- 10 Jun, 2014 17 commits
-
-
David Sterba authored
The patch "Btrfs: fix protection between send and root deletion" (18f687d5) does not actually prevent to delete the snapshot and just takes care during background cleaning, but this seems rather user unfriendly, this patch implements the idea presented in http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg30813.html - add an internal root_item flag to denote a dead root - check if the send_in_progress is set and refuse to delete, otherwise set the flag and proceed - check the flag in send similar to the btrfs_root_readonly checks, for all involved roots The root lookup in send via btrfs_read_fs_root_no_name will check if the root is really dead or not. If it is, ENOENT, aborted send. If it's alive, it's protected by send_in_progress, send can continue. CC: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Wang Shilong <wangsl.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Daeseok Youn authored
It doesn't need to check NULL for kfree() Signed-off-by:
Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Filipe Manana authored
This implements the tmpfile callback of struct inode_operations, introduced in the linux kernel 3.11, and implemented already by some filesystems. This callback is invoked by the VFS when the flag O_TMPFILE is passed to the open system call. Signed-off-by:
Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
-
David Sterba authored
This ioctl provides basic info about the filesystem that can be obtained in other ways (eg. sysfs), there's no reason to restrict it to CAP_SYSADMIN. Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
David Sterba authored
This ioctl provides basic info about the devices that can be obtained in other ways (eg. sysfs), there's no reason to restrict it to CAP_SYSADMIN. Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
David Sterba authored
Similar to the FS_INFO updates, export the basic filesystem info through sysfs: node size, sector size and clone alignment. Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
David Sterba authored
Provide the basic information about filesystem through the ioctl: * b-tree node size (same as leaf size) * sector size * expected alignment of CLONE_RANGE and EXTENT_SAME ioctl arguments Backward compatibility: if the values are 0, kernel does not provide this information, the applications should ignore them. Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
David Sterba authored
This started as debugging helper, to watch the effects of converting between raid levels on multiple devices, but could be useful standalone. In my case the usage filter was not finegrained enough and led to converting too many chunks at once. Another example use is in connection with drange+devid or vrange filters that allow to work with a specific chunk or even with a chunk on a given device. The limit filter applies last, the value of 0 means no limiting. CC: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> CC: Hugo Mills <hugo@carfax.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Filipe Manana authored
While running a stress test with multiple threads writing to the same btrfs file system, I ended up with a situation where a leaf was corrupted in that it had 2 file extent item keys that had the same exact key. I was able to detect this quickly thanks to the following patch which triggers an assertion as soon as a leaf is marked dirty if there are duplicated keys or out of order keys: Btrfs: check if items are ordered when a leaf is marked dirty (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/3955431/) Basically while running the test, I got the following in dmesg: [28877.415877] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 10706 at fs/btrfs/file.c:553 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x435/0x440 [btrfs]() (...) [28877.415917] Call Trace: [28877.415922] [<ffffffff816f1189>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x68 [28877.415926] [<ffffffff8104a32c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [28877.415929] [<ffffffff8104a37a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [28877.415944] [<ffffffffa03775a5>] btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x435/0x440 [btrfs] [28877.415949] [<ffffffff8118e7be>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfe/0x1c0 [28877.415962] [<ffffffffa03777d9>] fill_holes+0x229/0x3e0 [btrfs] [28877.415972] [<ffffffffa0345865>] ? block_rsv_add_bytes+0x55/0x80 [btrfs] [28877.415984] [<ffffffffa03792cb>] btrfs_fallocate+0xb6b/0xc20 [btrfs] (...) [29854.132560] BTRFS critical (device sdc): corrupt