position and size of file writes against various limits, using generic_write_check(). This was not being done for the splice write path. It was fixed upstream by commit 8d020765 ("->splice_write() via ->write_iter()") but we can't apply that. CVE-2014-7822 Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Ben Hutchings authored
When backporting commit 4023bfc9 ("be careful with nd->inode in path_init() and follow_dotdot_rcu()"), I failed to account for the vfsmount_lock that is used in 3.2 but not upstream. path_init() takes the lock if performing RCU lookup, but must drop it if (and only if) it subsequently fails. Reported-by: nuxi@vault24.org References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92531Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Tested-by: nuxi@vault24.org
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Jay Vosburgh authored
[ Upstream commit 2c26d34b ] When using VXLAN tunnels and a sky2 device, I have experienced checksum failures of the following type: [ 4297.761899] eth0: hw csum failure [...] [ 4297.765223] Call Trace: [ 4297.765224] <IRQ> [<ffffffff8172f026>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [ 4297.765235] [<ffffffff8162ba52>] netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x42/0x50 [ 4297.765238] [<ffffffff8161c1a0>] ? skb_push+0x40/0x40 [ 4297.765240] [<ffffffff8162325c>] __skb_checksum_complete+0xbc/0xd0 [ 4297.765243] [<ffffffff8168c602>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e2/0x950 [ 4297.765246] [<ffffffff81666ca0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360 These are reliably reproduced in a network topology of: container:eth0 == host(OVS VXLAN on VLAN) == bond0 == eth0 (sky2) -> switch When VXLAN encapsulated traffic is received from a similarly configured peer, the above warning is generated in the receive processing of the encapsulated packet. Note that the warning is associated with the container eth0. The skbs from sky2 have ip_summed set to CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, and because the packet is an encapsulated Ethernet frame, the checksum generated by the hardware includes the inner protocol and Ethernet headers. The receive code is careful to update the skb->csum, except in __dev_forward_skb, as called by dev_forward_skb. __dev_forward_skb calls eth_type_trans, which in turn calls skb_pull_inline(skb, ETH_HLEN) to skip over the Ethernet header, but does not update skb->csum when doing so. This patch resolves the problem by adding a call to skb_postpull_rcsum to update the skb->csum after the call to eth_type_trans. Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Govindarajulu Varadarajan authored
[ Upstream commit 17e96834 ] Hardware always provides compliment of IP pseudo checksum. Stack expects whole packet checksum without pseudo checksum if CHECKSUM_COMPLETE is set. This causes checksum error in nf & ovs. kernel: qg-19546f09-f2: hw csum failure kernel: CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: GF O-------------- 3.10.0-123.8.1.el7.x86_64 #1 kernel: Hardware name: Cisco Systems Inc UCSB-B200-M3/UCSB-B200-M3, BIOS B200M3.2.2.3.0.080820141339 08/08/2014 kernel: ffff881218f40000 df68243feb35e3a8 ffff881237a43ab8 ffffffff815e237b kernel: ffff881237a43ad0 ffffffff814cd4ca ffff8829ec71eb00 ffff881237a43af0 kernel: ffffffff814c6232 0000000000000286 ffff8829ec71eb00 ffff881237a43b00 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <IRQ> [<ffffffff815e237b>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b kernel: [<ffffffff814cd4ca>] netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x3a/0x40 kernel: [<ffffffff814c6232>] __skb_checksum_complete_head+0x62/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff814c6251>] __skb_checksum_complete+0x11/0x20 kernel: [<ffffffff8155a20c>] nf_ip_checksum+0xcc/0x100 kernel: [<ffffffffa049edc7>] icmp_error+0x1f7/0x35c [nf_conntrack_ipv4] kernel: [<ffffffff814cf419>] ? netif_rx+0xb9/0x1d0 kernel: [<ffffffffa040eb7b>] ? internal_dev_recv+0xdb/0x130 [openvswitch] kernel: [<ffffffffa04c8330>] nf_conntrack_in+0xf0/0xa80 [nf_conntrack] kernel: [<ffffffff81509380>] ? inet_del_offload+0x40/0x40 kernel: [<ffffffffa049e302>] ipv4_conntrack_in+0x22/0x30 [nf_conntrack_ipv4] kernel: [<ffffffff815005ca>] nf_iterate+0xaa/0xc0 kernel: [<ffffffff81509380>] ? inet_del_offload+0x40/0x40 kernel: [<ffffffff81500664>] nf_hook_slow+0x84/0x140 kernel: [<ffffffff81509380>] ? inet_del_offload+0x40/0x40 kernel: [<ffffffff81509dd4>] ip_rcv+0x344/0x380 Hardware verifies IP & tcp/udp header checksum but does not provide payload checksum, use CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY. Set it only if its valid IP tcp/udp packet. Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@redhat.com> Reported-by: Sunil Choudhary <schoudha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <_govind@gmx.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Prashant Sreedharan authored
[ Upstream commit 05b0aa57 ] During driver load in tg3_init_one, if the driver detects DMA activity before intializing the chip tg3_halt is called. As part of tg3_halt interrupts are disabled using routine tg3_disable_ints. This routine was using mailbox value which was not initialized (default value is 0). As a result driver was writing 0x00000001 to pci config space register 0, which is the vendor id / device id. This driver bug was exposed because of the commit a7877b17a667 (PCI: Check only the Vendor ID to identify Configuration Request Retry). Also this issue is only seen in older generation chipsets like 5722 because config space write to offset 0 from driver is possible. The newer generation chips ignore writes to offset 0. Also without commit a7877b17a667, for these older chips when a GRC reset is issued the Bootcode would reprogram the vendor id/device id, which is the reason this bug was masked earlier. Fixed by initializing the interrupt mailbox registers before calling tg3_halt. Please queue for -stable. Reported-by: Nils Holland <nholland@tisys.org> Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Ben Hutchings authored
