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Commit b339b3ee authored by Kazuhiko Shiozaki's avatar Kazuhiko Shiozaki Committed by Jérome Perrin
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stack/erp5: patch waitress-1.4.4 for CVE-2022-24761.

parent cea4626f
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component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-1.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:30:30 -0700
Subject: Add new regular expressions for Chunked Encoding
This also moves some regular expressions for QUOTED_PAIR/QUOTED_STRING
into this module from utilities so that they may be reused.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
src/waitress/rfc7230.py | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
src/waitress/utilities.py | 28 +++-------------------------
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/waitress/rfc7230.py b/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
index cd33c90..0b76a38 100644
--- a/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
+++ b/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ import re
from .compat import tobytes
+HEXDIG = "[0-9a-fA-F]"
+DIGIT = "[0-9]"
+
WS = "[ \t]"
OWS = WS + "{0,}?"
RWS = WS + "{1,}?"
@@ -27,6 +30,12 @@ TOKEN = TCHAR + "{1,}"
# ; visible (printing) characters
VCHAR = r"\x21-\x7e"
+# The '\\' between \x5b and \x5d is needed to escape \x5d (']')
+QDTEXT = "[\t \x21\x23-\x5b\\\x5d-\x7e" + OBS_TEXT + "]"
+
+QUOTED_PAIR = r"\\" + "([\t " + VCHAR + OBS_TEXT + "])"
+QUOTED_STRING = '"(?:(?:' + QDTEXT + ")|(?:" + QUOTED_PAIR + '))*"'
+
# header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
# field-name = token
# field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
@@ -45,8 +54,24 @@ FIELD_CONTENT = FIELD_VCHAR + "+(?:[ \t]+" + FIELD_VCHAR + "+)*"
# Which allows the field value here to just see if there is even a value in the first place
FIELD_VALUE = "(?:" + FIELD_CONTENT + ")?"
-HEADER_FIELD = re.compile(
+# chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
+# chunk-ext-name = token
+# chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-string
+
+CHUNK_EXT_NAME = TOKEN
+CHUNK_EXT_VAL = "(?:" + TOKEN + ")|(?:" + QUOTED_STRING + ")"
+CHUNK_EXT = (
+ "(?:;(?P<extension>" + CHUNK_EXT_NAME + ")(?:=(?P<value>" + CHUNK_EXT_VAL + "))?)*"
+)
+
+# Pre-compiled regular expressions for use elsewhere
+ONLY_HEXDIG_RE = re.compile(("^" + HEXDIG + "+$").encode("latin-1"))
+ONLY_DIGIT_RE = re.compile(("^" + DIGIT + "+$").encode("latin-1"))
+HEADER_FIELD_RE = re.compile(
tobytes(
"^(?P<name>" + TOKEN + "):" + OWS + "(?P<value>" + FIELD_VALUE + ")" + OWS + "$"
)
)
+QUOTED_PAIR_RE = re.compile(QUOTED_PAIR)
+QUOTED_STRING_RE = re.compile(QUOTED_STRING)
+CHUNK_EXT_RE = re.compile(("^" + CHUNK_EXT + "$").encode("latin-1"))
diff --git a/src/waitress/utilities.py b/src/waitress/utilities.py
index 556bed2..fa59657 100644
--- a/src/waitress/utilities.py
+++ b/src/waitress/utilities.py
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import re
import stat
import time
-from .rfc7230 import OBS_TEXT, VCHAR
+from .rfc7230 import QUOTED_PAIR_RE, QUOTED_STRING_RE
logger = logging.getLogger("waitress")
queue_logger = logging.getLogger("waitress.queue")
@@ -216,32 +216,10 @@ def parse_http_date(d):
return retval
-# RFC 5234 Appendix B.1 "Core Rules":
-# VCHAR = %x21-7E
-# ; visible (printing) characters
-vchar_re = VCHAR
-
-# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 "Field Value Components":
-# quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
-# qdtext = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
-# obs-text = %x80-FF
-# quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
-obs_text_re = OBS_TEXT
-
-# The '\\' between \x5b and \x5d is needed to escape \x5d (']')
-qdtext_re = "[\t \x21\x23-\x5b\\\x5d-\x7e" + obs_text_re + "]"
-
-quoted_pair_re = r"\\" + "([\t " + vchar_re + obs_text_re + "])"
-quoted_string_re = '"(?:(?:' + qdtext_re + ")|(?:" + quoted_pair_re + '))*"'
-
-quoted_string = re.compile(quoted_string_re)
-quoted_pair = re.compile(quoted_pair_re)
-
-
def undquote(value):
