1. 08 Jan, 2015 7 commits
    • Sonny Rao's avatar
      clocksource: arch_timer: Fix code to use physical timers when requested · 82c236bc
      Sonny Rao authored
      commit 0b46b8a7 upstream.
      
      This is a bug fix for using physical arch timers when
      the arch_timer_use_virtual boolean is false.  It restores the
      arch_counter_get_cntpct() function after removal in
      
      0d651e4e "clocksource: arch_timer: use virtual counters"
      
      We need this on certain ARMv7 systems which are architected like this:
      
      * The firmware doesn't know and doesn't care about hypervisor mode and
        we don't want to add the complexity of hypervisor there.
      
      * The firmware isn't involved in SMP bringup or resume.
      
      * The ARCH timer come up with an uninitialized offset between the
        virtual and physical counters.  Each core gets a different random
        offset.
      
      * The device boots in "Secure SVC" mode.
      
      * Nothing has touched the reset value of CNTHCTL.PL1PCEN or
        CNTHCTL.PL1PCTEN (both default to 1 at reset)
      
      One example of such as system is RK3288 where it is much simpler to
      use the physical counter since there's nobody managing the offset and
      each time a core goes down and comes back up it will get reinitialized
      to some other random value.
      
      Fixes: 0d651e4e ("clocksource: arch_timer: use virtual counters")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      82c236bc
    • Hante Meuleman's avatar
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit · ead468da
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      commit 29fa6825 upstream.
      
      paravirt_enabled has the following effects:
      
       - Disables the F00F bug workaround warning.  There is no F00F bug
         workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
         works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists.  This
         is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
         KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.
      
       - Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection.  On a KVM paravirt system,
         there should be no APM BIOS anyway.
      
       - Disables tboot.  I think that the tboot code should check the
         CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.
      
       - paravirt_enabled disables espfix32.  espfix32 should *not* be
         disabled under KVM paravirt.
      
      The last point is the purpose of this patch.  It fixes a leak of the
      high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
      guests.  Fixes CVE-2014-8134.
      Suggested-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ead468da
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES · a1f3f3d8
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      commit f647d7c1 upstream.
      
      Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
      array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.
      
      This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
      gotchas in the code.
      
      Before this patch, the both tests below failed.  With this
      patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.
      
       ----- begin es test -----
      
      /*
       * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
       * GPL v2
       */
      
      static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
      {
      	return (idx << 3) | 3;
      }
      
      static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
      {
      	struct user_desc desc = {
      		.entry_number    = idx,
      		.base_addr       = base,
      		.limit           = 0xfffff,
      		.seg_32bit       = 1,
      		.contents        = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
      		.read_exec_only  = 0,
      		.limit_in_pages  = 1,
      		.seg_not_present = 0,
      		.useable         = 0,
      	};
      
      	if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
      		err(1, "set_thread_area");
      
      	return desc.entry_number;
      }
      
      int main()
      {
      	int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
      	printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);
      
      	unsigned short orig_es;
      	asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));
      
      	int errors = 0;
      	int total = 1000;
      	for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
      		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
      		usleep(100);
      
      		unsigned short es;
      		asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
      		asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
      		if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
      			if (errors == 0)
      				printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
      				       GDT3(idx), es);
      			errors++;
      		}
      	}
      
      	if (errors) {
      		printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
      		return 1;
      	} else {
      		printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
      		return 0;
      	}
      }
      
       ----- end es test -----
      
       ----- begin gsbase test -----
      
      /*
       * gsbase.c, a gsbase test
       * Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
       * GPL v2
       */
      
      static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;
      
      static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
      {
      	unsigned char ret;
      	asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
      	return ret;
      }
      
      int main()
      {
      	int errors = 0;
      
      	testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
      		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
      	if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
      		err(1, "mmap");
      
      	testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
      		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
      	if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
      		err(1, "mmap");
      
      	*testptr = 0;
      	*testptr2 = 1;
      
      	if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
      		    (unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
      		err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");
      
      	usleep(100);
      
      	if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
      		printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
      	} else {
      		printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
      		errors++;
      	}
      
      	asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));
      
      	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
      		printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
      	} else {
      		printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
      		errors++;
      	}
      
      	usleep(100);
      
      	if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
      		printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
      	} else {
      		printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
      		errors++;
      	}
      
      	return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
      }
      
       ----- end gsbase test -----
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a1f3f3d8
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments · 7cc556d2
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      commit 0e58af4e upstream.
      
      Users have no business installing custom code segments into the
      GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid
      are a historical source of interesting attacks.
      
      For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit.  (Prior to
      this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)
      
      This is an ABI break.  I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and
      none of them look like they'll have any trouble.
      
      Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes
      no known bugs.  Given the possibility of ABI issues, this
      probably shouldn't be backported quickly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Acked-by: default avatarH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7cc556d2
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix · b9372b87
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      commit 41bdc785 upstream.
      
      Installing a 16-bit RW data segment into the GDT defeats espfix.
      AFAICT this will not affect glibc, Wine, or dosemu at all.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Acked-by: default avatarH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b9372b87
    • Jan Kara's avatar
      isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries · b6d20edb
      Jan Kara authored
      commit f54e18f1 upstream.
      
      Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
      define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
      image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
      containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
      traversing these entries.
      
      Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
      to store all the Rock Ridge data.
      Reported-by: default avatarP J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b6d20edb
  2. 16 Dec, 2014 20 commits
  3. 07 Dec, 2014 2 commits
  4. 06 Dec, 2014 2 commits
  5. 05 Dec, 2014 7 commits
  6. 04 Dec, 2014 2 commits