- 12 Feb, 2007 40 commits
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Alon Bar-Lev authored
1. Rename saved_command_line into boot_command_line. 2. Set command_line as __initdata. Signed-off-by:
Alon Bar-Lev <alon.barlev@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Molton <spyro@f2s.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Alon Bar-Lev authored
1. Rename saved_command_line into boot_command_line. 2. Set command_line as __initdata. Signed-off-by:
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Alon Bar-Lev authored
1. Rename saved_command_line into boot_command_line. 2. Set command_line as __initdata. Signed-off-by:
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Alon Bar-Lev authored
Current implementation stores a static command-line buffer allocated to COMMAND_LINE_SIZE size. Most architectures stores two copies of this buffer, one for future reference and one for parameter parsing. Current kernel command-line size for most architecture is much too small for module parameters, video settings, initramfs paramters and much more. The problem is that setting COMMAND_LINE_SIZE to a grater value, allocates static buffers. In order to allow a greater command-line size, these buffers should be dynamically allocated or marked as init disposable buffers, so unused memory can be released. This patch renames the static saved_command_line variable into boot_command_line adding __initdata attribute, so that it can be disposed after initialization. This rename is required so applications that use saved_command_line will not be affected by this change. It reintroduces saved_command_line as dynamically allocated buffer to match the data in boot_command_line. It also mark secondary command-line buffer as __initdata, and copies it to dynamically allocated static_command_line buffer components may hold reference to it after initialization. This patch is for linux-2.6.20-rc4-mm1 and is divided to target each architecture. I could not check this in any architecture so please forgive me if I got it wrong. The per-architecture modification is very simple, use boot_command_line in place of saved_command_line. The common code is the change into dynamic command-line. This patch: 1. Rename saved_command_line into boot_command_line, mark as init disposable. 2. Add dynamic allocated saved_command_line. 3. Add dynamic allocated static_command_line. 4. During startup copy: boot_command_line into saved_command_line. arch command_line into static_command_line. 5. Parse static_command_line and not arch command_line, so arch command_line may be freed. Signed-off-by:
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Nick Piggin authored
Avoid expensive integer divide 3 times per CPU per tick. A userspace test of this loop went from 26ns, down to 19ns on a G5; and from 123ns down to 28ns on a P3. (Also avoid a variable bit shift, as suggested by Alan. The effect of this wasn't noticable on the CPUs I tested with). Signed-off-by:
Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Call flush_dcache_page() after modifying a pagecache by hand. Signed-off-by:
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Open-code flag checking and manipulation. Signed-off-by:
Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Replace kmap() with kmap_atomic(). Reduce the amount of time that mappings are held. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
sys_write() takes a local copy of f_pos and writes that back into the struct file. It does this so that two concurrent write() callers don't make a mess of f_pos, and of the file contents. ecryptfs should be calling vfs_write(). That way we also get the fsnotify notifications, which ecryptfs presently appears to have subverted. Convert direct calls to f_op->write() into calls to vfs_write(). Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Provide an option to provide a view of the encrypted files such that the metadata is always in the header of the files, regardless of whether the metadata is actually in the header or in the extended attribute. This mode of operation is useful for applications like incremental backup utilities that do not preserve the extended attributes when directly accessing the lower files. With this option enabled, the files under the eCryptfs mount point will be read-only. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the lower file. [akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix] [bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region. This patch set implements two new mount options: ecryptfs_xattr_metadata - When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather than the header. When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at least 12KB in size. This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user creates a lot of small files. By storing the data in the extended attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space. As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space constraints. However, the majority of users will only ever associate one key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the xattr region. This option should be used with caution. I want to emphasize that the xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be rendered permanently unrecoverable. The last thing I want is for a user to forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover that their backups are worthless. ecryptfs_encrypted_view - When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored in the header or in the extended attributes. No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files. As of right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr. There is no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future versions. Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to back up the metadata file along with the files. The semantics of eCryptfs have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given eCryptfs file is the key. That is what has always been emphasized about eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect. Providing the encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files, regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the scenes. This patch: Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount options. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request packets from the userspace daemon. [akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism. Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport. Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API. These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication. eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by individual PKI modules in userspace. Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon, when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring. These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption. When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag 1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier (signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet; eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was registered at the time the daemon was started by the user. The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring. This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request. libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs module. The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires off the message to the user's registered daemon. When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply. The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as normal. The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request. > - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that > not suitable (or growable) for public key management? eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall, based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access that channel of communication. > - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key > management be private to a particular fs? The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any existing tools to do just what we wanted. > What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit > message? There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user. When the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo(). > - _why_ does it use netlink? Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with netlink. Signed-off-by:
