- 17 Oct, 2022 40 commits
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Ensure that retpolines do the proper call accounting so that the return accounting works correctly. Specifically; retpolines are used to replace both 'jmp *%reg' and 'call *%reg', however these two cases do not have the same accounting requirements. Therefore split things up and provide two different retpoline arrays for SKL. The 'jmp *%reg' case needs no accounting, the __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[] covers this. The retpoline is changed to not use the return thunk; it's a simple call;ret construct. [ strictly speaking it should do: andq $(~0x1f), PER_CPU_VAR(__x86_call_depth) but we can argue this can be covered by the fuzz we already have in the accounting depth (12) vs the RSB depth (16) ] The 'call *%reg' case does need accounting, the __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[] covers this. Again, this retpoline avoids the use of the return-thunk, in this case to avoid double accounting. Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
To address the Intel SKL RSB underflow issue in software it's required to do call depth tracking. Provide a return thunk for call depth tracking on Intel SKL CPUs. The tracking does not use a counter. It uses uses arithmetic shift right on call entry and logical shift left on return. The depth tracking variable is initialized to 0x8000.... when the call depth is zero. The arithmetic shift right sign extends the MSB and saturates after the 12th call. The shift count is 5 so the tracking covers 12 nested calls. On return the variable is shifted left logically so it becomes zero again. CALL RET 0: 0x8000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 1: 0xfc00000000000000 0xf000000000000000 ... 11: 0xfffffffffffffff8 0xfffffffffffffc00 12: 0xffffffffffffffff 0xffffffffffffffe0 After a return buffer fill the depth is credited 12 calls before the next stuffing has to take place. There is a inaccuracy for situations like this: 10 calls 5 returns 3 calls 4 returns 3 calls .... The shift count might cause this to be off by one in either direction, but there is still a cushion vs. the RSB depth. The algorithm does not claim to be perfect, but it should obfuscate the problem enough to make exploitation extremly difficult. The theory behind this is: RSB is a stack with depth 16 which is filled on every call. On the return path speculation "pops" entries to speculate down the call chain. Once the speculative RSB is empty it switches to other predictors, e.g. the Branch History Buffer, which can be mistrained by user space and misguide the speculation path to a gadget. Call depth tracking is designed to break this speculation path by stuffing speculation trap calls into the RSB which are never getting a corresponding return executed. This stalls the prediction path until it gets resteered, The assumption is that stuffing at the 12th return is sufficient to break the speculation before it hits the underflow and the fallback to the other predictors. Testing confirms that it works. Johannes, one of the retbleed researchers. tried to attack this approach but failed. There is obviously no scientific proof that this will withstand future research progress, but all we can do right now is to speculate about it. The SAR/SHL usage was suggested by Andi Kleen. Signed-off-by: -
Peter Zijlstra authored
Fairly straight forward adaptation/extention of ALTERNATIVE_2. Required for call depth tracking. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
In preparation for call depth tracking on Intel SKL CPUs, make it possible to patch in a SKL specific return thunk. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
As for the builtins create call thunks and patch the call sites to call the thunk on Intel SKL CPUs for retbleed mitigation. Note, that module init functions are ignored for sake of simplicity because loading modules is not something which is done in high frequent loops and the attacker has not really a handle on when this happens in order to launch a matching attack. The depth tracking will still work for calls into the builtins and because the call is not accounted it will underflow faster and overstuff, but that's mitigated by the saturating counter and the side effect is only temporary. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Mitigating the Intel SKL RSB underflow issue in software requires to track the call depth. That is every CALL and every RET need to be intercepted and additional code injected. The existing retbleed mitigations already include means of redirecting RET to __x86_return_thunk; this can be re-purposed and RET can be redirected to another function doing RET accounting. CALL accounting will use the function padding introduced in prior patches. For each CALL instruction, the destination symbol's padding is rewritten to do the accounting and the CALL instruction is adjusted to call into the padding. This ensures only affected CPUs pay the overhead of this accounting. Unaffected CPUs will leave the padding unused and have their 'JMP __x86_return_thunk' replaced with an actual 'RET' instruction. Objtool has been modified to supply a .call_sites section that lists all the 'CALL' instructions. Additionally the paravirt instruction sites are iterated since they will have been patched from an indirect call to direct calls (or direct instructions in which case it'll be ignored). Module handling and the actual thunk code for SKL will be added in subsequent steps. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
For the upcoming call thunk patching it's less ifdeffery when the data structure is unconditionally available. The code can then be trivially fenced off with IS_ENABLED(). Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
