- 06 Nov, 2019 36 commits
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Xiao Guangrong authored
kvm_lpage_info->write_count is used to detect if the large page mapping for the gfn on the specified level is allowed, rename it to disallow_lpage to reflect its purpose, also we rename has_wrprotected_page() to mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() to make the code more clearer Later we will extend this mechanism for page tracking: if the gfn is tracked then large mapping for that gfn on any level is not allowed. The new name is more straightforward Reviewed-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
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Takuya Yoshikawa authored
Rather than placing a handle_mmio_page_fault() call in each vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault() handler, moving it up to kvm_mmu_page_fault() makes the code better: - avoids code duplication - for kvm_arch_async_page_ready(), which is the other caller of vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(), removes an extra error_code check - avoids returning both RET_MMIO_PF_* values and raw integer values from vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault() Signed-off-by:
Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa_takuya_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Takuya Yoshikawa authored
These two have only slight differences: - whether 'addr' is of type u64 or of type gva_t - whether they have 'direct' parameter or not Concerning the former, quickly_check_mmio_pf()'s u64 is better because 'addr' needs to be able to have both a guest physical address and a guest virtual address. The latter is just a stylistic issue as we can always calculate the mode from the 'vcpu' as is_mmio_page_fault() does. This patch keeps the parameter to make the following patch cleaner. In addition, the patch renames the function to mmio_info_in_cache() to make it clear what it actually checks for. Signed-off-by:
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Takuya Yoshikawa authored
New struct kvm_rmap_head makes the code type-safe to some extent. Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
Turn on CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF to disable Intel's Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature by default. TSX can only be disable on certain, newer processors that support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR via a microcode update. Intel says that future processors will also support the MSR. On processors that support the MSR, TSX will be disabled unless the system administrator overrides the configuration with the "tsx" kernel command line option. CVE-2019-11135 Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
The linux-4.14.y backport of commit 286836a7 ("x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()") added a dependency on cpu.h from bugs.c so include the header file from bugs.c. CVE-2019-11135 Suggested-by:
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
The linux-4.14.y backport of upstream commit 95c5824f ("x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default") incorrectly dropped the call to tsx_init(). Add the function call back to identify_boot_cpu() CVE-2019-11135 Suggested-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
commit db616173 upstream There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make. There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux distributions which will provide TAA mitigations. Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options. [ bp: Text cleanups from Josh. ] Suggested-by:
Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> CVE-2019-11135 [tyhicks: Backport to 4.4 - Minor context adjustment in arch/x86/Kconfig due to different surrounding Kconfig options] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit a7a248c5 upstream Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation, guidance for system administrators. [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ] Co-developed-by:
Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 7531a359 upstream Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX. More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html [ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit e1d38b63 upstream Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain, "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode" when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers. Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is not exported to the guests. In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA. Signed-off-by:
Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 6608b45a upstream Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities. Sysfs file path is: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 1b42f017 upstream TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a TSX transaction. This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0, CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two bits in that MSR: * TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM). * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}. The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest. Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More details on this approach can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter. If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs. [ bp: - massage + comments cleanup - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh. - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh. - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 95c5824f upstream Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack. Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c. [ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer. - Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh. - Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ] Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit 286836a7 upstream Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Signed-off-by:
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Pawan Gupta authored
