Sanitize user pointer given to __copy_to_user, both for standard version
and memcopy version of the user accessor.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.

Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include
check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make
__put_user() an alias of put_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Porting commit c2f0ad4f ("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use
of the current addr_limit").
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

With Spectre-v1.1 mitigations, __put_user_error is pointless. In an attempt
to remove it, replace its references in frame setups with __put_user.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Copy events to user using __copy_to_user() rather than copy members of
individually with __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per event intead of
once per event member.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Use __copy_to_user() rather than __put_user_error() for individual
members when saving VFP state.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once per copied struct
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

When setting a dummy iwmmxt context, create a local instance and
use __copy_to_user both cases whether iwmmxt is being used or not.
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

When saving the ARM integer registers, use __copy_to_user() to
copy them into user signal frame, rather than __put_user_error().
This has the benefit of disabling/enabling PAN once for the whole copy
intead of once per write.
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Fixing __get_user() for spectre variant 1 is not sane: we would have to
add address space bounds checking in order to validate that the location
should be accessed, and then zero the address if found to be invalid.

Since __get_user() is supposed to avoid the bounds check, and this is
exactly what get_user() does, there's no point having two different
implementations that are doing the same thing.  So, when the Spectre
workarounds are required, make __get_user() an alias of get_user().
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Borrow the x86 implementation of __inttype() to use in get_user() to
select an integer type suitable to temporarily hold the result value.
This is necessary to avoid propagating the volatile nature of the
result argument, which can cause the following warning:

lib/iov_iter.c:413:5: warning: optimization may eliminate reads and/or writes to register variables [-Wvolatile-register-var]
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members as efficient as possible.  However, with software PAN and the
recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is reduced as these are no
longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

Rather than using __get_user_error() to copy each semops element member,
copy each semops element in full using __copy_from_user().
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible.  However,
with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is
reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

Use __copy_from_user() rather than __get_user_err() for individual
members when restoring VFP state.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible.  However,
with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is
reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

It becomes much more efficient to use __copy_from_user() instead, so
let's use this for the ARM integer registers.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Prevent speculation at the syscall table decoding by clamping the index
used to zero on invalid system call numbers, and using the csdb
speculative barrier.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Add an implementation of the array_index_mask_nospec() function for
mitigating Spectre variant 1 throughout the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to KVM guests for affected
CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible.
So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the
function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call
coming from the guest.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Include Brahma B15 in the Spectre v2 KVM workarounds.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor
on Cortex-A15, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit, which can
only be done by invalidating the icache (with ACTLR[0] being set).

We use the same hack as for A12/A17 to perform the vector decoding.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor,
let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit. This is made complicated
by the fact that we cannot take a branch before invalidating the
BTB.

We only apply this to A12 and A17, which are the only two ARM
cores on which this useful.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Warn at error level if the context switching function is not what we
are expecting.  This can happen with big.Little systems, which we
currently do not support.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
handling in firmware.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor,
invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be
affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user
task limit:

Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.

If the IBE bit is not set, then there is little point to enabling the
workaround.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set
the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register.  If this bit has not
been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level
if this is not the case.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Harden the branch predictor against Spectre v2 attacks on context
switches for ARMv7 and later CPUs.  We do this by:

Cortex A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: invalidating the BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidating the instruction cache.

Cortex A57 and Cortex A72 are not addressed in this patch.

Cortex R7 and Cortex R8 are also not addressed as we do not enforce
memory protection on these cores.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Add a Kconfig symbol for CPUs which are vulnerable to the Spectre
attacks.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Add support for per-processor bug checking - each processor function
descriptor gains a function pointer for this check, which must not be
an __init function.  If non-NULL, this will be called whenever a CPU
enters the kernel via which ever path (boot CPU, secondary CPU startup,
CPU resuming, etc.)