leaf, bad key order: block=955232256,root=1, slot=24 [29854.132565] BTRFS info (device sdc): leaf 955232256 total ptrs 40 free space 778 (...) [29854.132637] item 23 key (3486 108 667648) itemoff 2694 itemsize 53 [29854.132638] extent data disk bytenr 14574411776 nr 286720 [29854.132639] extent data offset 0 nr 286720 ram 286720 [29854.132640] item 24 key (3486 108 954368) itemoff 2641 itemsize 53 [29854.132641] extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0 [29854.132643] extent data offset 0 nr 0 ram 0 [29854.132644] item 25 key (3486 108 954368) itemoff 2588 itemsize 53 [29854.132645] extent data disk bytenr 8699670528 nr 77824 [29854.132646] extent data offset 0 nr 77824 ram 77824 [29854.132647] item 26 key (3486 108 1146880) itemoff 2535 itemsize 53 [29854.132648] extent data disk bytenr 8699670528 nr 77824 [29854.132649] extent data offset 0 nr 77824 ram 77824 (...) [29854.132707] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3901! (...) [29854.132771] Call Trace: [29854.132779] [<ffffffffa0342b5c>] setup_items_for_insert+0x2dc/0x400 [btrfs] [29854.132791] [<ffffffffa0378537>] __btrfs_drop_extents+0xba7/0xdd0 [btrfs] [29854.132794] [<ffffffff8109c0d6>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x1d0 [29854.132797] [<ffffffff8109c29d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [29854.132800] [<ffffffff8118e7be>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfe/0x1c0 [29854.132810] [<ffffffffa036783b>] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.66+0xab/0x310 [btrfs] [29854.132820] [<ffffffffa036a6c6>] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x116/0x340 [btrfs] [29854.132830] [<ffffffffa0374d53>] btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x23/0x30 [btrfs] (...) So this is caused by getting an -ENOSPC error while punching a file hole, more specifically, we get -ENOSPC error from __btrfs_drop_extents in the while loop of file.c:btrfs_punch_hole() when it's unable to modify the btree to delete one or more file extent items due to lack of enough free space. When this happens, in btrfs_punch_hole(), we attempt to reclaim free space by switching our transaction block reservation object to root->fs_info->trans_block_rsv, end our transaction and start a new transaction basically - and, we keep increasing our current offset (cur_offset) as long as it's smaller than the end of the target range (lockend) - this makes use leave the loop with cur_offset == drop_end which in turn makes us call fill_holes() for inserting a file extent item that represents a 0 bytes range hole (and this insertion succeeds, as in the meanwhile more space became available). This 0 bytes file hole extent item is a problem because any subsequent caller of __btrfs_drop_extents (regular file writes, or fallocate calls for e.g.), with a start file offset that is equal to the offset of the hole, will not remove this extent item due to the following conditional in the while loop of __btrfs_drop_extents: if (extent_end <= search_start) { path->slots[0]++; goto next_slot; } This later makes the call to setup_items_for_insert() (at the very end of __btrfs_drop_extents), insert a new file extent item with the same offset as the 0 bytes file hole extent item that follows it. Needless is to say that this causes chaos, either when reading the leaf from disk (btree_readpage_end_io_hook), where we perform leaf sanity checks or in subsequent operations that manipulate file extent items, as in the fallocate call as shown by the dmesg trace above. Without my other patch to perform the leaf sanity checks once a leaf is marked as dirty (if the integrity checker is enabled), it would have been much harder to debug this issue. This change might fix a few similar issues reported by users in the mailing list regarding assertion failures in btrfs_set_item_key_safe calls performed by __btrfs_drop_extents, such as the following report: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.btrfs/32938 Asking fill_holes() to create a 0 bytes wide file hole item also produced the first warning in the trace above, as we passed a range to btrfs_drop_extent_cache that has an end smaller (by -1) than its start. On 3.14 kernels this issue manifests itself through leaf corruption, as we get duplicated file extent item keys in a leaf when calling setup_items_for_insert(), but on older kernels, setup_items_for_insert() isn't called by __btrfs_drop_extents(), instead we have callers of __btrfs_drop_extents(), namely the functions inode.c:insert_inline_extent() and inode.c:insert_reserved_file_extent(), calling btrfs_insert_empty_item() to insert the new file extent item, which would fail with error -EEXIST, instead of inserting a duplicated key - which is still a serious issue as it would make all similar file extent item replace operations keep failing if they target the same file range. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Liu Bo authored