commit c2955f27 upstream Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations. The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well. [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ] Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits. TSX has two sub-features: 1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions. 2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of "old" style locks are used by software. Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR: Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the XBEGIN instruction). Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0). The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Similar to AMD bits, set the Intel bits from the vendor-independent feature and bug flags, because KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID does not care about the vendor and they should be set on AMD processors as well. Suggested-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
The CPUID flag ARCH_CAPABILITIES is unconditioinally exposed to host userspace for all x86 hosts, i.e. KVM advertises ARCH_CAPABILITIES regardless of hardware support under the pretense that KVM fully emulates MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Unfortunately, only VMX hosts handle accesses to MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (despite KVM_GET_MSRS also reporting MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES for all hosts). Move the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES handling to common x86 code so that it's emulated on AMD hosts. Fixes: 1eaafe91 ("kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Imre Deak authored
In some circumstances the RC6 context can get corrupted. We can detect this and take the required action, that is disable RC6 and runtime PM. The HW recovers from the corrupted state after a system suspend/resume cycle, so detect the recovery and re-enable RC6 and runtime PM. v2: rebase (Mika) v3: - Move intel_suspend_gt_powersave() to the end of the GEM suspend sequence. - Add commit message. v4: - Rebased on intel_uncore_forcewake_put(i915->uncore, ...) API change. v5: - Rebased on latest upstream gt_pm refactoring. Signed-off-by:
Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> CVE-2019-0154 Signed-off-by:
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Imre Deak authored
In some circumstances the RC6 context can get corrupted. We can detect this and take the required action, that is disable RC6 and runtime PM. The HW recovers from the corrupted state after a system suspend/resume cycle, so detect the recovery and re-enable RC6 and runtime PM. v2: rebase (Mika) v3: - Move intel_suspend_gt_powersave() to the end of the GEM suspend sequence. - Add commit message. v4: - Rebased on intel_uncore_forcewake_put(i915->uncore, ...) API change. v5: - Rebased on latest upstream gt_pm refactoring. Signed-off-by:
Timo Aaltonen <timo.aaltonen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Uma Shankar authored
In BXT/APL, device 2 MMIO reads from MIPI controller requires its PLL to be turned ON. When MIPI PLL is turned off (MIPI Display is not active or connected), and someone (host or GT engine) tries to read MIPI registers, it causes hard hang. This is a hardware restriction or limitation. Driver by itself doesn't read MIPI registers when MIPI display is off. But any userspace application can submit unprivileged batch buffer for execution. In that batch buffer there can be mmio reads. And these reads are allowed even for unprivileged applications. If these register reads are for MIPI DSI controller and MIPI display is not active during that time, then the MMIO read operation causes system hard hang and only way to recover is hard reboot. A genuine process/application won't submit batch buffer like this and doesn't cause any issue. But on a compromised system, a malign userspace process/app can generate such batch buffer and can trigger system hard hang (denial of service attack). The fix is to lower the internal MMIO timeout value to an optimum value of 950us as recommended by hardware team. If the timeout is beyond 1ms (which will hit for any value we choose if MMIO READ on a DSI specific register is performed without PLL ON), it causes the system hang. But if the timeout value is lower than it will be below the threshold (even if timeout happens) and system will not get into a hung state. This will avoid a system hang without losing any programming or GT interrupts, taking the worst case of lowest CDCLK frequency and early DC5 abort into account. Signed-off-by:
Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> CVE-2019-0154 [tjaalton: backport to i915_bpo - Use type safe register definitions.] Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
Some of the gen instruction macros (e.g. MI_DISPLAY_FLIP) have the length directly encoded in them. Since these are used directly in the tables, the Length becomes part of the comparison used for matching during parsing. Thus, if the cmd being parsed has a different length to that in the table, it is not matched and the cmd is accepted via the default variable length path. Fix by masking out everything except the Opcode in the cmd tables Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
To keep things manageable, the pre-gen9 cmdparser does not attempt to track any form of nested BB_START's. This did not prevent usermode from using nested starts, or even chained batches because the cmdparser is not strictly enforced pre gen9. Instead, the existence of a nested BB_START would cause the batch to be emitted in insecure mode, and any privileged capabilities would not be available. For Gen9, the cmdparser becomes mandatory (for BCS at least), and so not providing any form of nested BB_START support becomes overly restrictive. Any such batch will simply not run. We make heavy use of backward jumps in igt, and it is much easier to add support for this restricted subset of nested jumps, than to rewrite the whole of our test suite to avoid them. Add the required logic to support limited backward jumps, to instructions that have already been validated by the parser. Note that it's not sufficient to simply approve any BB_START that jumps backwards in the buffer because this would allow an attacker to embed a rogue instruction sequence within the operand words of a harmless instruction (say LRI) and jump to that. We introduce a bit array to track every instr offset successfully validated, and test the target of BB_START against this. If the target offset hits, it is re-written to the same offset in the shadow buffer and the BB_START cmd is allowed. Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in the cmdtables, in order to match the style of the surrounding code. We'll correct the entire file in one go in a later patch. v2: set dispatch secure late (Mika) v3: rebase (Mika) v4: Clear whitelist on each parse Minor review updates (Chris) v5: Correct backward jump batching v6: fix compilation error due to struct eb shuffle (Mika) Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