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Adrian Bunk authored
NFS_SUPER_MAGIC is already defined in include/linux/magic.h Signed-off-by:
Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Replace existing svc_create_socket() API to allow callers to pass addresses larger than a sockaddr_in. Signed-off-by:
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Aurelien Charbon <aurelien.charbon@ext.bull.net> Signed-off-by:
Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Add support for IPv6 addresses in the RPC server's UDP receive path. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by:
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akpm@linux-foundation.org authored
Modify svc_tcp_accept to support connecting on IPv6 sockets. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The only reason svcsock.c looks at a sockaddr's port is to check whether the remote peer is connecting from a privileged port. Refactor this check to hide processing that is specific to address format. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
CMSG_DATA comes in different sizes, depending on address family. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded do/while (0)] Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The rq_daddr field must support larger addresses. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Expand the rq_addr field to allow it to contain larger addresses. Specifically, we replace a 'sockaddr_in' with a 'sockaddr_storage', then everywhere the 'sockaddr_in' was referenced, we use instead an accessor function (svc_addr_in) which safely casts the _storage to _in. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Sockaddr_storage will allow us to store arbitrary socket addresses in the svc_deferred_req struct. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
There are loads of places where the RPC server assumes that the rq_addr fields contains an IPv4 address. Top among these are error and debugging messages that display the server's IP address. Let's refactor the address printing into a separate function that's smart enough to figure out the difference between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Clean-up: msg_name and msg_namelen are not used by sock_recvmsg, so don't bother to set them in svc_recvfrom. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The remote peer's address won't change after the socket has been accepted. We don't need to call ->getname on every incoming request. Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
Rather than calling svc_sock_enqueue at the end of svc_setup_socket, we now call it (via svc_sock_recieved) after calling svc_setup_socket at each call site. We do this because a subsequent patch will insert some code between the two calls at one call site. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Sometimes we need to create an RPC service but not register it with the local portmapper. NFSv4 delegation callback, for example. Change the svc_makesock() API to allow optionally creating temporary or permanent sockets, optionally registering with the local portmapper, and make it return the ephemeral port of the new socket. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Currently in the RPC server, registering with the local portmapper and creating "permanent" sockets are tied together. Expand the internal APIs to allow these two socket characteristics to be separately specified. This will be externalized in the next patch. Signed-off-by:
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Ahmed S. Darwish authored
Use ARRAY_SIZE macro already defined in kernel.h Signed-off-by:
Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Buesch authored
I think the following patch should go into the kernel, until the ISDN/CAPI guys create the real fix for this issue. The issue is a concurrency issue with some internal CAPI data structure which can crash the kernel. On my FritzCard DSL with the AVM driver it crashes about once a day without this workaround patch. With this workaround patch it's rock-stable (at least on UP, but I don't see why this shouldn't work on SMP as well. But maybe I'm missing something.) This workaround is kind of a sledgehammer which inserts a global lock to wrap around all the critical sections. Of course, this is a scalability issue, if you have many ISDN/CAPI cards. But it prevents a crash. So I vote for this fix to get merged, until people come up with a better solution. Better have a stable kernel that's less scalable, than a crashing and useless kernel. This bug is in the kernel since 2.6.15 (at least). Signed-off-by:
Michael Buesch <mb@bu3sch.de> Cc: Kai Germaschewski <kai.germaschewski@gmx.de> Cc: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Knutsson authored
Signed-off-by:
Richard Knutsson <ricknu-0@student.ltu.se> Acked-by:
Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Knutsson authored
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Rename the macro CONFIG_HISAX_HFC4S8S_PCIMEM to simply HISAX_HFC4S8S_PCIMEM so that it no longer resembles a user-settable kernel config macro. Signed-off-by:
Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com> Acked-by:
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Based on advice from K. Keil, get rid of remaining traces of defunct test emulator for HISAX. Signed-off-by:
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Based on advice from K. Keil, rename the special debug option CONFIG_SERIAL_NOPAUSE_IO to ELSA_SERIAL_NOPAUSE_IO so it no longer resembles a user-selectable kernel config option. Signed-off-by:
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Rename some of the debugging macros for ISDN AVM so that they don't resemble kernel config settings, as they're primarily for author debugging instead. Signed-off-by:
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Robert P. J. Day authored
Replace misspelled CONFIG_HISAX_QUADRO with CONFIG_HISAX_SCT_QUADRO. Signed-off-by:
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Ahmed S. Darwish authored
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Adrian Bunk authored
Add proper prototypes in a header file for global code under drivers/isdn/sc/. Since the GNU C compiler is now able do tell us that caller and callee disagreed about the number of arguments of setup_buffers(), this patch also fixes this bug. Signed-off-by:
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