Steven Rostedt reported: > Porting -rt to the latest 3.2 stable tree I triggered this bug: > > ===================================== > [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] > ------------------------------------- > rm/1638 is trying to release lock (rcu_read_lock) at: > [<c04fde6c>] rcu_read_unlock+0x0/0x23 > but there are no more locks to release! > > other info that might help us debug this: > 2 locks held by rm/1638: > #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04f93eb>] do_rmdir+0x5f/0xd2 > #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04f9329>] vfs_rmdir+0x49/0xac > > stack backtrace: > Pid: 1638, comm: rm Not tainted 3.2.66-test-rt96+ #2 > Call Trace: > [<c083f390>] ? printk+0x1d/0x1f > [<c0463cdf>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xc3/0xcd > [<c04653a8>] lock_release_non_nested+0x98/0x1ec > [<c046228d>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x18/0x90 > [<c0456f1c>] ? local_clock+0x2d/0x50 > [<c04fde6c>] ? d_hash+0x2f/0x2f > [<c04fde6c>] ? d_hash+0x2f/0x2f > [<c046568e>] lock_release+0x192/0x1ad > [<c04fde83>] rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x23 > [<c04ff344>] shrink_dcache_parent+0x227/0x270 > [<c04f9348>] vfs_rmdir+0x68/0xac > [<c04f9424>] do_rmdir+0x98/0xd2 > [<c04f03ad>] ? fput+0x1a3/0x1ab > [<c084dd42>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x1a > [<c0465b58>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x118/0x149 > [<c04fa3e0>] sys_unlinkat+0x2b/0x35 > [<c084dd13>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x12 > > > > > There's a path to calling rcu_read_unlock() without calling > rcu_read_lock() in have_submounts(). > > goto positive; > > positive: > if (!locked && read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) > goto rename_retry; > > rename_retry: > rcu_read_unlock(); > > in the above path, rcu_read_lock() is never done before calling > rcu_read_unlock(); I reviewed locking contexts in all three functions that I changed when backporting "deal with deadlock in d_walk()". It's actually worse than this: - We don't hold this_parent->d_lock at the 'positive' label in have_submounts(), but it is unlocked after 'rename_retry'. - There is an rcu_read_unlock() after the 'out' label in select_parent(), but it's not held at the 'goto out'. Fix all three lock imbalances. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 2196937e upstream. We could be reading 8 bytes into a 4 byte buffer here. It seems harmless but adding a check is the right thing to do and it silences a static checker warning. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Sasha Levin authored
commit a3a87844 upstream. When a key is being garbage collected, it's key->user would get put before the ->destroy() callback is called, where the key is removed from it's respective tracking structures. This leaves a key hanging in a semi-invalid state which leaves a window open for a different task to try an access key->user. An example is find_keyring_by_name() which would dereference key->user for a key that is in the process of being garbage collected (where key->user was freed but ->destroy() wasn't called yet - so it's still present in the linked list). This would cause either a panic, or corrupt memory. Fixes CVE-2014-9529. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Jerry Hoemann authored
commit 6424babf upstream. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 3b564968 upstream. This adds the workaround for erratum 793 as a precaution in case not every BIOS implements it. This addresses CVE-2013-6885. Erratum text: [Revision Guide for AMD Family 16h Models 00h-0Fh Processors, document 51810 Rev. 3.04 November 2013] 793 Specific Combination of Writes to Write Combined Memory Types and Locked Instructions May Cause Core Hang Description Under a highly specific and detailed set of internal timing conditions, a locked instruction may trigger a timing sequence whereby the write to a write combined memory type is not flushed, causing the locked instruction to stall indefinitely. Potential Effect on System Processor core hang. Suggested Workaround BIOS should set MSR C001_1020[15] = 1b. Fix Planned No fix planned [ hpa: updated description, fixed typo in MSR name ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140114230711.GS29865@pd.tnicTested-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravind.gopalakrishnan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust filename - Venkatesh Srinivas pointed out we should use {rd,wr}msrl_safe() to avoid crashing on KVM. This was fixed upstream by commit 8f86a737 ("x86, AMD: Convert to the new bit access MSR accessors") but that's too much trouble to backport. Here we must use {rd,wr}msrl_amd_safe().] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org> Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@google.com>
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Martin Schwidefsky authored
commit e512d56c upstream. git commit 37f81fa1 "n_tty: do O_ONLCR translation as a single write" surfaced a bug in the 3215 device driver. In combination this broke tab expansion for tty ouput. The cause is an asymmetry in the behaviour of tty3215_ops->write vs tty3215_ops->put_char. The put_char function scans for '\t' but the write function does not. As the driver has logic for the '\t' expansion remove XTABS from c_oflag of the initial termios as well. Reported-by: Stephen Powell <zlinuxman@wowway.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Lv Zheng authored
