1. 15 Feb, 2017 14 commits
  2. 06 Feb, 2017 1 commit
  3. 30 Jan, 2017 2 commits
  4. 27 Jan, 2017 23 commits
    • Jiri Slaby's avatar
      Linux 3.12.70 · d7f41d3b
      Jiri Slaby authored
      d7f41d3b
    • Gu Zheng's avatar
      tmpfs: clear S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs · b0369e53
      Gu Zheng authored
      commit 497de07d upstream.
      
      This change was missed the tmpfs modification in In CVE-2016-7097
      commit 07393101 ("posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting
      file permissions")
      It can test by xfstest generic/375, which failed to clear
      setgid bit in the following test case on tmpfs:
      
        touch $testfile
        chown 100:100 $testfile
        chmod 2755 $testfile
        _runas -u 100 -g 101 -- setfacl -m u::rwx,g::rwx,o::rwx $testfile
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGu Zheng <guzheng1@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      b0369e53
    • Tariq Saeed's avatar
      ocfs2: fix BUG_ON() in ocfs2_ci_checkpointed() · ded56d6d
      Tariq Saeed authored
      commit 3d46a44a upstream.
      
      PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
        #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
        #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
        #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
        #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
        #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
        #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
        #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
           [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
           RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
           RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
           RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
           RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
           R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
           R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
           ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
        #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
        #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
        #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
      assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.
      
      Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
      chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
      system_call_fastpath
        -> my_chmod
         -> sys_chmod
          -> sys_fchmodat
           -> notify_change
            -> ocfs2_setattr
             -> posix_acl_chmod
              -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
               -> ocfs2_set_acl
                -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
      Here is how.
      1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
      1120 {
      1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
      ..
      1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
      1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);
      
      519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
      520 {
      ..
      539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
      
      287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
      288 {
      289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);
      
      224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
      225                          struct inode *inode, ...
      231 {
      ..
      252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
      253                                                          handle, mode);
      
      168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
      170 {
      183         if (handle == NULL) {
                          >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
      184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
      185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);
      
      ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
      ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
      mode (it should be). How this could have happended?
      
      We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
      ocfs2_setattr.#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
      this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
      EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
      ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
      Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
      (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
      lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
      the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
      downconverting (to NULL) for the request.
      
      ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
      does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
      cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
      the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
      that is a mix of the two.
      
      Orabug: 20189959
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
      Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
      Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      ded56d6d
    • Mintz, Yuval's avatar
      bnx2x: Correct ringparam estimate when DOWN · 05dc5c8f
      Mintz, Yuval authored
      commit 65870fa7 upstream.
      
      Until interface is up [and assuming ringparams weren't explicitly
      configured] when queried for the size of its rings bnx2x would
      claim they're the maximal size by default.
      That is incorrect as by default the maximal number of buffers would
      be equally divided between the various rx rings.
      
      This prevents the user from actually setting the number of elements
      on each rx ring to be of maximal size prior to transitioning the
      interface into up state.
      
      To fix this, make a rough estimation about the number of buffers.
      It wouldn't always be accurate, but it would be much better than
      current estimation and would allow users to increase number of
      buffers during early initialization of the interface.
      Reported-by: default avatarSeymour, Shane <shane.seymour@hpe.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarYuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@cavium.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      05dc5c8f
    • Gabriel Krisman Bertazi's avatar
      serial: 8250_pci: Detach low-level driver during PCI error recovery · b6580bd9
      Gabriel Krisman Bertazi authored
      commit f209fa03 upstream.
      
      During a PCI error recovery, like the ones provoked by EEH in the ppc64
      platform, all IO to the device must be blocked while the recovery is
      completed.  Current 8250_pci implementation only suspends the port
      instead of detaching it, which doesn't prevent incoming accesses like
      TIOCMGET and TIOCMSET calls from reaching the device.  Those end up
      racing with the EEH recovery, crashing it.  Similar races were also
      observed when opening the device and when shutting it down during
      recovery.
      
      This patch implements a more robust IO blockage for the 8250_pci
      recovery by unregistering the port at the beginning of the procedure and
      re-adding it afterwards.  Since the port is detached from the uart
      layer, we can be sure that no request will make through to the device
      during recovery.  This is similar to the solution used by the JSM serial
      driver.
      