paranoid_entry(), error_entry() and xen_error_entry() have to be exempted from call accounting by thunk patching because they are before UNTRAIN_RET. Expose them so they are available in the alternative code. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The upcoming call thunk patching must hold text_mutex and needs access to text_poke_copy(), which takes text_mutex. Provide a _locked postfixed variant to expose the inner workings. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Intel SKL CPUs fall back to other predictors when the RSB underflows. The only microcode mitigation is IBRS which is insanely expensive. It comes with performance drops of up to 30% depending on the workload. A way less expensive, but nevertheless horrible mitigation is to track the call depth in software and overeagerly fill the RSB when returns underflow the software counter. Provide a configuration symbol and a CPU misfeature bit. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Now that all functions are 16 byte aligned, add 16 bytes of NOP padding in front of each function. This prepares things for software call stack tracking and kCFI/FineIBT. This significantly increases kernel .text size, around 5.1% on a x86_64-defconfig-ish build. However, per the random access argument used for alignment, these 16 extra bytes are code that wouldn't be used. Performance measurements back this up by showing no significant performance regressions. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
In preparation for mitigating the Intel SKL RSB underflow issue in software, add a new configuration symbol which allows to build the required call thunk infrastructure conditionally. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
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Peter Zijlstra authored
No point in having a call there. Spare the call/ret overhead. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Teach objtool about STT_NOTYPE -> STT_FUNC+0 sibling calls. Doing do allows slightly simpler .S files. There is a slight complication in that we specifically do not want to allow sibling calls from symbol holes (previously covered by STT_WEAK symbols) -- such things exist where a weak function has a .cold subfunction for example. Additionally, STT_NOTYPE tail-calls are allowed to happen with a modified stack frame, they don't need to obey the normal rules after all. Signed-off-by: -
Peter Zijlstra authored
Currently insn->func contains a instruction -> symbol link for STT_FUNC symbols. A NULL value is assumed to mean STT_NOTYPE. However, there are also instructions not covered by any symbol at all. This can happen due to __weak symbols for example. Since the current scheme cannot differentiate between no symbol and STT_NOTYPE symbol, change things around. Make insn->sym point to any symbol type such that !insn->sym means no symbol and add a helper insn_func() that check the sym->type to retain the old functionality. This then prepares the way to add code that depends on the distinction between STT_NOTYPE and no symbol at all. Signed-off-by: -
Peter Zijlstra authored
A semi common pattern is where code checks if a code address is within a specific range. All text addresses require either ENDBR or ANNOTATE_ENDBR, however the ANNOTATE_NOENDBR past the range is unnatural. Instead, suppress this warning when this is exactly at the end of a symbol that itself starts with either ENDBR/ANNOTATE_ENDBR. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
The current find_{symbol,func}_containing() functions are broken in the face of overlapping symbols, exactly the case that is needed for a new ibt/endbr supression. Import interval_tree_generic.h into the tools tree and convert the symbol tree to an interval tree to support proper range stabs. Signed-off-by: -
Peter Zijlstra authored
Make the call/func sections selectable via the --hacks option. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
In preparation for call depth tracking provide a section which collects all direct calls. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
For future usage of .init.text exclusion track the init section in the instruction decoder and use the result in retpoline validation. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Objtool doesn't currently much like per-cpu usage in alternatives: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .altinstr_replacement+0xf: unsupported relocation in alternatives section f: 65 c7 04 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 movl $0x80000000,%gs:0x0 13: R_X86_64_32S __x86_call_depth Since the R_X86_64_32S relocation is location invariant (it's computation doesn't include P - the address of the location itself), it can be trivially allowed. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra (Intel) authored
It turns out that 'stack_canary_offset' is a variable name; shadowing that with a #define is ripe of fail when the asm-offsets.h header gets included. Rename the thing. Signed-off-by: -
Thomas Gleixner authored
Another hot variable which is strict per CPU and benefits from being in the same cache line. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Further extend struct pcpu_hot with the hard and soft irq stack pointers. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Extend the struct pcpu_hot cacheline with current_top_of_stack; another very frequently used value. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Also add cpu_number to the pcpu_hot structure, it is often referenced and this cacheline is there. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Add preempt_count to pcpu_hot, since it is once of the most used per-cpu variables. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The layout of per-cpu variables is at the mercy of the compiler. This can lead to random performance fluctuations from build to build. Create a structure to hold some of the hottest per-cpu variables, starting with current_task. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. ( this code couldn't seem to make up it's mind about what alignment it actually wanted, randomly mixing 8 and 16 bytes ) Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
SYM_FUNC_START*() and friends already imply alignment, remove custom alignment hacks to make code consistent. This prepares for future function call ABI changes. Also, with having pushed the function alignment to 16 bytes, this custom alignment is completely superfluous. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Explicitly align a bunch of commonly called SYM_CODE_START() symbols. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Ensure inline asm functions are consistently aligned with compiler generated and SYM_FUNC_START*() functions. Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111144.038540008@infradead.org
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