if value.startswith('"') and value.endswith('"'):
# So it claims to be DQUOTE'ed, let's validate that
- matches = quoted_string.match(value)
+ matches = QUOTED_STRING_RE.match(value)
if matches and matches.end() == len(value):
# Remove the DQUOTE's from the value
@@ -249,7 +227,7 @@ def undquote(value):
# Remove all backslashes that are followed by a valid vchar or
# obs-text
- value = quoted_pair.sub(r"\1", value)
+ value = QUOTED_PAIR_RE.sub(r"\1", value)
return value
elif not value.startswith('"') and not value.endswith('"'):
component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-2.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:32:24 -0700
Subject: Be more strict in parsing Content-Length
Validate that we are only parsing digits and nothing else. RFC7230 is
explicit in that the Content-Length can only exist of 1*DIGIT and may
not include any additional sign information.
The Python int() function parses `+10` as `10` which means we were more
lenient than the standard intended.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
src/waitress/parser.py | 12 ++++++------
tests/test_parser.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/waitress/parser.py b/src/waitress/parser.py
index 765fe59..acaf494 100644
--- a/src/waitress/parser.py
+++ b/src/waitress/parser.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from io import BytesIO
from waitress.buffers import OverflowableBuffer
from waitress.compat import tostr, unquote_bytes_to_wsgi, urlparse
from waitress.receiver import ChunkedReceiver, FixedStreamReceiver
+from waitress.rfc7230 import HEADER_FIELD_RE, ONLY_DIGIT_RE
from waitress.utilities import (
BadRequest,
RequestEntityTooLarge,
@@ -29,8 +30,6 @@ from waitress.utilities import (
ServerNotImplemented,
find_double_newline,
)
-from .rfc7230 import HEADER_FIELD
-
class ParsingError(Exception):
pass
@@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ class HTTPRequestParser(object):
headers = self.headers
for line in lines:
- header = HEADER_FIELD.match(line)
+ header = HEADER_FIELD_RE.match(line)
if not header:
raise ParsingError("Invalid header")
@@ -299,11 +298,12 @@ class HTTPRequestParser(object):
self.connection_close = True
if not self.chunked:
- try:
- cl = int(headers.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
- except ValueError:
+ cl = headers.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", "0")
+
+ if not ONLY_DIGIT_RE.match(cl.encode("latin-1")):
raise ParsingError("Content-Length is invalid")
+ cl = int(cl)
self.content_length = cl
if cl > 0:
buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)
diff --git a/tests/test_parser.py b/tests/test_parser.py
index 91837c7..eabf353 100644
--- a/tests/test_parser.py
+++ b/tests/test_parser.py
@@ -194,6 +194,30 @@ class TestHTTPRequestParser(unittest.TestCase):
else: # pragma: nocover
self.assertTrue(False)
+ def test_parse_header_bad_content_length_plus(self):
+ from waitress.parser import ParsingError
+
+ data = b"GET /foobar HTTP/8.4\r\ncontent-length: +10\r\n"
+
+ try:
+ self.parser.parse_header(data)
+ except ParsingError as e:
+ self.assertIn("Content-Length is invalid", e.args[0])
+ else: # pragma: nocover
+ self.assertTrue(False)
+
+ def test_parse_header_bad_content_length_minus(self):
+ from waitress.parser import ParsingError
+
+ data = b"GET /foobar HTTP/8.4\r\ncontent-length: -10\r\n"
+
+ try:
+ self.parser.parse_header(data)
+ except ParsingError as e:
+ self.assertIn("Content-Length is invalid", e.args[0])
+ else: # pragma: nocover
+ self.assertTrue(False)
+
def test_parse_header_multiple_content_length(self):
from waitress.parser import ParsingError
component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-3.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:35:01 -0700
Subject: Update tests to remove invalid chunked encoding chunk-size
RFC7230 states the following:
chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
chunk-data CRLF
chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
Where chunk-ext is:
chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
Only if there is a chunk-ext should there be a `;` after the 1*HEXDIG.