      I thank Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> for valuable input on
      this one over one year ago.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      b6580bd9
    • Wanpeng Li's avatar
      x86/apic: Order irq_enter/exit() calls correctly vs. ack_APIC_irq() · a2b17a74
      Wanpeng Li authored
      commit b0f48706 upstream.
      
      ===============================
      [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
      4.8.0-rc6+ #5 Not tainted
      -------------------------------
      ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr-trace.h:47 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
      
      other info that might help us debug this:
      
      RCU used illegally from idle CPU!
      rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
      RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state!
      no locks held by swapper/2/0.
      
      stack backtrace:
      CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6+ #5
      Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 7020/0F5C5X, BIOS A03 01/08/2015
       0000000000000000 ffff8d1bd6003f10 ffffffff94446949 ffff8d1bd4a68000
       0000000000000001 ffff8d1bd6003f40 ffffffff940e9247 ffff8d1bbdfcf3d0
       000000000000080b 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8d1bd6003f70
      Call Trace:
       <IRQ>  [<ffffffff94446949>] dump_stack+0x99/0xd0
       [<ffffffff940e9247>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120
       [<ffffffff9448e0d5>] do_trace_write_msr+0x135/0x140
       [<ffffffff9406e750>] native_write_msr+0x20/0x30
       [<ffffffff9406503d>] native_apic_msr_eoi_write+0x1d/0x30
       [<ffffffff9405b17e>] smp_trace_call_function_interrupt+0x1e/0x270
       [<ffffffff948cb1d6>] trace_call_function_interrupt+0x96/0xa0
       <EOI>  [<ffffffff947200f4>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xe4/0x360
       [<ffffffff947200df>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xcf/0x360
       [<ffffffff947203a7>] cpuidle_enter+0x17/0x20
       [<ffffffff940df008>] cpu_startup_entry+0x338/0x4d0
       [<ffffffff9405bfc4>] start_secondary+0x154/0x180
      
      This can be reproduced readily by running ftrace test case of kselftest.
      
      Move the irq_enter() call before ack_APIC_irq(), because irq_enter() tells
      the RCU susbstems to end the extended quiescent state, so that the
      following trace call in ack_APIC_irq() works correctly. The same applies to
      exiting_ack_irq() which calls ack_APIC_irq() after irq_exit().
      
      [ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474198491-3738-1-git-send-email-wanpeng.li@hotmail.comSigned-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      a2b17a74
    • Al Viro's avatar
      move the call of __d_drop(anon) into __d_materialise_unique(dentry, anon) · 75e8aab4
      Al Viro authored
      commit 6f18493e upstream.
      
      and lock the right list there
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Acked-by: default avatarNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      75e8aab4
    • Robert Doebbelin's avatar
      fuse: do not use iocb after it may have been freed · 77eed176
      Robert Doebbelin authored
      commit 7cabc61e upstream.
      
      There's a race in fuse_direct_IO(), whereby is_sync_kiocb() is called on an
      iocb that could have been freed if async io has already completed.  The fix
      in this case is simple and obvious: cache the result before starting io.
      
      It was discovered by KASan:
      
      Kernel: ==================================================================
      Kernel: BUG: KASan: use after free in fuse_direct_IO+0xb1a/0xcc0 at addr ffff88036c414390
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRobert Doebbelin <robert@quobyte.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      Fixes: bcba24cc ("fuse: enable asynchronous processing direct IO")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      77eed176
    • Calvin Owens's avatar
      sg: Fix double-free when drives detach during SG_IO · 96954119
      Calvin Owens authored
      commit f3951a37 upstream.
      
      In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if
      the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl().
      
      Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we
      end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free
      the object itself out from under the current user.
      
      This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq
      object. The most common crash trace I saw is this:
      
        ------------[ cut here ]------------
        kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420!
        Call Trace:
        [<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80
        [<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg]
        [<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg]
        [<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70
        [<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg]
        [<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg]
        [<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520
        [<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0
        [<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0
        [<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
          RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0
      
      The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the
      failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free
      it.
      
      Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object
      when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't
      embedded in the object itself.
      
      KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarCalvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDouglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarJohannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      96954119
    • Takashi Iwai's avatar
      xc2028: Fix use-after-free bug properly · f093600f
      Takashi Iwai authored
      commit 22a1e778 upstream.
      
      The commit 8dfbcc43 ("[media] xc2028: avoid use after free") tried
      to address the reported use-after-free by clearing the reference.
      
      However, it's clearing the wrong pointer; it sets NULL to
      priv->ctrl.fname, but it's anyway overwritten by the next line
      memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl)).
      
