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  1. 23 Feb, 2016 5 commits
  3. 11 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  5. 10 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  7. 09 Feb, 2016 6 commits
    • Yevgeny Pats's avatar
      KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring() · 1c6cbac5
      Yevgeny Pats authored 
      commit 23567fd0 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-0728.

If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stddef.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial < 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: default avatarYevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDon Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      1c6cbac5
    • David Howells's avatar
      ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun · 9e67a1f7
      David Howells authored 
      commit 0d62e9dd upstream.

If the ASN.1 decoder is asked to parse a sequence of objects, non-optional
matches get skipped if there's no more data to be had rather than a
data-overrun error being reported.

This is due to the code segment that decides whether to skip optional
matches (ie. matches that could get ignored because an element is marked
OPTIONAL in the grammar) due to a lack of data also skips non-optional
elements if the data pointer has reached the end of the buffer.

This can be tested with the data decoder for the new RSA akcipher algorithm
that takes three non-optional integers.  Currently, it skips the last
integer if there is insufficient data.

Without the fix, #defining DEBUG in asn1_decoder.c will show something
like:

	next_op: pc=0/13 dp=0/270 C=0 J=0
	- match? 30 30 00
	- TAG: 30 266 CONS
	next_op: pc=2/13 dp=4/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 257
	- LEAF: 257
	next_op: pc=5/13 dp=265/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 3
	- LEAF: 3
	next_op: pc=8/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	next_op: pc=11/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	- end cons t=4 dp=270 l=270/270

The next_op line for pc=8/13 should be followed by a match line.

This is not exploitable for X.509 certificates by means of shortening the
message and fixing up the ASN.1 CONS tags because:

 (1) The relevant records being built up are cleared before use.

 (2) If the message is shortened sufficiently to remove the public key, the
     ASN.1 parse of the RSA key will fail quickly due to a lack of data.

 (3) Extracted signature data is either turned into MPIs (which cope with a
     0 length) or is simpler integers specifying algoritms and suchlike
     (which can validly be 0); and

 (4) The AKID and SKID extensions are optional and their removal is handled
     without risking passing a NULL to asymmetric_key_generate_id().

 (5) If the certificate is truncated sufficiently to remove the subject,
     issuer or serialNumber then the ASN.1 decoder will fail with a 'Cons
     stack underflow' return.

This is not exploitable for PKCS#7 messages by means of removal of elements
from such a message from the tail end of a sequence:

 (1) Any shortened X.509 certs embedded in the PKCS#7 message are survivable
     as detailed above.

 (2) The message digest content isn't used if it shows a NULL pointer,
     similarly, the authattrs aren't used if that shows a NULL pointer.

 (3) A missing signature results in a NULL MPI - which the MPI routines deal
     with.

 (4) If data is NULL, it is expected that the message has detached content and
     that is handled appropriately.

 (5) If the serialNumber is excised, the unconditional action associated
     with it will pick up the containing SEQUENCE instead, so no NULL
     pointer will be seen here.

     If both the issuer and the serialNumber are excised, the ASN.1 decode
     will fail with an 'Unexpected tag' return.

     In either case, there's no way to get to asymmetric_key_generate_id()
     with a NULL pointer.

 (6) Other fields are decoded to simple integers.  Shortening the message
     to omit an algorithm ID field will cause checks on this to fail early
     in the verification process.

This can also be tested by snipping objects off of the end of the ASN.1 stream
such that mandatory tags are removed - or even from the end of internal
SEQUENCEs.  If any mandatory tag is missing, the error EBADMSG *should* be
produced.  Without this patch ERANGE or ENOPKG might be produced or the parse
may apparently succeed, perhaps with ENOKEY or EKEYREJECTED being produced
later, depending on what gets snipped.

Just snipping off the final BIT_STRING or OCTET_STRING from either sample
should be a start since both are mandatory and neither will cause an EBADMSG
without the patches
Reported-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      9e67a1f7
    • Vladis Dronov's avatar
      [media] usbvision: fix crash on detecting device with invalid configuration · 6eb67094
      Vladis Dronov authored 
      commit fa52bd50 upstream.

The usbvision driver crashes when a specially crafted usb device with invalid
number of interfaces or endpoints is detected. This fix adds checks that the
device has proper configuration expected by the driver.
Reported-by: default avatarRalf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarVladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      6eb67094
    • Oliver Neukum's avatar
      [media] usbvision fix overflow of interfaces array · e217263c
      Oliver Neukum authored 
      commit 588afcc1 upstream.

This fixes the crash reported in:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Oct/35
The interface number needs a sanity check.
Signed-off-by: default avatarOliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      e217263c
    • David Vrabel's avatar
      x86/xen/p2m: hint at the last populated P2M entry · 72be9734
      David Vrabel authored 
      commit 98dd166e upstream.

With commit 633d6f17 (x86/xen: prepare
p2m list for memory hotplug) the P2M may be sized to accomdate a much
larger amount of memory than the domain currently has.

When saving a domain, the toolstack must scan all the P2M looking for
populated pages.  This results in a performance regression due to the
unnecessary scanning.

Instead of reporting (via shared_info) the maximum possible size of
the P2M, hint at the last PFN which might be populated.  This hint is
increased as new leaves are added to the P2M (in the expectation that
they will be used for populated entries).
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
[ tim.gardner: backport to 4.2-stable ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      72be9734
    • Kamal Mostafa's avatar
      Linux 4.2.8-ckt4 · 17f04966
      Kamal Mostafa authored 
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      17f04966
  9. 04 Feb, 2016 27 commits
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