And a chunk-ext that is empty is invalid.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
tests/test_functional.py | 6 +++---
tests/test_parser.py | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
index e894497..7a54b22 100644
--- a/tests/test_functional.py
+++ b/tests/test_functional.py
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
self.assertFalse("transfer-encoding" in headers)
def test_chunking_request_with_content(self):
- control_line = b"20;\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
+ control_line = b"20\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
expected = s * 12
header = tobytes("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n")
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
self.assertFalse("transfer-encoding" in headers)
def test_broken_chunked_encoding(self):
- control_line = "20;\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
+ control_line = "20\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
to_send = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
to_send += control_line + s + "\r\n"
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
def test_broken_chunked_encoding_missing_chunk_end(self):
- control_line = "20;\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
+ control_line = "20\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
to_send = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
to_send += control_line + s
diff --git a/tests/test_parser.py b/tests/test_parser.py
index eabf353..420f280 100644
--- a/tests/test_parser.py
+++ b/tests/test_parser.py
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ class TestHTTPRequestParser(unittest.TestCase):
b"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n"
b"X-Foo: 1\r\n"
b"\r\n"
- b"1d;\r\n"
+ b"1d\r\n"
b"This string has 29 characters\r\n"
b"0\r\n\r\n"
)
component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-4.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:42:51 -0700
Subject: Error when receiving back Chunk Extension
Waitress discards chunked extensions and does no further processing on
them, however it failed to validate that the chunked encoding extension
did not contain invalid data.
We now validate that if there are any chunked extensions that they are
well-formed, if they are not and contain invalid characters, then
Waitress will now correctly return a Bad Request and stop any further
processing of the request.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
src/waitress/receiver.py | 11 ++++++++++-
tests/test_functional.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/test_receiver.py | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
index 5d1568d..106dbc7 100644
--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
+++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
"""Data Chunk Receiver
"""
+from waitress.rfc7230 import CHUNK_EXT_RE, ONLY_HEXDIG_RE
from waitress.utilities import BadRequest, find_double_newline
@@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
s = b""
else:
self.chunk_end = b""
+
if pos == 0:
# Chop off the terminating CR LF from the chunk
s = s[2:]
@@ -140,7 +142,14 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
semi = line.find(b";")
if semi >= 0:
- # discard extension info.