      OTOH, the actual code accessing the freed string is the strcmp() call
      with priv->fname:
      	if (!firmware_name[0] && p->fname &&
      	    priv->fname && strcmp(p->fname, priv->fname))
      		free_firmware(priv);
      
      where priv->fname points to the previous file name, and this was
      already freed by kfree().
      
      For fixing the bug properly, this patch does the following:
      
      - Keep the copy of firmware file name in only priv->fname,
        priv->ctrl.fname isn't changed;
      - The allocation is done only when the firmware gets loaded;
      - The kfree() is called in free_firmware() commonly
      
      Fixes: commit 8dfbcc43 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free')
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      f093600f
    • Omar Sandoval's avatar
      block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get() · 075030bd
      Omar Sandoval authored
      commit 8ba86821 upstream.
      
      get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
      lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
      use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
      my 4-core QEMU VM:
      
      int main(int argc, char **argv)
      {
      	pid_t pid, child;
      	long nproc, i;
      
      	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
      	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);
      
      	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
      
      	for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
      		pid = fork();
      		assert(pid != -1);
      		if (pid == 0) {
      			for (;;) {
      				pid = fork();
      				assert(pid != -1);
      				if (pid == 0) {
      					_exit(0);
      				} else {
      					child = wait(NULL);
      					assert(child == pid);
      				}
      			}
      		}
      
      		pid = fork();
      		assert(pid != -1);
      		if (pid == 0) {
      			for (;;) {
      				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
      				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
      			}
      		}
      	}
      
      	for (;;) {
      		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
      		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
      	}
      
      	return 0;
      }
      
      This gets us KASAN dumps like this:
      
      [   35.526914] ==================================================================
      [   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
      [   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
      [   35.530009] =============================================================================
      [   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
      [   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      [   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
      [   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
      [   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
      [   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
      [   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
      [   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
      [   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
      [   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
      [   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
      [   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
      [   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
      [   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
      [   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
      [   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
      [   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
      [   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
      [   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
      [   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
      [   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
      [   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
      [   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
      [   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
      [   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
      [   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
      [   35.530009] ==================================================================
      
      Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.
      Reported-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOmar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarJohannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      075030bd
    • Dan Carpenter's avatar
      [media] xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config() · 6f9247bc
      Dan Carpenter authored
      commit 210bd104 upstream.
      
      We have to unlock before returning -ENOMEM.
      
      Fixes: 8dfbcc43 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free')
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      6f9247bc
    • Mauro Carvalho Chehab's avatar
      [media] xc2028: avoid use after free · 74e3d04c
      Mauro Carvalho Chehab authored
      commit 8dfbcc43 upstream.
      
      If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
      the following trouble may happen:
      
      [11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
      [11009.907491] ==================================================================
      [11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
      [11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
      [11009.907994] =============================================================================
      [11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G        W      ): kasan: bad access detected
      [11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      [11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
      [11009.908012] 	___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
      [11009.908014] 	__slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
      [11009.908017] 	__kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
      [11009.908022] 	xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
      [11009.908026] 	usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
      [11009.908029] 	usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
      [11009.908032] 	usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
      [11009.908035] 	usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
      [11009.908039] 	usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
      [11009.908045] 	call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
      [11009.908051] 	console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
      [11009.908056] 	vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
      [11009.908061] 	vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
      [11009.908064] 	printk+0x99/0xb5
      [11009.908067] 	kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
      [11009.908070] 	__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
      [11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
      [11009.908077] 	__slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
      [11009.908080] 	kfree+0x266/0x280
      [11009.908083] 	xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
      [11009.908086] 	xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
      [11009.908090] 	em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908094] 	em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908098] 	em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908101] 	em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
      [11009.908105] 	em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908108] 	do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
      [11009.908111] 	do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
      [11009.908114] 	load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
      [11009.908117] 	SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
      [11009.908120] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
      [11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x          (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
      [11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
      
