Commit 8417f697 authored by Andrea Righi's avatar Andrea Righi Committed by yonghong-song

capable: add user and kernel stack trace options (#2042)

* add kernel stack trace option to capable
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>

* capable: avoid stack trace overwrite

Use 0 in get_stack() to avoid overwriting the stack trace in the
kernel for the same stack_id.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: print both TID and PID
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* add user-space stack trace option to capable
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: avoid catching itself
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: drop unused member pid_tgid in struct
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: report a proper error message when stack trace is missing

Print [Missed User Stack] or [Missed Kernel Stack] when get_stackid()
returns an error.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: add missing errno import
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>

* capable: remove dependency from python-enum module
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
parent 6bbdb9c6
......@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
.SH NAME
capable \- Trace security capability checks (cap_capable()).
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B capable [\-h] [\-v] [\-p PID]
.B capable [\-h] [\-v] [\-p PID] [\-K] [\-U]
.SH DESCRIPTION
This traces security capability checks in the kernel, and prints details for
each call. This can be useful for general debugging, and also security
......@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ USAGE message.
Include non-audit capability checks. These are those deemed not interesting and
not necessary to audit, such as CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks on memory allocation to
affect the behavior of overcommit.
.TP
\-K
Include kernel stack traces to the output.
.TP
\-U
Include user-space stack traces to the output.
.SH EXAMPLES
.TP
Trace all capability checks system-wide:
......
......@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
# capable Trace security capabilitiy checks (cap_capable()).
# For Linux, uses BCC, eBPF. Embedded C.
#
# USAGE: capable [-h] [-v] [-p PID]
#
# ToDo: add -s for kernel stacks.
# USAGE: capable [-h] [-v] [-p PID] [-K] [-U]
#
# Copyright 2016 Netflix, Inc.
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License")
......@@ -14,7 +12,10 @@
# 13-Sep-2016 Brendan Gregg Created this.
from __future__ import print_function
from os import getpid
from functools import partial
from bcc import BPF
import errno
import argparse
from time import strftime
import ctypes as ct
......@@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ examples = """examples:
./capable # trace capability checks
./capable -v # verbose: include non-audit checks
./capable -p 181 # only trace PID 181
./capable -K # add kernel stacks to trace
./capable -U # add user-space stacks to trace
"""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Trace security capability checks",
......@@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ parser.add_argument("-v", "--verbose", action="store_true",
help="include non-audit checks")
parser.add_argument("-p", "--pid",
help="trace this PID only")
parser.add_argument("-K", "--kernel-stack", action="store_true",
help="output kernel stack trace")
parser.add_argument("-U", "--user-stack", action="store_true",
help="output user stack trace")
args = parser.parse_args()
debug = 0
......@@ -80,31 +87,59 @@ capabilities = {
37: "CAP_AUDIT_READ",
}
class Enum(set):
def __getattr__(self, name):
if name in self:
return name
raise AttributeError
# Stack trace types
StackType = Enum(("Kernel", "User",))
# define BPF program
bpf_text = """
#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
struct data_t {
// switch to u32s when supported
u64 pid;
u64 uid;
u32 tgid;
u32 pid;
u32 uid;
int cap;
int audit;
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
#ifdef KERNEL_STACKS
int kernel_stack_id;
#endif
#ifdef USER_STACKS
int user_stack_id;
#endif
};
BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(events);
#if defined(USER_STACKS) || defined(KERNEL_STACKS)
BPF_STACK_TRACE(stacks, 2048);
#endif
int kprobe__cap_capable(struct pt_regs *ctx, const struct cred *cred,
struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
{
u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid();
u64 __pid_tgid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid();
u32 tgid = __pid_tgid >> 32;
u32 pid = __pid_tgid;
FILTER1
FILTER2
FILTER3
u32 uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid();
struct data_t data = {.pid = pid, .uid = uid, .cap = cap, .audit = audit};
struct data_t data = {.tgid = tgid, .pid = pid, .uid = uid, .cap = cap, .audit = audit};