+ extinfo = line[semi:]
+ valid_ext_info = CHUNK_EXT_RE.match(extinfo)
+
+ if not valid_ext_info:
+ self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk extension")
+ self.all_chunks_received = True
+
+ break
line = line[:semi]
try:
sz = int(line.strip(), 16) # hexadecimal
diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
index 7a54b22..853942c 100644
--- a/tests/test_functional.py
+++ b/tests/test_functional.py
@@ -345,6 +345,28 @@ class EchoTests(object):
self.send_check_error(to_send)
self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+ def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_extension(self):
+ control_line = b"20;invalid=\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
+ s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+ to_send = b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
+ to_send += control_line + s + b"\r\n"
+ self.connect()
+ self.sock.send(to_send)
+ with self.sock.makefile("rb", 0) as fp:
+ line, headers, response_body = read_http(fp)
+ self.assertline(line, "400", "Bad Request", "HTTP/1.1")
+ cl = int(headers["content-length"])
+ self.assertEqual(cl, len(response_body))
+ self.assertIn(b"Invalid chunk extension", response_body)
+ self.assertEqual(
+ sorted(headers.keys()),
+ ["connection", "content-length", "content-type", "date", "server"],
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(headers["content-type"], "text/plain")
+ # connection has been closed
+ self.send_check_error(to_send)
+ self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+
def test_broken_chunked_encoding_missing_chunk_end(self):
control_line = "20\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
index b4910bb..a6261ea 100644
--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
+++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
import unittest
+import pytest
+
class TestFixedStreamReceiver(unittest.TestCase):
def _makeOne(self, cl, buf):
@@ -226,6 +228,41 @@ class TestChunkedReceiver(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(inst.error, None)
+class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
+ def _makeOne(self, buf):
+ from waitress.receiver import ChunkedReceiver
+
+ return ChunkedReceiver(buf)
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "invalid_extension", [b"\n", b"invalid=", b"\r", b"invalid = true"]
+ )
+ def test_received_invalid_extensions(self, invalid_extension):
+ from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
+
+ buf = DummyBuffer()
+ inst = self._makeOne(buf)
+ data = b"4;" + invalid_extension + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
+ result = inst.received(data)
+ assert result == len(data)
+ assert inst.error.__class__ == BadRequest
+ assert inst.error.body == "Invalid chunk extension"
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "valid_extension", [b"test", b"valid=true", b"valid=true;other=true"]
+ )
+ def test_received_valid_extensions(self, valid_extension):
+ # While waitress may ignore extensions in Chunked Encoding, we do want
+ # to make sure that we don't fail when we do encounter one that is
+ # valid
+ buf = DummyBuffer()
+ inst = self._makeOne(buf)
+ data = b"4;" + valid_extension + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
+ result = inst.received(data)
+ assert result == len(data)
+ assert inst.error == None
+
+
class DummyBuffer(object):
def __init__(self, data=None):
if data is None:
component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-5.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:48:26 -0700
Subject: Validate chunk size in Chunked Encoding are HEXDIG
RFC7230 states that a chunk-size should be 1*HEXDIG, this is now
validated before passing the resulting string to int() which would also
parse other formats for hex, such as: `0x01` as `1` and `+0x01` as `1`.
This would lead to a potential for a frontend proxy server and waitress
to disagree on where a chunk started and ended, thereby potentially
leading to request smuggling.
With the increased validation if the size is not just hex digits,
Waitress now returns a Bad Request and stops processing the request.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
src/waitress/receiver.py | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
tests/test_functional.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/test_receiver.py | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
index 106dbc7..9e4bffe 100644
--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
+++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
@@ -150,12 +150,21 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
self.all_chunks_received = True
break
+
line = line[:semi]
- try:
- sz = int(line.strip(), 16) # hexadecimal
- except ValueError: # garbage in input
- self.error = BadRequest("garbage in chunked encoding input")
- sz = 0
+
+ # Remove any whitespace
+ line = line.strip()
+
+ if not ONLY_HEXDIG_RE.match(line):
+ self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk size")
+ self.all_chunks_received = True
+
+ break
+
+ # Can not fail due to matching against the regular
+ # expression above
+ sz = int(line.strip(), 16) # hexadecimal
if sz > 0:
# Start a new chunk.
diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
index 853942c..448e0c0 100644
--- a/tests/test_functional.py
+++ b/tests/test_functional.py
@@ -345,6 +345,28 @@ class EchoTests(object):
self.send_check_error(to_send)
self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+ def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_hex(self):
+ control_line = b"0x20\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
+ s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+ to_send = b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
+ to_send += control_line + s + b"\r\n"
+ self.connect()
+ self.sock.send(to_send)
+ with self.sock.makefile("rb", 0) as fp:
+ line, headers, response_body = read_http(fp)
+ self.assertline(line, "400", "Bad Request", "HTTP/1.1")
+ cl = int(headers["content-length"])
+ self.assertEqual(cl, len(response_body))
+ self.assertIn(b"Invalid chunk size", response_body)
+ self.assertEqual(
+ sorted(headers.keys()),
+ ["connection", "content-length", "content-type", "date", "server"],
+ )
+ self.assertEqual(headers["content-type"], "text/plain")
+ # connection has been closed
+ self.send_check_error(to_send)
+ self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+
def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_extension(self):
control_line = b"20;invalid=\r\n" # 20 hex = 32 dec
s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
index a6261ea..17328d4 100644
--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
+++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
@@ -262,6 +262,18 @@ class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
assert result == len(data)
assert inst.error == None
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04"])
+ def test_received_invalid_size(self, invalid_size):
+ from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
+
+ buf = DummyBuffer()
+ inst = self._makeOne(buf)
+ data = invalid_size + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
+ result = inst.received(data)
+ assert result == len(data)
+ assert inst.error.__class__ == BadRequest
+ assert inst.error.body == "Invalid chunk size"
+
class DummyBuffer(object):
def __init__(self, data=None):
component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-6.patch 0 → 100644
View file @ b339b3ee
From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 19:16:23 -0700
Subject: Remove extraneous calls to .strip() in Chunked Encoding
To be valid chunked encoding we should not be removing any whitespace as
the standard does not allow for optional whitespace.
If whitespace is encountered in the wrong place, it should lead to a 400
Bad Request instead.
Part of CVE-2022-24761
---
src/waitress/receiver.py | 6 +-----
tests/test_receiver.py | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
index 9e4bffe..806ff87 100644
--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
+++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
line = s[:pos]
s = s[pos + 2 :]
self.control_line = b""
- line = line.strip()
if line:
# Begin a new chunk.
@@ -153,9 +152,6 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
line = line[:semi]
- # Remove any whitespace
- line = line.strip()
-
if not ONLY_HEXDIG_RE.match(line):
self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk size")
self.all_chunks_received = True
@@ -164,7 +160,7 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
# Can not fail due to matching against the regular
# expression above
- sz = int(line.strip(), 16) # hexadecimal
+ sz = int(line, 16) # hexadecimal
if sz > 0:
# Start a new chunk.
diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
index 17328d4..014f785 100644
--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
+++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
@@ -262,7 +262,9 @@ class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
assert result == len(data)
assert inst.error == None
- @pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04"])
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04", b" 04", b" 0x04"]
+ )
def test_received_invalid_size(self, invalid_size):
from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
stack/erp5/buildout.cfg
View file @ b339b3ee
......@@ -701,7 +701,15 @@ Acquisition-patches = ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/Acqu
Acquisition-patch-options = -p1
python-magic-patches = ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/python_magic/magic.patch#de0839bffac17801e39b60873a6c2068
python-magic-patch-options = -p1
# backported security patches for waitress-1.4.4 from Debian 1.4.4-1.1+deb11u1 package.
waitress-patches =
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-1.patch#a0508880f24662e48a20ce3bcbf440c2
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-2.patch#1ff77cede06d5bc39a9891d3647708a2
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-3.patch#8bab78102e0c2966f6bcafde7819ea8e
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-4.patch#d752ca3ac251ebfaf36c667b28744c20
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-5.patch#ad2765822397cd1e28e02a68a52d7768
${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-6.patch#85fc9c4105eabee3ff71c800b2ddf63b
waitress-patch-options = -p1
# neoppod installs bin/coverage so we inject erp5 plugin here so that coverage script can use it in report
[neoppod]
......@@ -740,6 +748,7 @@ pysvn = 1.9.15+SlapOSPatched001
python-ldap = 2.4.32+SlapOSPatched001
python-magic = 0.4.12+SlapOSPatched001
PyPDF2 = 1.26.0+SlapOSPatched001
waitress = 1.4.4+SlapOSPatched006
## https://lab.nexedi.com/nexedi/slapos/merge_requests/648
pylint = 1.4.4+SlapOSPatched002
# astroid 1.4.1 breaks testDynamicClassGeneration
......@@ -827,8 +836,6 @@ cloudpickle = 0.5.3
dask = 0.18.1
toolz = 0.9.0
zope.globalrequest = 1.5
waitress = 1.4.4
Products.ZSQLMethods = 2.13.5
fpconst = 0.7.2
graphviz = 0.5.2
......
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