commit 79149001 upstream. It is reported that Samsung laptops that need to poll events are broken by the following commit: Commit 3afcf2ec Subject: ACPI / EC: Add support to disallow QR_EC to be issued when SCI_EVT isn't set The behaviors of the 2 vendor firmwares are conflict: 1. Acer: OSPM shouldn't issue QR_EC unless SCI_EVT is set, firmware automatically sets SCI_EVT as long as there is event queued up. 2. Samsung: OSPM should issue QR_EC whatever SCI_EVT is set, firmware returns 0 when there is no event queued up. This patch is a quick fix to distinguish the behaviors to make Acer behavior only effective for Acer EC firmware so that the breakages on Samsung EC firmware can be avoided. Fixes: 3afcf2ec (ACPI / EC: Add support to disallow QR_EC to be issued ...) Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44161Reported-and-tested-by: Ortwin Glück <odi@odi.ch> Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> [ rjw : Subject ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Ben Hutchings authored
This reverts commit e105c818 which was commit 72212675 upstream. This caused suspend/resume to stop working on at least some systems - specifically, the system would reboot when woken. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Ben Hutchings authored
This reverts commit a5c187d9 which was commit 45e2a9d4 upstream. The previous commit caused suspend/resume to stop working on at least some systems - specifically, the system would reboot when woken. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit 9c145c56 upstream. The stack guard page error case has long incorrectly caused a SIGBUS rather than a SIGSEGV, but nobody actually noticed until commit fee7e49d ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page") because that error case was never actually triggered in any normal situations. Now that we actually report the error, people noticed the wrong signal that resulted. So far, only the test suite of libsigsegv seems to have actually cared, but there are real applications that use libsigsegv, so let's not wait for any of those to break. Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> # "s390 still compiles and boots" Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit 33692f27 upstream. The core VM already knows about VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, but cannot return a "you should SIGSEGV" error, because the SIGSEGV case was generally handled by the caller - usually the architecture fault handler. That results in lots of duplication - all the architecture fault handlers end up doing very similar "look up vma, check permissions, do retries etc" - but it generally works. However, there are cases where the VM actually wants to SIGSEGV, and applications _expect_ SIGSEGV. In particular, when accessing the stack guard page, libsigsegv expects a SIGSEGV. And it usually got one, because the stack growth is handled by that duplicated architecture fault handler. However, when the generic VM layer started propagating the error return from the stack expansion in commit fee7e49d ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page"), that now exposed the existing VM_FAULT_SIGBUS result to user space. And user space really expected SIGSEGV, not SIGBUS. To fix that case, we need to add a VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV, and teach all those duplicate architecture fault handlers about it. They all already have the code to handle SIGSEGV, so it's about just tying that new return value to the existing code, but it's all a bit annoying. This is the mindless minimal patch to do this. A more extensive patch would be to try to gather up the mostly shared fault handling logic into one generic helper routine, and long-term we really should do that cleanup. Just from this patch, you can generally see that most architectures just copied (directly or indirectly) the old x86 way of doing things, but in the meantime that original x86 model has been improved to hold the VM semaphore for shorter times etc and to handle VM_FAULT_RETRY and other "newer" things, so it would be a good idea to bring all those improvements to the generic case and teach other architectures about them too. Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> # "s390 still compiles and boots" Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust filenames, context - Drop arc, metag, nios2 and lustre changes - For sh, patch both 32-bit and 64-bit implementations to use goto bad_area - For s390, pass int_code and trans_exc_code as arguments to do_no_context() and do_sigsegv()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 600ddd68 upstream. When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as already described in detail in commit 1be9a950 ("net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950 ... [ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 [ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 [ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] [ 534.939704] Call Trace: [ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 [ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 [ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 [ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 [ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ... or depending on the the application, for example this one: [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] [ 1370.963431] Call Trace: [ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 [ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: [ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten [ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 [ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 [ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] [ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] [ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 [ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 [ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 [ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] [ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] [ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). Reference counting of auth keys revisited: Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a7 ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Clemens Ladisch authored
