- 27 Jun, 2016 9 commits
-
-
Anton Blanchard authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592481 When calling ppc-xlate.pl, we pass it either linux-ppc64 or linux-ppc64le. The script however was expecting linux64le, a result of its OpenSSL origins. This means we aren't obeying the ppc64le ABIv2 rules. Fix this by checking for linux-ppc64le. Fixes: 5ca55738 ("crypto: vmx - comply with ABIs that specify vrsave as reserved.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (cherry picked from commit 975f57fd git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git) Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-
Paulo Flabiano Smorigo authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592481 It gives significant improvements ( ~+15%) on some modes. These code has been adopted from OpenSSL project in collaboration with the original author (Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>). Signed-off-by:
Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tim Gardner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1593134Signed-off-by:
Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Paul Mackerras authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592809 Commit c9a5ecca ("kvm/eventfd: add arch-specific set_irq", 2015-10-16) added the possibility for architecture-specific code to handle the generation of virtual interrupts in atomic context where possible, without having to schedule a work function. Since we can easily generate virtual interrupts on XICS without having to do anything worse than take a spinlock, we define a kvm_arch_set_irq_inatomic() for XICS. We also remove kvm_set_msi() since it is not used any more. The one slightly tricky thing is that with the new interface, we don't get told whether the interrupt is an MSI (or other edge sensitive interrupt) vs. level-sensitive. The difference as far as interrupt generation is concerned is that for LSIs we have to set the asserted flag so it will continue to fire until it is explicitly cleared. In fact the XICS code gets told which interrupts are LSIs by userspace when it configures the interrupt via the KVM_DEV_XICS_GRP_SOURCES attribute group on the XICS device. To store this information, we add a new "lsi" field to struct ics_irq_state. With that we can also do a better job of returning accurate values when reading the attribute group. Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> (cherry picked from commit b1a4286b) Signed-off-by:
Christopher Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Michael S. Tsirkin authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592042 Everything should be LE when using virtio-1, but the linux balloon driver does not seem to care about that. Reported-by:
Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Tested-by:
-
Benjamin Tissoires authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1579190 Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of out-of-bound readings. The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do not have enough fields to fit the incoming values. Add checks and silence KASAN. Signed-off-by:
Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (cherry picked from commit 50220dea) Signed-off-by:
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by:
-
Brian Behlendorf authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1587686 Commit efc412b updated spa_config_write() for Linux 4.2 kernels to truncate and overwrite rather than rename the cache file. This is the correct fix but it should have only been applied for the kernel build. In user space rename(2) is needed because ztest depends on the cache file. Signed-off-by:
Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Closes #4129 (cherry picked from zfs commit 151f84e2c32f690b92c424d8c55d2dfccaa76e51) Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
James Smart authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1587316 Driver didn't program the REG_VFI mailbox correctly, giving the adapter bad addresses. Signed-off-by:
Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
James Smart <james.smart@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit ae09c765) Signed-off-by:
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
-
- 24 Jun, 2016 20 commits
-
-
Luis Henriques authored
Signed-off-by:Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
-
Florian Westphal authored
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> (cherry picked from commit d7591f0c) BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1595350Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix. Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path. For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies. While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case. Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync. At a high level 32 bit compat works like this: 1- initial pass over blob: validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.) 2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to contain the translated ruleset 3- second pass over original blob: for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc). 4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps) 5-first pass over translated blob: call the checkentry function of all matches and targets. The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement. In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name . This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks. This has two drawbacks: 1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets. 2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target. THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code. iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002 -A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003 shows no noticeable differences in restore times: old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s 64bit: 0m25.674s Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Always returned 0. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Quoting John Stultz: In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that /proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty. Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the: if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the offset + standard_target struct size. next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members of ip(6)t_entry struct). This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding. Reported-by:John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Tested-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size. The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