'bio_index' is just a index, it's really not necessary to do increment one by one. Signed-off-by:
Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Filipe Manana authored
In a previous change, commit 12870f1c, I accidentally moved the roundup of inode->i_size to outside of the critical section delimited by the inode mutex, which is not atomic and not correct since the size can be changed by other task before we acquire the mutex. Therefore fix it. Signed-off-by:
Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Tobias Klauser authored
iput() already checks for the inode being NULL, thus it's unnecessary to check before calling. Signed-off-by:
Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Zach Brown authored
uncompress_inline() is dropping the error from btrfs_decompress() after testing it and zeroing the page that was supposed to hold decompressed data. This can silently turn compressed inline data in to zeros if decompression fails due to corrupt compressed data or memory allocation failure. I verified this by manually forcing the error from btrfs_decompress() for a silly named copy of od: if (!strcmp(current->comm, "failod")) ret = -ENOMEM; # od -x /mnt/btrfs/dir/80 | head -1 0000000 3031 3038 310a 2d30 6f70 6e69 0a74 3031 # echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches # cp $(which od) /tmp/failod # /tmp/failod -x /mnt/btrfs/dir/80 | head -1 0000000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 The fix is to pass the error to its caller. Which still has a BUG_ON(). So we fix that too. There seems to be no reason for the zeroing of the page on the error from btrfs_decompress() but not from the allocation error a few lines above. So the page zeroing is removed. Signed-off-by:
Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Zach Brown authored
The btrfs compression wrappers translated errors from workspace allocation to either -ENOMEM or -1. The compression type workspace allocators are already returning a ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM). Just return that and get rid of the magical -1. This helps a future patch return errors from the compression wrappers. Signed-off-by:
Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Zach Brown authored
The compression layer seems to have been built to return -1 and have callers make up errors that make sense. This isn't great because there are different errors that originate down in the compression layer. Let's return real negative errnos from the compression layer so that callers can pass on the error without having to guess what happened. ENOMEM for allocation failure, E2BIG when compression exceeds the uncompressed input, and EIO for everything else. This helps a future path return errors from btrfs_decompress(). Signed-off-by:
Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Stefan Behrens authored
This issue was not causing any harm but IMO (and in the opinion of the static code checker) it is better to propagate this error status upwards. Signed-off-by:
Stefan Behrens <sbehrens@giantdisaster.de> Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
Filipe Manana authored
When running low on available disk space and having several processes doing buffered file IO, I got the following trace in dmesg: [ 4202.720152] INFO: task kworker/u8:1:5450 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 4202.720401] Not tainted 3.13.0-fdm-btrfs-next-26+ #1 [ 4202.720596] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 4202.720874] kworker/u8:1 D 0000000000000001 0 5450 2 0x00000000 [ 4202.720904] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc normal_work_helper [btrfs] [ 4202.720908] ffff8801f62ddc38 0000000000000082 ffff880203ac2490 00000000001d3f40 [ 4202.720913] ffff8801f62ddfd8 00000000001d3f40 ffff8800c4f0c920 ffff880203ac2490 [ 4202.720918] 00000000001d4a40 ffff88020fe85a40 ffff88020fe85ab8 0000000000000001 [ 4202.720922] Call Trace: [ 4202.720931] [<ffffffff816a3cb9>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [ 4202.720950] [<ffffffffa01ec48d>] btrfs_start_ordered_extent+0x6d/0x110 [btrfs] [ 4202.720956] [<ffffffff8108e620>] ? bit_waitqueue+0xc0/0xc0 [ 4202.720972] [<ffffffffa01ec559>] btrfs_run_ordered_extent_work+0x29/0x40 [btrfs] [ 