- 27 Jun, 2016 2 commits
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James Smart authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1587316 Driver didn't program the REG_VFI mailbox correctly, giving the adapter bad addresses. Signed-off-by:
Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
James Smart <james.smart@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit ae09c765) Signed-off-by:
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 24 Jun, 2016 20 commits
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Luis Henriques authored
Signed-off-by:Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Florian Westphal authored
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> (cherry picked from commit d7591f0c) BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1595350Signed-off-by:
Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
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Florian Westphal authored
This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix. Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path. For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies. While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case. Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync. At a high level 32 bit compat works like this: 1- initial pass over blob: validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.) 2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to contain the translated ruleset 3- second pass over original blob: for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc). 4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps) 5-first pass over translated blob: call the checkentry function of all matches and targets. The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement. In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name . This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks. This has two drawbacks: 1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets. 2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target. THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code. iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002 -A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003 shows no noticeable differences in restore times: old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s 64bit: 0m25.674s Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Always returned 0. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
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Florian Westphal authored
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Florian Westphal authored
Quoting John Stultz: In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that /proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty. Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the: if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the offset + standard_target struct size. next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members of ip(6)t_entry struct). This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding. Reported-by:John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Tested-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size. The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
We have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict. The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated. Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob. Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
The target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob or a normal one. Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry, compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of a rule (an ipt_entry). The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases. 300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain: [ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]: Before: real 0m24.874s user 0m7.532s sys 0m16.076s After: real 0m27.464s user 0m7.436s sys 0m18.840s Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Base chains enforce absolute verdict. User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return, xtables userspace adds them automatically. But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule. Reported-by:
Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
We should check that e->target_offset is sane before mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry for loop detection. Signed-off-by:
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- 22 Jun, 2016 1 commit
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Jun, 2016 3 commits
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Wen-chien Jesse Sung authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1512999 This commit reverts 8b6d64a7. Although the BT LED works with the patch, it introduces a new regression that causes HCI stops responding after LED-on command is issued. Tested with the latest master-next head with this revert patch, HCI works, and both Marvell wireless driver update and WiFi LED work without problem. Signed-off-by:
Wen-chien Jesse Sung <jesse.sung@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Jun, 2016 3 commits
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Tim Gardner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1593075 This is a better method for detecting the state of secure boot and the MOKSBState override, as opposed to grepping status from the kernel log. Both variables return 0 or 1. If secure_boot==0 then signed module enforcement is not enabled. Likewise, if moksbstate_disabled==1 then signed module enforcement is not enabled. The only conditions uder which signed module enforcement is enabled is when secure_boot==1 and moksbstate_disabled==0. /proc/sys/kernel/secure_boot /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592930 INT_MAX needs limits.h in userland. When ethtool.h is included by a userland app, we got the following error: .../usr/include/linux/ethtool.h: In function 'ethtool_validate_speed': .../usr/include/linux/ethtool.h:1471:18: error: 'INT_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function) return speed <= INT_MAX || speed == SPEED_UNKNOWN ^ Fixes: 72f843bd ("ethtool: make validate_speed accept all speeds between 0 and INT_MAX") CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 14e20379) Signed-off-by:
Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com> Reported-by:
Iain Lane <iain@orangesquash.org.uk> Acked-by:
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- 14 Jun, 2016 1 commit
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 10 Jun, 2016 10 commits
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455Signed-off-by:
