- 30 Jun, 2020 40 commits
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Currently, the struct file_operations fops_bool associated with files created through the debugfs_create_bool() helpers are not file lifetime aware. Thus, a lifetime managing proxy is created around fops_bool each time such a file is opened which is an unnecessary waste of resources. Implement file lifetime management for the fops_bool file_operations. Namely, make debugfs_read_file_bool() and debugfs_write_file_bool() safe against file removals by means of debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish(). Make debugfs_create_bool() create its files in non-proxying operation mode through debugfs_create_mode_unsafe(). Finally, purge debugfs_create_mode() as debugfs_create_bool() had been its last user. Signed-off-by:
Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 4d45f797) Signed-off-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Currently, the struct file_operations associated with the integer attribute style files created through the debugfs_create_*() helpers are not file lifetime aware as they are defined by means of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(). Thus, a lifetime managing proxy is created around the original fops each time such a file is opened which is an unnecessary waste of resources. Migrate all usages of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() within debugfs itself to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() in order to implement file lifetime managing within the struct file_operations thus defined. Introduce the debugfs_create_mode_unsafe() helper, analogous to debugfs_create_mode(), but distinct in that it creates the files in non-proxying operation mode through debugfs_create_file_unsafe(). Feed all struct file_operations migrated to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() into debugfs_create_mode_unsafe() instead of former debugfs_create_mode(). Signed-off-by:
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 In order to protect them against file removal issues, debugfs_create_file() creates a lifetime managing proxy around each struct file_operations handed in. In cases where this struct file_operations is able to manage file lifetime by itself already, the proxy created by debugfs is a waste of resources. The most common class of struct file_operations given to debugfs are those defined by means of the DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() macro. Introduce a DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() macro to allow any struct file_operations of this class to be easily made file lifetime aware and thus, to be operated unproxied. Specifically, introduce debugfs_attr_read() and debugfs_attr_write() which wrap simple_attr_read() and simple_attr_write() under the protection of a debugfs_use_file_start()/debugfs_use_file_finish() pair. Make DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() set the defined struct file_operations' ->read() and ->write() members to these wrappers. Export debugfs_create_file_unsafe() in order to allow debugfs users to create their files in non-proxying operation mode. Signed-off-by:
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Upon return of debugfs_remove()/debugfs_remove_recursive(), it might still be attempted to access associated private file data through previously opened struct file objects. If that data has been freed by the caller of debugfs_remove*() in the meanwhile, the reading/writing process would either encounter a fault or, if the memory address in question has been reassigned again, unrelated data structures could get overwritten. However, since debugfs files are seldomly removed, usually from module exit handlers only, the impact is very low. Currently, there are ~1000 call sites of debugfs_create_file() spread throughout the whole tree and touching all of those struct file_operations in order to make them file removal aware by means of checking the result of debugfs_use_file_start() from within their methods is unfeasible. Instead, wrap the struct file_operations by a lifetime managing proxy at file open: - In debugfs_create_file(), the original fops handed in has got stashed away in ->d_fsdata already. - In debugfs_create_file(), install a proxy file_operations factory, debugfs_full_proxy_file_operations, at ->i_fop. This proxy factory has got an ->open() method only. It carries out some lifetime checks and if successful, dynamically allocates and sets up a new struct file_operations proxy at ->f_op. Afterwards, it forwards to the ->open() of the original struct file_operations in ->d_fsdata, if any. The dynamically set up proxy at ->f_op has got a lifetime managing wrapper set for each of the methods defined in the original struct file_operations in ->d_fsdata. Its ->release()er frees the proxy again and forwards to the original ->release(), if any. In order not to mislead the VFS layer, it is strictly necessary to leave those fields blank in the proxy that have been NULL in the original struct file_operations also, i.e. aren't supported. This is why there is a need for dynamically allocated proxies. The choice made not to allocate a proxy instance for every dentry at file creation, but for every struct file object instantiated thereof is justified by the expected usage pattern of debugfs, namely that in general very few files get opened more than once at a time. The wrapper methods set in the struct file_operations implement lifetime managing by means of the SRCU protection facilities already in place for debugfs: They set up a SRCU read side critical section and check whether the dentry is still alive by means of debugfs_use_file_start(). If so, they forward the call to the original struct file_operation stored in ->d_fsdata, still under the protection of the SRCU read side critical section. This SRCU read side critical section prevents any pending debugfs_remove() and friends to return to their callers. Since a file's private data must only be freed after the return of debugfs_remove(), the ongoing proxied call is guarded against any file removal race. If, on the other hand, the initial call to debugfs_use_file_start() detects that the dentry is dead, the wrapper simply returns -EIO and does not forward the call. Note that the ->poll() wrapper is special in that its signature does not allow for the return of arbitrary -EXXX values and thus, POLLHUP is returned here. In order not to pollute debugfs with wrapper definitions that aren't ever needed, I chose not to define a wrapper for every struct file_operations method possible. Instead, a wrapper is defined only for the subset of methods which are actually set by any debugfs users. Currently, these are: ->llseek() ->read() ->write() ->unlocked_ioctl() ->poll() The ->release() wrapper is special in that it does not protect the original ->release() in any way from dead files in order not to leak resources. Thus, any ->release() handed to debugfs must implement file lifetime management manually, if needed. For only 33 out of a total of 434 releasers handed in to debugfs, it could not be verified immediately whether they access data structures that might have been freed upon a debugfs_remove() return in the meanwhile. Export debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish() in order to allow any ->release() to manually implement file lifetime management. For a set of common cases of struct file_operations implemented by the debugfs_core itself, future patches will incorporate file lifetime management directly within those in order to allow for their unproxied operation. Rename the original, non-proxying "debugfs_create_file()" to "debugfs_create_file_unsafe()" and keep it for future internal use by debugfs itself. Factor out code common to both into the new __debugfs_create_file(). Signed-off-by:
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Nicolai Stange authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Nothing prevents a dentry found by path lookup before a return of __debugfs_remove() to actually get opened after that return. Now, after the return of __debugfs_remove(), there are no guarantees whatsoever regarding the memory the corresponding inode's file_operations object had been kept in. Since __debugfs_remove() is seldomly invoked, usually from module exit handlers only, the race is hard to trigger and the impact is very low. A discussion of the problem outlined above as well as a suggested solution can be found in the (sub-)thread rooted at http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20130401203445.GA20862@ZenIV.linux.org.uk ("Yet another pipe related oops.") Basically, Greg KH suggests to introduce an intermediate fops and Al Viro points out that a pointer to the original ones may be stored in ->d_fsdata. Follow this line of reasoning: - Add SRCU as a reverse dependency of DEBUG_FS. - Introduce a srcu_struct object for the debugfs subsystem. - In debugfs_create_file(), store a pointer to the original file_operations object in ->d_fsdata. - Make debugfs_remove() and debugfs_remove_recursive() wait for a SRCU grace period after the dentry has been delete()'d and before they return to their callers. - Introduce an intermediate file_operations object named "debugfs_open_proxy_file_operations". It's ->open() functions checks, under the protection of a SRCU read lock, whether the dentry is still alive, i.e. has not been d_delete()'d and if so, tries to acquire a reference on the owning module. On success, it sets the file object's ->f_op to the original file_operations and forwards the ongoing open() call to the original ->open(). - For clarity, rename the former debugfs_file_operations to debugfs_noop_file_operations -- they are in no way canonical. The choice of SRCU over "normal" RCU is justified by the fact, that the former may also be used to protect ->i_private data from going away during the execution of a file's readers and writers which may (and do) sleep. Finally, introduce the fs/debugfs/internal.h header containing some declarations internal to the debugfs implementation. Signed-off-by:
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Javier Martinez Canillas authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without using the efivar API. Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services. Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the chardev file mode bits for this. The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't cause any regression to this tool. [0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfoSigned-off-by:
Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by:
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> (backported from commit 359efcc2) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error. Reported-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> (backported from commit 8d8c1da752c5ea837f1dbe06fa21d4ca891fcd83 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jwboyer/fedora.git) Signed-off-by:
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Chun-Yi Lee authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down. This code was showed in Matthew's patch but not in git: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/13/778 Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Signed-off-by:
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org (backported from commit 6620737c201ed7242dbb672803085b46ae600ce7 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jwboyer/fedora.git) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the kernel is locked down. Suggested-by:
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). Suggested-by:
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in sound/pci/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in sound/oss/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in sound/isa/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in sound/drivers/. Suggested-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org (cherry picked from commit b11ce420) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in fs/pstore/. Suggested-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> (backported from commit b90fe0c4) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/watchdog/. Suggested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be> cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 5d1c93ce) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/video/. Suggested-by:
Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit c729203d) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/tty/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/vme/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/speakup/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/media/. Suggested-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org (cherry picked from commit 32820d8a) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/scsi/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pcmcia/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pci/hotplug/. Suggested-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> cc: Scott Murray <scott@spiteful.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit 01b961b7) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/parport/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wireless/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wan/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/irda/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/hamradio/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/ethernet/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/can/. Suggested-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit e43f2c52) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/arcnet/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/appletalk/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/mmc/host/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/misc/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/media/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/isdn/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/input/. Suggested-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit f6b12d04) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/i2c/. Suggested-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit c78babcc) Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884159 When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/gpio/. Suggested-by:
William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> cc: Alexandre Courbot <gnurou@gmail.com> cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org (backported from commit d759f906) Signed-off-by:
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