      [11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00  ....*....(......
      [11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff  ...........j....
      [11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G    B   W       4.5.0-rc1+ #43
      [11009.908140] Hardware name:                  /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
      [11009.908142]  ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
      [11009.908148]  ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
      [11009.908153]  ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
      [11009.908158] Call Trace:
      [11009.908162]  [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
      [11009.908165]  [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
      [11009.908168]  [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
      [11009.908171]  [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
      [11009.908175]  [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
      [11009.908179]  [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
      [11009.908182]  [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
      [11009.908185]  [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
      [11009.908189]  [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
      [11009.908192]  [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
      [11009.908196]  [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
      [11009.908200]  [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
      [11009.908203]  [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
      [11009.908206]  [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
      [11009.908211]  [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908215]  [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908219]  [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908222]  [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
      [11009.908226]  [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
      [11009.908230]  [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
      [11009.908233]  [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
      [11009.908238]  [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908242]  [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908245]  [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
      [11009.908249]  [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
      [11009.908253]  [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
      [11009.908257]  [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
      [11009.908260]  [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
      [11009.908264]  [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
      [11009.908268]  [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
      [11009.908271]  [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
      [11009.908275]  [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
      [11009.908278]  [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
      [11009.908282]  [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
      [11009.908285]  [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
      [11009.908289]  [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
      [11009.908292]  [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
      [11009.908296]  [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
      [11009.908299]  [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
      [11009.908302]  [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
      [11009.908306]  [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
      [11009.908309]  [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
      [11009.908314]  [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908317]  [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
      [11009.908320]  [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
      [11009.908324]  [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908327]  [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
      [11009.908330]  [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
      [11009.908333]  [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
      [11009.908337]  [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
      [11009.908340]  [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
      [11009.908343]  [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
      [11009.908346]  [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
      [11009.908350]  [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
      [11009.908353]  [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
      [11009.908356]  [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
      [11009.908361]  [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
      [11009.908366]  [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
      [11009.908369]  [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
      [11009.908374]  [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
      [11009.908377]  [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
      [11009.908379]  [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
      [11009.908383]  [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
      [11009.908394]  [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
      [11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
      [11009.908398]  ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [11009.908401]  ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [11009.908405]                                            ^
      [11009.908407]  ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [11009.908409]  ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [11009.908411] ==================================================================
      
      In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
      name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
      the memory allocation fails.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      74e3d04c
    • Benjamin Poirier's avatar
      bna: Add synchronization for tx ring. · 32dacf49
      Benjamin Poirier authored
      commit d667f785 upstream.
      
      We received two reports of BUG_ON in bnad_txcmpl_process() where
      hw_consumer_index appeared to be ahead of producer_index. Out of order
      write/read of these variables could explain these reports.
      
      bnad_start_xmit(), as a producer of tx descriptors, has a few memory
      barriers sprinkled around writes to producer_index and the device's
      doorbell but they're not paired with anything in bnad_txcmpl_process(), a
      consumer.
      
      Since we are synchronizing with a device, we must use mandatory barriers,
      not smp_*. Also, I didn't see the purpose of the last smp_mb() in
      bnad_start_xmit().
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBenjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      32dacf49
    • Vlad Tsyrklevich's avatar
      vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check · e4f13c5f
      Vlad Tsyrklevich authored
      commit 05692d70 upstream.
      
      The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
      user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
      patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
      for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
      in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
      VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
      vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
      
      Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
      kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
      condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
      and should prevent a similar occurrence.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      e4f13c5f
    • Heinrich Schuchardt's avatar
      apparmor: do not expose kernel stack · c0b039ec
      Heinrich Schuchardt authored
      commit f4ee2def upstream.
      
      Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHeinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      c0b039ec
    • John Johansen's avatar
      apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked · a5d852b9
      John Johansen authored
      commit 58acf9d9 upstream.
      
      the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
      from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
      can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
      
      split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
      and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      a5d852b9
    • John Johansen's avatar
      apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present · d035c957
      John Johansen authored
      commit 5f20fdfe upstream.
      
      BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
      
      If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
      profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      d035c957
    • John Johansen's avatar
      66bffcb5
    • John Johansen's avatar
      1e612988
    • John Johansen's avatar
      apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile · 7a203ea2
      John Johansen authored
      commit de7c4cc9 upstream.
      
      When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile
      may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but
      before its refcount is incremented.
      
      Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount
      is 0 and is one its way to deletion.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarSeth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      7a203ea2
    • John Johansen's avatar
      c49d78b4
    • John Johansen's avatar
      apparmor: ensure the target profile name is always audited · 15021f31
      John Johansen authored
      commit f7da2de0 upstream.
      
      The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few
      cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos
      passed the code to set it at apply:
      
      Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var
      and conditionally report based on new_profile.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarSeth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarJeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      15021f31