4202.720988] [<ffffffffa0201987>] normal_work_helper+0x137/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 4202.720994] [<ffffffff810680e5>] process_one_work+0x1f5/0x530 (...) [ 4202.721027] 2 locks held by kworker/u8:1/5450: [ 4202.721028] #0: (%s-%s){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff81068083>] process_one_work+0x193/0x530 [ 4202.721037] #1: ((&work->normal_work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81068083>] process_one_work+0x193/0x530 [ 4202.721054] INFO: task btrfs:7891 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 4202.721258] Not tainted 3.13.0-fdm-btrfs-next-26+ #1 [ 4202.721444] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 4202.721699] btrfs D 0000000000000001 0 7891 7890 0x00000001 [ 4202.721704] ffff88018c2119e8 0000000000000086 ffff8800a33d2490 00000000001d3f40 [ 4202.721710] ffff88018c211fd8 00000000001d3f40 ffff8802144b0000 ffff8800a33d2490 [ 4202.721714] ffff8800d8576640 ffff88020fe85bc0 ffff88020fe85bc8 7fffffffffffffff [ 4202.721718] Call Trace: [ 4202.721723] [<ffffffff816a3cb9>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [ 4202.721727] [<ffffffff816a2ebc>] schedule_timeout+0x1dc/0x270 [ 4202.721732] [<ffffffff8109bd79>] ? mark_held_locks+0xb9/0x140 [ 4202.721736] [<ffffffff816a90c0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x40 [ 4202.721740] [<ffffffff8109bf0d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1d0 [ 4202.721744] [<ffffffff816a488f>] wait_for_completion+0xdf/0x120 [ 4202.721749] [<ffffffff8107fa90>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x310/0x310 [ 4202.721765] [<ffffffffa01ebee4>] btrfs_wait_ordered_extents+0x1f4/0x280 [btrfs] [ 4202.721781] [<ffffffffa020526e>] btrfs_mksubvol.isra.62+0x30e/0x5a0 [btrfs] [ 4202.721786] [<ffffffff8108e620>] ? bit_waitqueue+0xc0/0xc0 [ 4202.721799] [<ffffffffa02056a9>] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1a9/0x1b0 [btrfs] [ 4202.721813] [<ffffffffa020583a>] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x10a/0x170 [btrfs] (...) It turns out that extent_io.c:__extent_writepage(), which ends up being called through filemap_fdatawrite_range() in btrfs_start_ordered_extent(), was getting -ENOSPC when calling the fill_delalloc callback. In this situation, it returned without the writepage_end_io_hook callback (inode.c:btrfs_writepage_end_io_hook) ever being called for the respective page, which prevents the ordered extent's bytes_left count from ever reaching 0, and therefore a finish_ordered_fn work is never queued into the endio_write_workers queue. This makes the task that called btrfs_start_ordered_extent() hang forever on the wait queue of the ordered extent. This is fairly easy to reproduce using a small filesystem and fsstress on a quad core vm: mkfs.btrfs -f -b `expr 2100 \* 1024 \* 1024` /dev/sdd mount /dev/sdd /mnt fsstress -p 6 -d /mnt -n 100000 -x \ "btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap" \ -f allocsp=0 \ -f bulkstat=0 \ -f bulkstat1=0 \ -f chown=0 \ -f creat=1 \ -f dread=0 \ -f dwrite=0 \ -f fallocate=1 \ -f fdatasync=0 \ -f fiemap=0 \ -f freesp=0 \ -f fsync=0 \ -f getattr=0 \ -f getdents=0 \ -f link=0 \ -f mkdir=0 \ -f mknod=0 \ -f punch=1 \ -f read=0 \ -f readlink=0 \ -f rename=0 \ -f resvsp=0 \ -f rmdir=0 \ -f setxattr=0 \ -f stat=0 \ -f symlink=0 \ -f sync=0 \ -f truncate=1 \ -f unlink=0 \ -f unresvsp=0 \ -f write=4 So just ensure that if an error happens while writing the extent page we call the writepage_end_io_hook callback. Also make it return the error code and ensure the caller (extent_write_cache_pages) processes all pages in the page vector even if an error happens only for some of them, so that ordered extents end up released. Signed-off-by:
Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
- 08 Jun, 2014 2 commits
-
-
Linus Torvalds authored
-
Linus Torvalds authored
This reverts commit 3e1a878b. It came in very late, and already has one reported failure: Sitsofe reports that the current tree fails to boot on his EeePC, and bisected it down to this. Rather than waste time trying to figure out what's wrong, just revert it. Reported-by:
Sitsofe Wheeler <sitsofe@gmail.com> Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 07 Jun, 2014 4 commits
-
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull btrfs fix from Chris Mason: "I had this in my 3.16 merge window queue, but it is small and obvious enough for 3.15. I cherry-picked and retested against current rc8" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs: Btrfs: send, fix corrupted path strings for long paths
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nab/target-pendingLinus Torvalds authored