For gen9 we enable cmdparsing on the BCS ring, specifically to catch inadvertent accesses to sensitive registers Unlike gen7/hsw, we use the parser only to block certain registers. We can rely on h/w to block restricted commands, so the command tables only provide enough info to allow the parser to delineate each command, and identify commands that access registers. Note: This patch deliberately ignores checkpatch issues in favour of matching the style of the surrounding code. We'll correct the entire file in one go in a later patch. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
In "drm/i915: Add support for mandatory cmdparsing" we introduced the concept of mandatory parsing. This allows the cmdparser to be invoked even when user passes batch_len=0 to the execbuf ioctl's. However, the cmdparser needs to know the extents of the buffer being scanned. Refactor the code to ensure the cmdparser uses the actual object size, instead of the incoming length, if user passes 0. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
For Gen7, the original cmdparser motive was to permit limited use of register read/write instructions in unprivileged BB's. This worked by copying the user supplied bb to a kmd owned bb, and running it in secure mode, from the ggtt, only if the scanner finds no unsafe commands or registers. For Gen8+ we can't use this same technique because running bb's from the ggtt also disables access to ppgtt space. But we also do not actually require 'secure' execution since we are only trying to reduce the available command/register set. Instead we will copy the user buffer to a kmd owned read-only bb in ppgtt, and run in the usual non-secure mode. Note that ro pages are only supported by ppgtt (not ggtt), but luckily that's exactly what we need. Add the required paths to map the shadow buffer to ppgtt ro for Gen8+ Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
The existing cmdparser for gen7 can be bypassed by specifying batch_len=0 in the execbuf call. This is safe because bypassing simply reduces the cmd-set available. In a later patch we will introduce cmdparsing for gen9, as a security measure, which must be strictly enforced since without it we are vulnerable to DoS attacks. Introduce the concept of 'required' cmd parsing that cannot be bypassed by submitting zero-length bb's. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
The previous patch has killed support for secure batches on gen6+, and hence the cmdparsers master tables are now dead code. Remove them. Signed-off-by:
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Michal Srb authored
The find_reg function was assuming that there is always at least one table in reg_tables. It is not always true. In case of VCS or VECS, the reg_tables is NULL and reg_table_count is 0, implying that no register-accessing commands are allowed. However, the command tables include commands such as MI_STORE_REGISTER_MEM. When trying to check such command, the find_reg would dereference NULL pointer. Now it will just return NULL meaning that the register was not found and the command will be rejected. Fixes: 76ff480e ("drm/i915/cmdparser: Use binary search for faster register lookup") Signed-off-by:
Michal Srb <msrb@suse.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180205142916.27092-2-msrb@suse.com Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Chris Wilson authored
A significant proportion of the cmdparsing time for some batches is the cost to find the register in the mmiotable. We ensure that those tables are in ascending order such that we could do a binary search if it was ever merited. It is. Signed-off-by:
Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20160818161718.27187-38-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk CVE-2019-0155 (cherry picked from commit 76ff480e) Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
Retroactively stop reporting support for secure batches through the api for gen6+ so that older binaries trigger the fallback path instead. Older binaries use secure batches pre gen6 to access resources that are not available to normal usermode processes. However, all known userspace explicitly checks for HAS_SECURE_BATCHES before relying on the secure batch feature. Since there are no known binaries relying on this for newer gens we can kill secure batches from gen6, via I915_PARAM_HAS_SECURE_BATCHES. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
We're about to introduce some new tables for later gens, and the current naming for the gen7 tables will no longer make sense. Signed-off-by:
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Chris Wilson authored
GVT is not propagating the PTE bits, and is always setting the read-write bit, thus breaking read-only support. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
Hook up the flags to allow read-only ppGTT mappings for gen8+ v2: Include a selftest to check that writes to a readonly PTE are dropped v3: Don't duplicate cpu_check() as we can just reuse it, and even worse don't wholesale copy the theory-of-operation comment from igt_ctx_exec without changing it to explain the intention behind the new test! v4: Joonas really likes magic mystery values Signed-off-by:
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld@gmail.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180712185315.3288-2-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk (backported from commit 250f8c81) CVE-2019-0155 [tjaalton: backport to i915_bpo - ggtt_vm doesn't exist, use ggtt->base - dev_priv doesn't have gtt, use ggtt instead] Signed-off-by:
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Jon Bloomfield authored
We can set a bit inside the ppGTT PTE to indicate a page is read-only; writes from the GPU will be discarded. We can use this to protect pages and in particular support read-only userptr mappings (necessary for importing PROT_READ vma). Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Oct, 2019 4 commits
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Khalid Elmously authored
Signed-off-by:Khalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
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Khalid Elmously authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1848780 This driver was removed in Ubuntu commit 74fb80c7f1b7 ("USB: rio500: Remove Rio 500 kernel driver"). Signed-off-by:
Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Khalid Elmously authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1849051 Properties: no-test-build Signed-off-by:
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Khalid Elmously authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by:
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