commit 0767e95b upstream. When the last subscriber to a "Through" port has been removed, the subscribed destination ports might still be active, so it would be wrong to send "all sounds off" and "reset controller" events to them. The proper place for such a shutdown would be the closing of the actual MIDI port (and close_substream() in rawmidi.c already can do this). This also fixes a deadlock when dummy_unuse() tries to send events to its own port that is already locked because it is being freed. Reported-by: Peter Billam <peter@www.pjb.com.au> Signed-off-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Bob Paauwe authored
commit af1a7301 upstream. When creating a fence for a tiled object, only fence the area that makes up the actual tiles. The object may be larger than the tiled area and if we allow those extra addresses to be fenced, they'll get converted to addresses beyond where the object is mapped. This opens up the possiblity of writes beyond the end of object. To prevent this, we adjust the size of the fence to only encompass the area that makes up the actual tiles. The extra space is considered un-tiled and now behaves as if it was a linear object. Testcase: igt/gem_tiled_fence_overflow Reported-by: Dan Hettena <danh@ghs.com> Signed-off-by: Bob Paauwe <bob.j.paauwe@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context, indentation - Apply to both i965_write_fence_reg() and sandybridge_write_fence_reg(), which have been combined into one function upstream] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Macpaul Lin authored
commit e5dff0e8 upstream. OTG device shall support this device for allowing compliance automated testing. The modification is derived from Pavankumar and Vijayavardhans' previous work. Signed-off-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul@gmail.com> Cc: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org> Cc: Vijayavardhan Vennapusa <vvreddy@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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James P Michels III authored
commit cd83ce9e upstream. This patch adds a usb quirk to support devices with interupt endpoints and bInterval values expressed as microframes. The quirk causes the parse endpoint function to modify the reported bInterval to a standards conforming value. There is currently code in the endpoint parser that checks for bIntervals that are outside of the valid range (1-16 for USB 2+ high speed and super speed interupt endpoints). In this case, the code assumes the bInterval is being reported in 1ms frames. As well, the correction is only applied if the original bInterval value is out of the 1-16 range. With this quirk applied to the device, the bInterval will be accurately adjusted from microframes to an exponent. Signed-off-by: James P Michels III <james.p.michels@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Dmitry Nezhevenko authored
commit bf5c4136 upstream. It looks like FUA support is broken on JMicron 152d:2566 bridge: [223159.885704] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] Write Protect is off [223159.885706] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] Mode Sense: 47 00 10 08 [223159.885942] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, supports DPO and FUA [223283.691677] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] [223283.691680] Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE [223283.691681] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] [223283.691682] Sense Key : Illegal Request [current] [223283.691684] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] [223283.691685] Add. Sense: Invalid field in cdb [223283.691686] sd 7:0:0:0: [sdc] CDB: [223283.691687] Write(10): 2a 08 15 d0 83 0d 00 00 01 00 [223283.691690] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev sdc, sector 2927892584 This patch adds blacklist flag so that sd will not use FUA Signed-off-by: Dmitry Nezhevenko <dion@dion.org.ua> Cc: Phil Dibowitz <phil@ipom.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 0fa7b391 upstream. In case userspace attempts to obtain key information for or delete a unicast key, this is currently erroneously rejected unless the driver sets the WIPHY_FLAG_IBSS_RSN flag. Apparently enough drivers do so it was never noticed. Fix that, and while at it fix a potential memory leak: the error path in the get_key() function was placed after allocating a message but didn't free it - move it to a better place. Luckily admin permissions are needed to call this operation. Fixes: e31b8213 ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 3669ef9f upstream. The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index: struct user_desc u_info; bzero(&u_info, sizeof(u_info)); u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1; syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &u_info); Strictly speaking, this code was never correct. It should have set read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate a TLS entry for real. The actual effect of this code was to allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix. The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game. This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game expects but should be close enough to keep it working. In particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will allocate the same segment both times. According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2. If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me. Fixes: 41bdc785 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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