Pull SCSI target fixes from Nicholas Bellinger: "Here are the remaining fixes for v3.15. This series includes: - iser-target fix for ImmediateData exception reference count bug (Sagi + nab) - iscsi-target fix for MC/S login + potential iser-target MRDSL buffer overrun (Santosh + Roland) - iser-target fix for v3.15-rc multi network portal shutdown regression (nab) - target fix for allowing READ_CAPCITY during ALUA Standby access state (Chris + nab) - target fix for NULL pointer dereference of alua_access_state for un-configured devices (Chris + nab)" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nab/target-pending: target: Fix alua_access_state attribute OOPs for un-configured devices target: Allow READ_CAPACITY opcode in ALUA Standby access state iser-target: Fix multi network portal shutdown regression iscsi-target: Fix wrong buffer / buffer overrun in iscsi_change_param_value() iser-target: Add missing target_put_sess_cmd for ImmedateData failure
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull x86 fixes from Peter Anvin: "A significantly larger than I'd like set of patches for just below the wire. All of these, however, fix real problems. The one thing that is genuinely scary in here is the change of SMP initialization, but that *does* fix a confirmed hang when booting virtual machines. There is also a patch to actually do the right thing about not offlining a CPU when there are not enough interrupt vectors available in the system; the accounting was done incorrectly. The worst case for that patch is that we fail to offline CPUs when we should (the new code is strictly more conservative than the old), so is not particularly risky. Most of the rest is minor stuff; the EFI patches are all about exporting correct information to boot loaders and kexec" * 'x86/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: EFI_MIXED should not prohibit loading above 4G x86/smpboot: Initialize secondary CPU only if master CPU will wait for it x86/smpboot: Log error on secondary CPU wakeup failure at ERR level x86: Fix list/memory corruption on CPU hotplug x86: irq: Get correct available vectors for cpu disable x86/efi: Do not export efi runtime map in case old map x86/efi: earlyprintk=efi,keep fix
-
Matt Fleming authored
commit 7d453eee ("x86/efi: Wire up CONFIG_EFI_MIXED") introduced a regression for the functionality to load kernels above 4G. The relevant (incorrect) reasoning behind this change can be seen in the commit message, "The xloadflags field in the bzImage header is also updated to reflect that the kernel supports both entry points by setting both of XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_32 and XLF_EFI_HANDOVER_64 when CONFIG_EFI_MIXED=y. XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G is disabled so that the kernel text is guaranteed to be addressable with 32-bits." This is obviously bogus since 32-bit EFI loaders will never place the kernel above the 4G mark. So this restriction is entirely unnecessary. But things are worse than that - since we want to encourage people to always compile with CONFIG_EFI_MIXED=y so that their kernels work out of the box for both 32-bit and 64-bit firmware, commit 7d453eee effectively disables XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G completely. Remove the overzealous and superfluous restriction and restore the XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G functionality. Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1402140380-15377-1-git-send-email-matt@console-pimps.orgSigned-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
-
- 06 Jun, 2014 6 commits
-
-
Naoya Horiguchi authored
The age table walker doesn't check non-present hugetlb entry in common path, so hugetlb_entry() callbacks must check it. The reason for this behavior is that some callers want to handle it in its own way. [ I think that reason is bogus, btw - it should just do what the regular code does, which is to call the "pte_hole()" function for such hugetlb entries - Linus] However, some callers don't check it now, which causes unpredictable result, for example when we have a race between migrating hugepage and reading /proc/pid/numa_maps. This patch fixes it by adding !pte_present checks on buggy callbacks. This bug exists for years and got visible by introducing hugepage migration. ChangeLog v2: - fix if condition (check !pte_present() instead of pte_present()) Reported-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.12+] Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> [ Backported to 3.15. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> ] Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Filipe Manana authored