We have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict. The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated. Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob. Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
The target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob or a normal one. Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry, compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of a rule (an ipt_entry). The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases. 300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain: [ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]: Before: real 0m24.874s user 0m7.532s sys 0m16.076s After: real 0m27.464s user 0m7.436s sys 0m18.840s Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Base chains enforce absolute verdict. User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return, xtables userspace adds them automatically. But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule. Reported-by:
Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob. Signed-off-by:
-
Florian Westphal authored
We should check that e->target_offset is sane before mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry for loop detection. Signed-off-by:
-
- 22 Jun, 2016 1 commit
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
-
- 21 Jun, 2016 3 commits
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Wen-chien Jesse Sung authored
BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1512999 This commit reverts 8b6d64a7. Although the BT LED works with the patch, it introduces a new regression that causes HCI stops responding after LED-on command is issued. Tested with the latest master-next head with this revert patch, HCI works, and both Marvell wireless driver update and WiFi LED work without problem. Signed-off-by:
Wen-chien Jesse Sung <jesse.sung@canonical.com> Acked-by:
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
-
- 20 Jun, 2016 3 commits
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Tim Gardner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1593075 This is a better method for detecting the state of secure boot and the MOKSBState override, as opposed to grepping status from the kernel log. Both variables return 0 or 1. If secure_boot==0 then signed module enforcement is not enabled. Likewise, if moksbstate_disabled==1 then signed module enforcement is not enabled. The only conditions uder which signed module enforcement is enabled is when secure_boot==1 and moksbstate_disabled==0. /proc/sys/kernel/secure_boot /proc/sys/kernel/moksbstate_disabled Signed-off-by:
-
Nicolas Dichtel authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592930 INT_MAX needs limits.h in userland. When ethtool.h is included by a userland app, we got the following error: .../usr/include/linux/ethtool.h: In function 'ethtool_validate_speed': .../usr/include/linux/ethtool.h:1471:18: error: 'INT_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function) return speed <= INT_MAX || speed == SPEED_UNKNOWN ^ Fixes: 72f843bd ("ethtool: make validate_speed accept all speeds between 0 and INT_MAX") CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 14e20379) Signed-off-by:
Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com> Reported-by:
Iain Lane <iain@orangesquash.org.uk> Acked-by:
-
- 14 Jun, 2016 1 commit
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
-
- 10 Jun, 2016 3 commits
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455Signed-off-by:
-
Dave Chinner authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1590455 commit 7d6a13f0 upstream. When we do dquot readahead in log recovery, we do not use a verifier as the underlying buffer may not have dquots in it. e.g. the allocation operation hasn't yet been replayed. Hence we do not want to fail recovery because we detect an operation to be replayed has not been run yet. This problem was addressed for inodes in commit d8914002 ("xfs: inode buffers may not be valid during recovery readahead") but the problem was not recognised to exist for dquots and their buffers as the dquot readahead did not have a verifier. The result of not using a verifier is that when the buffer is then next read to replay a dquot modification, the dquot buffer verifier will only be attached to the buffer if *readahead is not complete*. Hence we can read the buffer, replay the dquot changes and then add it to the delwri submission list without it having a verifier attached to it. This then generates warnings in xfs_buf_ioapply(), which catches and warns about this case. Fix this and make it handle the same readahead verifier error cases as for inode buffers by adding a new readahead verifier that has a write operation as well as a read operation that marks the buffer as not done if any corruption is detected. Also make sure we don't run readahead if the dquot buffer has been marked as cancelled by recovery. This will result in readahead either succeeding and the buffer having a valid write verifier, or readahead failing and the buffer state requiring the subsequent read to resubmit the IO with the new verifier. In either case, this will result in the buffer always ending up with a valid write verifier on it. Note: we also need to fix the inode buffer readahead error handling to mark the buffer with EIO. Brian noticed the code I copied from there wrong during review, so fix it at the same time. Add comments linking the two functions that handle readahead verifier errors together so we don't forget this behavioural link in future. Signed-off-by:
Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
-