#ifdef KERNEL_STACKS
data.kernel_stack_id = stacks.get_stackid(ctx, 0);
#endif
#ifdef USER_STACKS
data.user_stack_id = stacks.get_stackid(ctx, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
#endif
bpf_get_current_comm(&data.comm, sizeof(data.comm));
events.perf_submit(ctx, &data, sizeof(data));
......@@ -116,8 +151,14 @@ if args.pid:
'if (pid != %s) { return 0; }' % args.pid)
if not args.verbose:
bpf_text = bpf_text.replace('FILTER2', 'if (audit == 0) { return 0; }')
if args.kernel_stack:
bpf_text = "#define KERNEL_STACKS\n" + bpf_text
if args.user_stack:
bpf_text = "#define USER_STACKS\n" + bpf_text
bpf_text = bpf_text.replace('FILTER1', '')
bpf_text = bpf_text.replace('FILTER2', '')
bpf_text = bpf_text.replace('FILTER3',
'if (pid == %s) { return 0; }' % getpid())
if debug:
print(bpf_text)
......@@ -128,30 +169,51 @@ TASK_COMM_LEN = 16 # linux/sched.h
class Data(ct.Structure):
_fields_ = [
("pid", ct.c_ulonglong),
("uid", ct.c_ulonglong),
("tgid", ct.c_uint32),
("pid", ct.c_uint32),
("uid", ct.c_uint32),
("cap", ct.c_int),
("audit", ct.c_int),
("comm", ct.c_char * TASK_COMM_LEN)
]
("comm", ct.c_char * TASK_COMM_LEN),
] + ([("kernel_stack_id", ct.c_int)] if args.kernel_stack else []) \
+ ([("user_stack_id", ct.c_int)] if args.user_stack else [])
# header
print("%-9s %-6s %-6s %-16s %-4s %-20s %s" % (
"TIME", "UID", "PID", "COMM", "CAP", "NAME", "AUDIT"))
print("%-9s %-6s %-6s %-6s %-16s %-4s %-20s %s" % (
"TIME", "UID", "PID", "TID", "COMM", "CAP", "NAME", "AUDIT"))
def stack_id_err(stack_id):
# -EFAULT in get_stackid normally means the stack-trace is not availible,
# Such as getting kernel stack trace in userspace code
return (stack_id < 0) and (stack_id != -errno.EFAULT)
def print_stack(bpf, stack_id, stack_type, tgid):
if stack_id_err(stack_id):
print(" [Missed %s Stack]" % stack_type)
return
stack = list(bpf.get_table("stacks").walk(stack_id))
for addr in stack:
print(" ", end="")
print("%s" % (bpf.sym(addr, tgid, show_module=True, show_offset=True)))
# process event
def print_event(cpu, data, size):
def print_event(bpf, cpu, data, size):
event = ct.cast(data, ct.POINTER(Data)).contents
if event.cap in capabilities:
name = capabilities[event.cap]
else:
name = "?"
print("%-9s %-6d %-6d %-16s %-4d %-20s %d" % (strftime("%H:%M:%S"),
event.uid, event.pid, event.comm.decode('utf-8', 'replace'),
print("%-9s %-6d %-6d %-6d %-16s %-4d %-20s %d" % (strftime("%H:%M:%S"),
event.uid, event.pid, event.tgid, event.comm.decode('utf-8', 'replace'),
event.cap, name, event.audit))
if args.kernel_stack:
print_stack(bpf, event.kernel_stack_id, StackType.Kernel, -1)
if args.user_stack:
print_stack(bpf, event.user_stack_id, StackType.User, event.tgid)
# loop with callback to print_event
b["events"].open_perf_buffer(print_event)
callback = partial(print_event, b)
b["events"].open_perf_buffer(callback)
while 1:
b.perf_buffer_poll()
......@@ -44,36 +44,45 @@ checking CAP_FOWNER, CAP_FSETID, etc.
To see what each of these capabilities does, check the capabilities(7) man
page and the kernel source.
It is possible to include a kernel stack trace to the capable events by passing
-K to the command:
Sometimes capable catches itself starting up:
# ./capable.py
# ./capable.py -K
TIME UID PID COMM CAP NAME AUDIT
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21949 capable.py 21 CAP_SYS_ADMIN 1
22:22:19 0 21952 run 24 CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 1
[...]
These are capability checks from BPF and perf_events syscalls.
15:32:21 1000 10708 fetchmail 7 CAP_SETUID 1
cap_capable+0x1 [kernel]
ns_capable_common+0x7a [kernel]
__sys_setresuid+0xc8 [kernel]
do_syscall_64+0x56 [kernel]
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49 [kernel]
15:32:21 1000 30047 procmail 6 CAP_SETGID 1
cap_capable+0x1 [kernel]
ns_capable_common+0x7a [kernel]
may_setgroups+0x2f [kernel]
__x64_sys_setgroups+0x18 [kernel]
do_syscall_64+0x56 [kernel]
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49 [kernel]
Similarly, it is possible to include user-space stack with -U (or they can be
used both at the same time to include user and kernel stack).
USAGE:
# ./capable.py -h
usage: capable.py [-h] [-v] [-p PID]
usage: capable.py [-h] [-v] [-p PID] [-K] [-U]
Trace security capability checks
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-v, --verbose include non-audit checks
-p PID, --pid PID trace this PID only
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-v, --verbose include non-audit checks
-p PID, --pid PID trace this PID only
-K, --kernel-stack output kernel stack trace
-U, --user-stack output user stack trace
examples:
./capable # trace capability checks
./capable -v # verbose: include non-audit checks
./capable -p 181 # only trace PID 181
./capable -K # add kernel stacks to trace
./capable -U # add user-space stacks to trace
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