If a path has more than 230 characters, we allocate a new buffer to use for the path, but we were forgotting to copy the contents of the previous buffer into the new one, which has random content from the kmalloc call. Test: mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd mount /dev/sdd /mnt TEST_PATH="/mnt/fdmanana/.config/google-chrome-mysetup/Default/Pepper_Data/Shockwave_Flash/WritableRoot/#SharedObjects/JSHJ4ZKN/s.wsj.net/[[IMPORT]]/players.edgesuite.net/flash/plugins/osmf/advanced-streaming-plugin/v2.7/osmf1.6/Ak#" mkdir -p $TEST_PATH echo "hello world" > $TEST_PATH/amaiAdvancedStreamingPlugin.txt btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap1 btrfs send /mnt/mysnap1 -f /tmp/1.snap A test for xfstests follows. Signed-off-by:
Filipe David Borba Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Cc: Marc Merlin <marc@merlins.org> Tested-by:
Marc MERLIN <marc@merlins.org> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Four misc fixes: each was deemed serious enough to warrant v3.15 inclusion" * 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: sched/fair: Fix tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() deadlock on rq->lock sched/dl: Fix race in dl_task_timer() sched: Fix sched_policy < 0 comparison sched/numa: Fix use of spin_{un}lock_irq() when interrupts are disabled
-
Andrey Ryabinin authored
While working address sanitizer for kernel I've discovered use-after-free bug in __put_anon_vma. For the last anon_vma, anon_vma->root freed before child anon_vma. Later in anon_vma_free(anon_vma) we are referencing to already freed anon_vma->root to check rwsem. This fixes it by freeing the child anon_vma before freeing anon_vma->root. Signed-off-by:
Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0+ Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Nicholas Bellinger authored
This patch fixes a OOPs where an attempt to write to the per-device alua_access_state configfs attribute at: /sys/kernel/config/target/core/$HBA/$DEV/alua/$TG_PT_GP/alua_access_state results in an NULL pointer dereference when the backend device has not yet been configured. This patch adds an explicit check for DF_CONFIGURED, and fails with -ENODEV to avoid this case. Reported-by:
Chris Boot <crb@tiger-computing.co.uk> Reported-by:
Philip Gaw <pgaw@darktech.org.uk> Cc: Chris Boot <crb@tiger-computing.co.uk> Cc: Philip Gaw <pgaw@darktech.org.uk> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.8+ Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
-
Nicholas Bellinger authored
This patch allows READ_CAPACITY + SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16 opcode processing to occur while the associated ALUA group is in Standby access state. This is required to avoid host side LUN probe failures during the initial scan if an ALUA group has already implicitly changed into Standby access state. This addresses a bug reported by Chris + Philip using dm-multipath + ESX hosts configured with ALUA multipath. Reported-by:
Chris Boot <crb@tiger-computing.co.uk> Reported-by:
Philip Gaw <pgaw@darktech.org.uk> Cc: Chris Boot <crb@tiger-computing.co.uk> Cc: Philip Gaw <pgaw@darktech.org.uk> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
-
- 05 Jun, 2014 11 commits
-
-
H. Peter Anvin authored
* Fix earlyprintk=efi,keep support by switching to an ioremap() mapping of the framebuffer when early_ioremap() is no longer available and dropping __init from functions that may be invoked after free_initmem() - Dave Young * We shouldn't be exporting the EFI runtime map in sysfs if not using the new 1:1 EFI mapping code since in that case the mappings are not static across a kexec reboot - Dave Young Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Two last minute tooling fixes" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: perf probe: Fix perf probe to find correct variable DIE perf probe: Fix a segfault if asked for variable it doesn't find
-
Linus Torvalds authored
