- 07 Jun, 2018 34 commits
-
-
Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit 7eccb738 upstream. Rx data frames notified through HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_RX_IND and HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_RX_FRAG_IND expect PN/TSC check to be done on host (mac80211) rather than firmware. Rebuild cipher header in every received data frames (that are notified through those HTT interfaces) from the rx_hdr_status tlv available in the rx descriptor of the first msdu. Skip setting RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED flag for the packets which requires mac80211 PN/TSC check support and set appropriate RX_FLAG for stripped crypto tail. Hw QCA988X, QCA9887, QCA99X0, QCA9984, QCA9888 and QCA4019 currently need the rebuilding of cipher header to perform PN/TSC check for replay attack. Please note that removing crypto tail for CCMP-256, GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers in raw mode needs to be fixed. Since Rx with these ciphers in raw mode does not work in the current form even without this patch and removing crypto tail for these chipers needs clean up, raw mode related issues in CCMP-256, GCMP and GCMP-256 can be addressed in follow up patches. Tested-by:
Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@qti.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan <vthiagar@qti.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by:
Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by:
Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
-
Vasanthakumar Thiagarajan authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit 2f38c3c0 upstream. Chipset from QCA99X0 onwards (QCA99X0, QCA9984, QCA4019 & future) rx_hdr_status is not padded to align in 4-byte boundary. Define a new hw_params field to handle different alignment behaviour between different hw. This patch fixes improper retrieval of rfc1042 header with QCA4019. This patch along with "ath10k: Properly remove padding from the start of rx payload" will fix traffic failure in ethernet decap mode for QCA4019. Signed-off-by:
-
David Spinadel authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit cef0acd4 upstream. Add a flag that indicates that the WEP ICV was stripped from an RX packet, allowing the device to not transfer that if it's already checked. Signed-off-by:
David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Cc: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Sara Sharon authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit f631a77b upstream. Some hardware (iwlwifi an example) de-aggregate AMSDUs and copy the IV as is to the generated MPDUs, so the same PN appears in multiple packets without being a replay attack. Allow driver to explicitly indicate that a frame is allowed to have the same PN as the previous frame. Signed-off-by:
Sara Sharon <sara.sharon@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Sara Sharon authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit f980ebc0 upstream. When HW crypto is used, there's no need for the CCMP/GCMP MIC to be available to mac80211, and the hardware might have removed it already after checking. The MIC is also useless to have when the frame is already decrypted, so allow indicating that it's not present. Since we are running out of bits in mac80211_rx_flags, make the flags field a u64. Signed-off-by:
Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tejun Heo authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit 71546d10 upstream. microblaze build broke due to missing declaration of the cond_resched() invocation added recently. Let's include linux/sched.h explicitly. Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by:
kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
-
Teng Qin authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit 8fe45924 upstream. When iterating through a map, we need to find a key that does not exist in the map so map_get_next_key will give us the first key of the map. This often requires a lot of guessing in production systems. This patch makes map_get_next_key return the first key when the key pointer in the parameter is NULL. Signed-off-by:
Teng Qin <qinteng@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tan Xiaojun authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774173 commit 1572e45a upstream. Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input value from user-space. If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like "sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected problems. Signed-off-by:
Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <acme@kernel.org> Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 With the rename of osb() in the previous commit, use barrier_nospec() instead. Signed-off-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 The x86 barrier macro that landed in upstream is named barrier_nospec() and is an LFENCE/MFENCE alternative. What was added in Ubuntu with the original embargoed patches is named osb() but it's the same thing, so rename it. Also, rename the Ubuntu-specific non-x86 osb() macros and simplify the code to turn barrier_nospec() into a no-op for arches that don't support it. And while we're at it, drop the reporting of osb for x86. It's always enabled and OSB is not a recognizable upstream term and only adds confusion. Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 The original embargoed patches introduced an arch-specific barrier macro gmb() (later renamed to osb()) which is used to prevent speculation beyond array boundaries. What finally landed in upstream is an arch-agnostic masking solution in favor of osb(). In Ubuntu, we still use osb() in a couple of places where upstream does nothing, so change those to using the masking solution. Signed-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit 69fa6f19 upstream. As recently Smatch suggested, one place in HD-audio hwdep ioctl codes may expand the array directly from the user-space value with speculation: sound/pci/hda/hda_local.h:467 get_wcaps() warn: potential spectre issue 'codec->wcaps' As get_wcaps() itself is a fairly frequently called inline function, and there is only one single call with a user-space value, we replace only the latter one to open-code locally with array_index_nospec() hardening in this patch. BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit 8d218dd8 upstream. As Smatch recently suggested, a few places in OSS sequencer codes may expand the array directly from the user-space value with speculation, namely there are a significant amount of references to either info->ch[] or dp->synths[] array: sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:315 note_on_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'info->ch' (local cap) sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:362 note_off_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'info->ch' (local cap) sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:470 snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' (local cap) sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:293 note_on_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:353 note_off_event() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:506 snd_seq_oss_synth_sysex() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:580 snd_seq_oss_synth_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' Although all these seem doing only the first load without further reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with array_index_nospec() would still make sense. We may put array_index_nospec() at each place, but here we take a different approach: - For dp->synths[], change the helpers to retrieve seq_oss_synthinfo pointer directly instead of the array expansion at each place - For info->ch[], harden in a normal way, as there are only a couple of places As a result, the existing helper, snd_seq_oss_synth_is_valid() is replaced with snd_seq_oss_synth_info(). Also, we cover MIDI device where a similar array expansion is done, too, although it wasn't reported by Smatch. BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2Reported-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit 1d91c1d2 upstream. There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in array_index_nospec_mask_check(): * It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like in the 64-bit case. * In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new kernel enabling. * The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to array_index_nospec(). Reported-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
-
Will Deacon authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit 8fa80c50 upstream. For architectures providing their own implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() in asm/barrier.h, attempting to use WARN_ONCE() to complain about out-of-range parameters using WARN_ON() results in a mess of mutually-dependent include files. Rather than unpick the dependencies, simply have the core code in nospec.h perform the checking for us. Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517840166-15399-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.comSigned-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit eb6174f6 upstream. The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file <asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default array_index_mask_nospec() implementation. The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation on architectures that perform data value speculation. Reported-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit 3968523f upstream. mpls_label_ok() validates that the 'platform_label' array index from a userspace netlink message payload is valid. Under speculation the mpls_label_ok() result may not resolve in the CPU pipeline until after the index is used to access an array element. Sanitize the index to zero to prevent userspace-controlled arbitrary out-of-bounds speculation, a precursor for a speculative execution side channel vulnerability. Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
Jiri Slaby authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 In 4.4.118, we have commit c8961332 (x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation), which is a backport of upstream commit 2fbd7af5. But it fixed only the C part of the upstream patch -- the IA32 sysentry. So it ommitted completely the assembly part -- the 64bit sysentry. Fix that in this patch by explicit array_index_mask_nospec written in assembly. The same was used in lib/getuser.S. However, to have "sbb" working properly, we have to switch from "cmp" against (NR_syscalls-1) to (NR_syscalls), otherwise the last syscall number would be "and"ed by 0. It is because the original "ja" relies on "CF" or "ZF", but we rely only on "CF" in "sbb". That means: switch to "jae" conditional jump too. Final note: use rcx for mask as this is exactly what is overwritten by the 4th syscall argument (r10) right after. Reported-by:
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Cc: Jinpu Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
-
Rasmus Villemoes authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 commit b98c6a16 upstream. The last expression in a statement expression need not be a bare variable, quoting gcc docs The last thing in the compound statement should be an expression followed by a semicolon; the value of this subexpression serves as the value of the entire construct. and we already use that in e.g. the min/max macros which end with a ternary expression. This way, we can allow index to have const-qualified type, which will in some cases avoid the need for introducing a local copy of index of non-const qualified type. That, in turn, can prevent readers not familiar with the internals of array_index_nospec from wondering about the seemingly redundant extra variable, and I think that's worthwhile considering how confusing the whole _nospec business is. The expression _i&_mask has type unsigned long (since that is the type of _mask, and the BUILD_BUG_ONs guarantee that _i will get promoted to that), so in order not to change the type of the whole expression, add a cast back to typeof(_i). Signed-off-by:
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit 085331df) Commit 75f139aa "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151744959670.6342.3001723920950249067.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by:
Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit edfbae53) Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit 259d8c1e) Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by:
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit 56c30ba7) 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5) The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit c7f631cb) Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit b3d7ad85) Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Suggested-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit babdde26) array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by:
-
Dan Williams authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit f3804203) array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by:
Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Mark Rutland authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 (cherry picked from commit f84a56f7) Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
CVE-2018-3639 (x86) We now have individual feature flags for IBRS and IBPB, so query them when reloading microcode. Just like we do on boot (in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c). Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
CVE-2018-3639 (x86) Commit f93e1bcd ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown") introduced a smarter detection of CPUs that are not affected by Meltdown. Make use of that when pti=auto which also matches Linus' tree. While at it, remove the unused variable 'enable'. Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
CVE-2018-3639 (x86) Fixes: f3b21b13 ("UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/bugs: Honour SPEC_CTRL default") Signed-off-by:
-
Juerg Haefliger authored
CVE-2018-3639 (x86) It's ok to have holes in CPU feature bits array, so move the CPUID_7_EDX bits from word 16 to word 18 to match upstream. Primarily to avoid confusion and conflicts with future backports/cherry-picks. Fixes: e8e6c1d5 ("x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf") Signed-off-by:
-
Huaitong Han authored
CVE-2018-3639 (x86) This patch removes magic number with enum cpuid_leafs. Signed-off-by:
Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
- 06 Jun, 2018 6 commits
-
-
Hendrik Brueckner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1772593 Correct a trinity finding for the perf_event_open() system call with a perf event attribute structure that uses a frequency but has the sampling frequency set to zero. This causes a FP divide exception during the sample rate initialization for the hardware sampling facility. Fixes: 8c069ff4 ("s390/perf: add support for the CPU-Measurement Sampling Facility") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14+ Reviewed-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> (cherry picked from commit 4bbaf258) Signed-off-by:
Joseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
-
Johannes Wienke authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1773509 ELAN0612 touchpad uses elan_i2c as its driver. ELAN0612 is being included in newer laptops, so add it to ACPI table to enable the touchpad. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Wienke <languitar@semipol.de> Signed-off-by:
Po-Hsu Lin <po-hsu.lin@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Lei Xue authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774336 There is a potential race in fscache operation enqueuing for reading and copying multiple pages from cachefiles to netfs. If this race occurs, an oops similar to the following is seen: [585042.202316] FS-Cache: [585042.202343] FS-Cache: Assertion failed [585042.202367] FS-Cache: 6 == 5 is false [585042.202452] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [585042.202480] kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:494! ... [585042.209600] Call Trace: [585042.211233] [<ffffffffc034c29a>] fscache_op_work_func+0x2a/0x50 [fscache] [585042.212677] [<ffffffff81095a70>] process_one_work+0x150/0x3f0 [585042.213550] [<ffffffff810961ea>] worker_thread+0x11a/0x470 ... The race occurs in the following situation: One thread is in cachefiles_read_waiter: 1) object->work_lock is taken. 2) the operation is added to the to_do list. 3) the work lock is dropped. 4) fscache_enqueue_retrieval is called, which takes a reference. Another thread is in cachefiles_read_copier: 1) object->work_lock is taken 2) an item is popped off the to_do list. 3) object->work_lock is dropped. 4) some processing is done on the item, and fscache_put_retrieval() is called, dropping a reference. Now if the this process in cachefiles_read_copier takes place *between* steps 3 and 4 in cachefiles_read_waiter, a reference will be dropped before it is taken, which leads to the object's reference count hitting zero, which leads to lifecycle events for the object happening too soon, leading to the assertion failure later on. Move fscache_enqueue_retrieval under the lock in cachefiles_read_waiter. This means that the object cannot be popped off the to_do list until it is in a fully consistent state with the reference taken. Signed-off-by:
Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> [dja: rewrite and expand commit message] (From https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2018-February/msg00000.html This patch has been sitting on the mailing list for months with no response from the maintainer. A similar patch fixing the same issue was posted as far back as May 2017, and likewise had no response: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2017-May/msg00002.html I poked the list recently and also got nothing: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2018-May/msg00000.html and the problem was again reported and this patch validated by another user: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-cachefs/2018-May/msg00001.html Hence the submission as a sauce patch.) Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <daniel.axtens@canonical.com> Acked-by:
-
Jens Axboe authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1772575 We have this: ERROR: "__aeabi_ldivmod" [drivers/block/nbd.ko] undefined! ERROR: "__divdi3" [drivers/block/nbd.ko] undefined! nbd.c:(.text+0x247c72): undefined reference to `__divdi3' due to a recent commit, that did 64-bit division. Use the proper divider function so that 32-bit compiles don't break. Fixes: ef77b515 ("nbd: use loff_t for blocksize and nbd_set_size args") Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> (cherry picked from commit e88f72cb) Signed-off-by:
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Acked-by:
-
David S. Miller authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1772775 This reverts commit b699d003. As per Eric Dumazet, the pskb_may_pull() is a NOP in this particular case, so the 'iph' reload is unnecessary. Signed-off-by:
-
Mimi Zohar authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1771826 Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs, but they are not context aware. In the case of security.ima, the security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature. Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to be context aware. In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata (eg. owner) making it in policy. As a result, these files are not labeled properly. This reverts commit c68ed80c, which prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs. Requested-by:
Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (cherry picked from commit f5acb3dc) Signed-off-by:
-