This allows processor specific bug checks to validate that workaround
bits are properly enabled by firmware via all entry paths to the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Check for CPU bugs when secondary processors are being brought online,
and also when CPUs are resuming from a low power mode.  This gives an
opportunity to check that processor specific bug workarounds are
correctly enabled for all paths that a CPU re-enters the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Prepare the processor bug infrastructure so that it can be expanded to
check for per-processor bugs.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Add CPU part numbers for Cortex A53, A57, A72, A73, A75 and the
Broadcom Brahma B15 CPU.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two fixlets"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  perf/hwbp: Simplify the perf-hwbp code, fix documentation
  perf/x86/intel: Fix linear IP of PEBS real_ip on Haswell and later CPUs

Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two UV platform fixes, and a kbuild fix"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/platform/UV: Fix critical UV MMR address error
  x86/platform/uv/BAU: Add APIC idt entry
  x86/purgatory: Avoid creating stray .<pid>.d files, remove -MD from KBUILD_CFLAGS

Pull x86 PTI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two fixes: a relatively simple objtool fix that makes Clang built
  kernels work with ORC debug info, plus an alternatives macro fix"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/alternatives: Fixup alternative_call_2
  objtool: Add Clang support

Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v4.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:

 - fix missed rebuild of TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS

 - fix rpm-pkg for GNU tar >= 1.29

 - include scripts/dtc/include-prefixes/* to kernel header deb-pkg

 - add -no-integrated-as option ealier to fix building with Clang

 - fix netfilter Makefile for parallel building

* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v4.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add correct dependency to Makefile
  kbuild: rpm-pkg: Support GNU tar >= 1.29
  builddeb: Fix header package regarding dtc source links
  kbuild: set no-integrated-as before incl. arch Makefile
  kbuild: make scripts/adjust_autoksyms.sh robust against timestamp races

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix RCU locking in xfrm_local_error(), from Taehee Yoo.

 2) Fix return value assignments and thus error checking in
    iwl_mvm_start_ap_ibss(), from Johannes Berg.

 3) Don't count header length twice in vti4, from Stefano Brivio.

 4) Fix deadlock in rt6_age_examine_exception, from Eric Dumazet.

 5) Fix out-of-bounds access in nf_sk_lookup_slow{v4,v6}() from Subash
    Abhinov.

 6) Check nladdr size in netlink_connect(), from Alexander Potapenko.

 7) VF representor SQ numbers are 32 not 16 bits, in mlx5 driver, from
    Or Gerlitz.

 8) Out of bounds read in skb_network_protocol(), from Eric Dumazet.

 9) r8169 driver sets driver data pointer after register_netdev() which
    is too late. Fix from Heiner Kallweit.

10) Fix memory leak in mlx4 driver, from Moshe Shemesh.

11) The multi-VLAN decap fix added a regression when dealing with device
    that lack a MAC header, such as tun. Fix from Toshiaki Makita.

12) Fix integer overflow in dynamic interrupt coalescing code. From Tal
    Gilboa.

13) Use after free in vrf code, from David Ahern.

14) IPV6 route leak between VRFs fix, also from David Ahern.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (81 commits)
  net: mvneta: fix enable of all initialized RXQs
  net/ipv6: Fix route leaking between VRFs
  vrf: Fix use after free and double free in vrf_finish_output
  ipv6: sr: fix seg6 encap performances with TSO enabled
  net/dim: Fix int overflow
  vlan: Fix vlan insertion for packets without ethernet header
  net: Fix untag for vlan packets without ethernet header
  atm: iphase: fix spelling mistake: "Receiverd" -> "Received"
  vhost: validate log when IOTLB is enabled
  qede: Do not drop rx-checksum invalidated packets.
  hv_netvsc: enable multicast if necessary
  ip_tunnel: Resolve ipsec merge conflict properly.
  lan78xx: Crash in lan78xx_writ_reg (Workqueue: events lan78xx_deferred_multicast_write)
  qede: Fix barrier usage after tx doorbell write.
  vhost: correctly remove wait queue during poll failure
  net/mlx4_core: Fix memory leak while delete slave's resources
  net/mlx4_en: Fix mixed PFC and Global pause user control requests
  net/smc: use announced length in sock_recvmsg()
  llc: properly handle dev_queue_xmit() return value
  strparser: Fix sign of err codes
  ...

In mvneta_port_up() we enable relevant RX and TX port queues by write
queues bit map to an appropriate register.

q_map must be ZERO in the beginning of this process.
Signed-off-by: Yelena Krivosheev <yelena@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>