Merge futex fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "So with more awake and less futex wreckaged brain, I went through my list of points again and came up with the following 4 patches. 1) Prevent pi requeueing on the same futex I kept Kees check for uaddr1 == uaddr2 as a early check for private futexes and added a key comparison to both futex_requeue and futex_wait_requeue_pi. Sebastian, sorry for the confusion yesterday night. I really misunderstood your question. You are right the check is pointless for shared futexes where the same physical address is mapped to two different virtual addresses. 2) Sanity check atomic acquisiton in futex_lock_pi_atomic That's basically what Darren suggested. I just simplified it to use futex_top_waiter() to find kernel internal state. If state is found return -EINVAL and do not bother to fix up the user space variable. It's corrupted already. 3) Ensure state consistency in futex_unlock_pi The code is silly versus the owner died bit. There is no point to preserve it on unlock when the user space thread owns the futex. What's worse is that it does not update the user space value when the owner died bit is set. So the kernel itself creates observable inconsistency. Another "optimization" is to retry an atomic unlock. That's pointless as in a sane environment user space would not call into that code if it could have unlocked it atomically. So we always check whether there is kernel state around and only if there is none, we do the unlock by setting the user space value to 0. 4) Sanitize lookup_pi_state lookup_pi_state is ambigous about TID == 0 in the user space value. This can be a valid state even if there is kernel state on this uaddr, but we miss a few corner case checks. I tried to come up with a smaller solution hacking the checks into the current cruft, but it turned out to be ugly as hell and I got more confused than I was before. So I rewrote the sanity checks along the state documentation with awful lots of commentry" * emailed patches from Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>: futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic() futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path or from user space just for fun. The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some circumstances. Handle the cases explicit: Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() and exit_pi_state_list() [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. [8] Owner and user space value match [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space TID out of sync. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner (the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state, especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred. Clean it up unconditionally. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel associated to the real owner. Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem. [ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try restoring the already corrupted user space state. ] Signed-off-by:
Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Thomas Gleixner authored
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1) If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable condition. This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a ("futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()") [ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be different depending on the mapping ] Fixes CVE-2014-3153. Reported-by: Pinkie Pie Signed-off-by:
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Igor Mammedov authored
Hang is observed on virtual machines during CPU hotplug, especially in big guests with many CPUs. (It reproducible more often if host is over-committed). It happens because master CPU gives up waiting on secondary CPU and allows it to run wild. As result AP causes locking or crashing system. For example as described here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/3/6/257 If master CPU have sent STARTUP IPI successfully, and AP signalled to master CPU that it's ready to start initialization, make master CPU wait indefinitely till AP is onlined. To ensure that AP won't ever run wild, make it wait at early startup till master CPU confirms its intention to wait for AP. If AP doesn't respond in 10 seconds, the master CPU will timeout and cancel AP onlining. Signed-off-by:
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401975765-22328-4-git-send-email-imammedo@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-
Igor Mammedov authored
If system is running without debug level logging, it will not log error if do_boot_cpu() failed to wakeup AP. It may lead to silent AP bringup failures at boot time. Change message level to KERN_ERR to make error visible to user as it's done on other architectures. Signed-off-by:
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401975765-22328-3-git-send-email-imammedo@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-
Igor Mammedov authored