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Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit 7d6a13f0 upstream. When we do dquot readahead in log recovery, we do not use a verifier as the underlying buffer may not have dquots in it. e.g. the allocation operation hasn't yet been replayed. Hence we do not want to fail recovery because we detect an operation to be replayed has not been run yet. This problem was addressed for inodes in commit d8914002 ("xfs: inode buffers may not be valid during recovery readahead") but the problem was not recognised to exist for dquots and their buffers as the dquot readahead did not have a verifier. The result of not using a verifier is that when the buffer is then next read to replay a dquot modification, the dquot buffer verifier will only be attached to the buffer if *readahead is not complete*. Hence we can read the buffer, replay the dquot changes and then add it to the delwri submission list without it having a verifier attached to it. This then generates warnings in xfs_buf_ioapply(), which catches and warns about this case. Fix this and make it handle the same readahead verifier error cases as for inode buffers by adding a new readahead verifier that has a write operation as well as a read operation that marks the buffer as not done if any corruption is detected. Also make sure we don't run readahead if the dquot buffer has been marked as cancelled by recovery. This will result in readahead either succeeding and the buffer having a valid write verifier, or readahead failing and the buffer state requiring the subsequent read to resubmit the IO with the new verifier. In either case, this will result in the buffer always ending up with a valid write verifier on it. Note: we also need to fix the inode buffer readahead error handling to mark the buffer with EIO. Brian noticed the code I copied from there wrong during review, so fix it at the same time. Add comments linking the two functions that handle readahead verifier errors together so we don't forget this behavioural link in future. Signed-off-by:
Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Sandeen authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit 233135b7 upstream. This adds a name to each buf_ops structure, so that if a verifier fails we can print the type of verifier that failed it. Should be a slight debugging aid, I hope. Signed-off-by:
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit 7d3aa7fe upstream. We don't write back stale inodes so we should skip them in xfs_iflush_cluster, too. Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit 51b07f30 upstream. Some careless idiot(*) wrote crap code in commit 1a3e8f3d ("xfs: convert inode cache lookups to use RCU locking") back in late 2010, and so xfs_iflush_cluster checks the wrong inode for whether it is still valid under RCU protection. Fix it to lock and check the correct inode. (*) Careless-idiot: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Discovered-by:
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Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit b1438f47 upstream. When a failure due to an inode buffer occurs, the error handling fails to abort the inode writeback correctly. This can result in the inode being reclaimed whilst still in the AIL, leading to use-after-free situations as well as filesystems that cannot be unmounted as the inode log items left in the AIL never get removed. Fix this by ensuring fatal errors from xfs_imap_to_bp() result in the inode flush being aborted correctly. Reported-by:
Shyam Kaushik <shyam@zadarastorage.com> Diagnosed-by:
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Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit ad747e3b upstream. Commit 96f859d5 ("libxfs: pack the agfl header structure so XFS_AGFL_SIZE is correct") allowed the freelist to use the empty slot at the end of the freelist on 64 bit systems that was not being used due to sizeof() rounding up the structure size. This has caused versions of xfs_repair prior to 4.5.0 (which also has the fix) to report this as a corruption once the filesystem has been grown. Older kernels can also have problems (seen from a whacky container/vm management environment) mounting filesystems grown on a system with a newer kernel than the vm/container it is deployed on. To avoid this problem, change the initial free list indexes not to wrap across the end of the AGFL, hence avoiding the initialisation of agf_fllast to the last index in the AGFL. Signed-off-by:
Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Sandeen authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit d0a58e83 upstream. Today, a kernel which refuses to mount a filesystem read-write due to unknown ro-compat features can still transition to read-write via the remount path. The old kernel is most likely none the wiser, because it's unaware of the new feature, and isn't using it. However, writing to the filesystem may well corrupt metadata related to that new feature, and moving to a newer kernel which understand the feature will have problems. Right now the only ro-compat feature we have is the free inode btree, which showed up in v3.16. It would be good to push this back to all the active stable kernels, I think, so that if anyone is using newer mkfs (which enables the finobt feature) with older kernel releases, they'll be protected. Signed-off-by:
Bill O'Donnell <billodo@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit c87bf431 upstream. Enabling CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL produces us a lot of warnings like lib/lz4/lz4hc_compress.c: In function 'lz4_compresshcctx': lib/lz4/lz4hc_compress.c:514:1: warning: the frame size of 1504 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] After some investigation, I found that this behavior started with gcc-4.9, and opened https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=69702. A suggested workaround for it is to use the -fno-tree-loop-im flag that turns off one of the optimization stages in gcc, so the code runs a little slower but does not use excessive amounts of stack. We could make this conditional on the gcc version, but I could not find an easy way to do this in Kbuild and the benefit would be fairly small, given that most of the gcc version in production are affected now. I'm marking this for 'stable' backports because it addresses a bug with code generation in gcc that exists in all kernel versions with the affected gcc releases. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by:
Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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