currently if AP wake up is failed, master CPU marks AP as not present in do_boot_cpu() by calling set_cpu_present(cpu, false). That leads to following list corruption on the next physical CPU hotplug: [ 418.107336] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 45 at lib/list_debug.c:33 __list_add+0xbe/0xd0() [ 418.115268] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff88003dc57600), but was ffff88003e20c3a0. (prev=ffff88003e20c3a0). [ 418.123693] Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6t_REJECT ipt_REJECT cfg80211 xt_conntrack rfkill ee [ 418.138979] CPU: 1 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u10:1 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc6+ #387 [ 418.149989] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2007 [ 418.165750] Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn [ 418.166433] 0000000000000021 ffff880038ca7988 ffffffff8159b22d 0000000000000021 [ 418.176460] ffff880038ca79d8 ffff880038ca79c8 ffffffff8106942c ffff880038ca79e8 [ 418.177453] ffff88003e20c3a0 ffff88003dc57600 ffff88003e20c3a0 00000000ffffffea [ 418.178445] Call Trace: [ 418.185811] [<ffffffff8159b22d>] dump_stack+0x49/0x5c [ 418.186440] [<ffffffff8106942c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0 [ 418.187192] [<ffffffff81069516>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [ 418.191231] [<ffffffff8136ef51>] ? acpi_ns_get_node+0xb7/0xc7 [ 418.193889] [<ffffffff812f796e>] __list_add+0xbe/0xd0 [ 418.196649] [<ffffffff812e2aa9>] kobject_add_internal+0x79/0x200 [ 418.208610] [<ffffffff812e2e18>] kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [ 418.213831] [<ffffffff812e2ef4>] kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [ 418.229961] [<ffffffff813e2c60>] device_add+0xd0/0x550 [ 418.234991] [<ffffffff813f0e95>] ? pm_runtime_init+0xe5/0xf0 [ 418.250226] [<ffffffff813e32be>] device_register+0x1e/0x30 [ 418.255296] [<ffffffff813e82a3>] register_cpu+0xe3/0x130 [ 418.266539] [<ffffffff81592be5>] arch_register_cpu+0x65/0x150 [ 418.285845] [<ffffffff81355c0d>] acpi_processor_hotadd_init+0x5a/0x9b ... Which is caused by the fact that generic_processor_info() allocates logical CPU id by calling: cpu = cpumask_next_zero(-1, cpu_present_mask); which returns id of previously failed to wake up CPU, since its bit is cleared by do_boot_cpu() and as result register_cpu() tries to register another CPU with the same id as already present but failed to be onlined CPU. Taking in account that AP will not do anything if master CPU failed to wake it up, there is no reason to mark that AP as not present and break next cpu hotplug attempts. As a side effect of not marking AP as not present, user would be allowed to online it again later. Also fix memory corruption in acpi_unmap_lsapic() if during CPU hotplug master CPU failed to wake up AP it set percpu x86_cpu_to_apicid to BAD_APICID=0xFFFF for AP. However following attempt to unplug that CPU will lead to out of bound write access to __apicid_to_node[] which is 32768 items long on x86_64 kernel. So with above fix of cpu_present_mask make sure that a present CPU has a valid APIC ID by not setting x86_cpu_to_apicid to BAD_APICID in do_boot_cpu() on failure and allow acpi_processor_remove()->acpi_unmap_lsapic() cleanly remove CPU. Signed-off-by:
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1401975765-22328-2-git-send-email-imammedo@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-
Roman Gushchin authored
tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() sets cfs_b->timer_active to 0 to force the period timer restart. It's not safe, because can lead to deadlock, described in commit 927b54fc: "__start_cfs_bandwidth calls hrtimer_cancel while holding rq->lock, waiting for the hrtimer to finish. However, if sched_cfs_period_timer runs for another loop iteration, the hrtimer can attempt to take rq->lock, resulting in deadlock." Three CPUs must be involved: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 take rq->lock period timer fired ... take cfs_b lock ... ... tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() throttle_cfs_rq() release cfs_b lock take cfs_b lock ... distribute_cfs_runtime() timer_active = 0 take cfs_b->lock wait for rq->lock ... __start_cfs_bandwidth() {wait for timer callback break if timer_active == 1} So, CPU0 and CPU1 are deadlocked. Instead of resetting cfs_b->timer_active, tg_set_cfs_bandwidth can wait for period timer callbacks (ignoring cfs_b->timer_active) and restart the timer explicitly. Signed-off-by:
Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by:
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wqdi9g8e.wl\%klamm@yandex-team.ru Cc: pjt@google.com Cc: chris.j.arges@canonical.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-